20 October 1962 Sino Indian Conflict

[bls31]

An Extract from My Book BLS

Prelude to the Battle of Namka Chu

2 Rajput that faced the brunt of the initial Chinese attack came on air for about 15 minutes to inform that they were under attack; soon there was this ominous silence. What had transpired was that the battalion’s Signal bunker was demolished by enemy fire killing all including the operators of my section manning the forward link with the battalion. Those dead included Capt Mangat also, the Battalion Signal officer, whom I had met only on the afternoon of 18th, when the Signal Officers of the battalions had been called to Brigade HQ for a coordinating Conference. He was to leave this morning for Poona this day as instructor at national defence Academy.

Mangat had written a letter to Ian Cardazo, his erstwhile roommate at IMA, that aptly describes the situation prevailing and the spirit and morale of the officers and men of 2 Rajput deployed in the RiverNamakchuValley



He wrote: ‘My dear Cardi,
It looks like it is I who will go first into battle. I am not able to tell you where I am but we are just short of the McMahon Line. The Chinese hold the high ground and seem to be in great strength. Should they attack we will defend our territory to our very last breath. It is very cold out here and we do not have snow clothing but we will give the Chinese a hot reception if they dare to attack. Will tell you all about it, IF and WHEN we meet again, I don't know where you are but I wish we were better prepared.
With regards and best wishes
Mahabir’



His room mate, Cardazo, now a retired Maj Gen, with some event triggering a desire, was inspired to write a poem about 1962 and his friend Mangat some times much later:

Prelude to the Battle of Namkachu –1962


Do not wait for me when I am gone
Duty calls and I must go
For this last battle was I born
When our great country’s friend has turned a foe
Much has happened in recent times gone by
Blinkered vision blinds our leader’s eyes
They fail to heed our army’s desperate cry
Disabled minds prefer our neighbour’s lies
To understand our Army’s basic need
Our leaders do not even seem to try
To do or die has been our basic creed
And not to question how or when or why
This brigade is tasked to face first blow
We fight with old and antiquated arms
We’re up against a far superior foe
On ground dictated by their forceful terms
This battleground in which we now are placed
Below the enemy’s dominating ground
A malignant Chinese force is what we face
With all advantage in their favour found
Wars only start when leaders fail
When armies are allowed to lose their strength
When governance permits itself to become frail
And fails to execute the role for which it’s meant
We know that we are in a desperate state
There is no way that we can save the day
Leaders far away decide our fate
Ignorant of the need for better ways
To further complicate the game
The enemy continues to call the shots
And to our everlasting shame
We have no game, no plan, no plot
Daily we see the Chinese army grow
They now have massed on Upper Thagla hill
We’re badly placed in positions down below
No mines, no guns no winter clothing still
Winter’s cold and icy hand of death
Has announced its presence in skies no longer blue\
And all we do is wait with baited breath
For death to strike across the Namkachu
When we are gone it’s only this we ask
A chance to snatch fair victory from the jaws of death
To give our sons the means so they can do their task
In defending freedom with every mortal breath


What Mangat had feared came true and when the Chinese attacked Seven Brigade on the morning of 20th October 1962, 2 Rajput did fight nearly to the last man ant to Mangat’s last breath. The battalion had faced the brunt of the Chinese attack fought valiantly as apparent from the casualties suffered. From :a strength of 513 in situ it had 282 killed wounded and captured 81, captured unwounded 90 at the end only 60 all ranks managed to get away; mostly JCO’s and Jawans.


There were two Mahabirs /Mahavirs in Namkachu; the other was Mahabir Singh of 1 Sikh, the nephew of Gen Niranjan Prasad the then GOC 4 Div. Mahabir had established the Dhola post and was on attachment with 1/9 GR, as an expert, on orders of The GOC , sadly both perished in the valley of Namkachu.

[devdahiya]

There is no doubts with me that Our troops were in no position to defend during 62 war as Chinese were too far superior and battle worthy at that point of time and that the war was forced on India.In spite of that Our jawans[all ranks] did their best to give them a fight but frankly inspite of a few heroic deeds as brought out by Laxman sir,it was a mass murder of our great soldiers.


Wars can only bring pains and sufferings and nothing else but then where ego to be powerful roost the world,it will be resorted to in some form or other and thus our defense forces need to stay focused,trained,battle worthy and updated with modern trends of warfare and in doing so the Leadership will have a lot at stake.

[trueblueindian]

my heart goes out for those who laid their live's for US ...... long live hero's of 62 ............ we are in a great debt .... thx for a freedom full life CHAPS ... we wuld'nt have een here had u all not been there on those terrains .........

[bls31]

Story of 2 Lt AJS Behl GPO at Tsangdhar

…..We saw a helicopter approaching the helipad. By that time small arm fire had also started from the black rock area and shelling was also going on. There was no sign of the helicopter taking-off again. I sent a patrol of two men to see what had happened. They came back and told me that that the helicopter was there, and two persons; one pilot and another person in a red turban were lying dead near the helicopter. Next day, when we buried them as prisoners of war (POWs) I could identify one as Sqn Ldr Sehgal and the other as Maj Ram Singh of Signals.

I saw a man crawling towards my gun position and shouting don’t kill me. He came and stood in my trench with me. He was the Battery Havildar Major (BHM) of the mortar battery deployed ahead of us and wanted to know about the latest information. I told him that we were out of communication with any body. While I was explaining the local situation he was hit by small arms fire and died there only. It was a sad end to a keen soldier. The situation had become very desperate. I ordered my two guns to fire on the only area we could see clearly, the black rock by direct firing. We fired about 10 rounds per gun. By this time it was getting to be mid-day, we saw another helicopter approaching our position but it went away while it was half way to Tsangdhar, I am sure it must have been hit by the Chinese MMG fire from ground either from the black rock area or spurs right of Tsangdhar. By this time the small arms fire from the black rock (the dominating feature on our left) had increased.

…..I felt proud of my troop everybody wanted to fight it out at the gun position.

The enemy was closing in but the ground was such that much of the direct artillery fire was not possible. We still fired about 20 rounds per gun towards black rock and beyond supply point. The melee of the battle was confusing; our personnel withdrawing, Chinese devastating shelling and small arms firing. My three LMGs were firing and we were using our personal weapons.

….I will say this with pride that at no stage did any of my jawans suggested to me that we should withdraw or tried to runaway from the fight, though three jawans had died by this time, they all obeyed me till the end. They saw a large number of all ranks running past our gun position but not even one person deserted.
(Shades of the Boy named Casabianca from he poem by Feliacia Hemans ;
Quote The boy stood on the burning deck,
Whence all but him had fled Unquote. -Author)

Our stubborn resistance came to an end by about by about 3-4 PM and it changed our position from proud soldiers to helpless prisoners. We were made to stay at Tsangdhar that night and next morning, I buried Sqn Ldr Sehgal and Maj Ram Singh with all the military respect I could manage.

I was shocked to realise that I was a prisoner of war but felt consoled in my own way that all my jawans had stood by my orders and fought to the last. Even during the period we were prisoners in Tibet, their loyalty and discipline remained above board and exemplary at position where not even one person deserted.



An Extract from My earlier book 'Letters from the Border and other Less Told Stories ' BLS

[bls31]

Some thing that I had to write; I could not take the remark addressed to My commander BLs

The Plastic Soldier

The other day while in the Noida Golf Course for an evening of socialising; now long retired, then Captains and Lieutenants during the time of the 1962 Sino Indian conflict in NEFA, the conversation somehow veered to our personal experiences of those days.

I was the Signal officer of Seven Brigade that faced the brunt of the Chinese attack, commanded by Brig JP Dalvi and I casually mentioned about my book ‘Letters from the Border’ about my experiences of the Operation Leghorn released a few years back.
Looking at me one of us queried, ‘How was Brig Dalvi?’ ‘He was a nice person.’ I spontaneously responded.

‘No,’ he insisted ‘but how was he as a Soldier?’ Even before I could respond, another present injected, ‘He was a ‘Plastic Soldier’

Having been a close witness to what had been happening to him as the commander of the ill fated brigade and his troops beginning the 8th of October and culminating in the decimating of the Brigade on the 20th October 1962, this sudden and unexpected assault took me aback,

I wondered as to what was implied by the sobriquet ‘Plastic Soldier.’ Was Dalvi ever allowed to do ‘Soldering’ and what soldering is as the brigade commander’s level? Forget about soldering, the question remains was he even allowed exercising command? Dalvi, in any case had done enough soldering in his life at the level where real soldering is done; serving with Baluch regiment during the Second World War being also mentioned in despatches for gallantry. And later having two command tenures first that of the 4th Battalion of Guards and later the 1st Guards.

If he was at all plastic it was not by character but by the constant battering from the higher commanders that made him in to a foil with no elasticity left. In their wisdom they ensured that he remained away from his HQ, staff, and communications, either on move or sitting in wilderness with his GSO 3, the intelligence officer, the rover operator, the cipher operator and the radio mechanic for company for days together. The man pack Radio Set no 62 which could be operated only when static on the Brigade Command net as his only link with the out side world. He was denied any decision making authority, the brigade was moved forward from the concentration area at Lumpu to Tsangdhar and the valley of River Namka Chu with out his knowledge. As the matter stood the command of the brigade was being exercised, even a day earlier to 20th October, from thousands of miles away from the place of operation by the Corps Commanded lying on his sick-bed in Delhi.

If this makes Dalvi ‘Plastic’, he definitely was of that genre, but that makes ever one up the chain of command ‘Plastic’ starting from the Division, the Corps the Command and right up to Army HQ.

[rkumar]

India China hostilities are bound to increase with time. High time we Indians realise this truth, else we will face another 1962 situation, Here as an article I was going through, which I thought I must share with you all;

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=695&language_id=1

Chinese have penetrated much deeper in India now through their CPM friends. Then they are getting stronger in Nepal through maoists. India is almost getting encircled by Chinese once again and Indians are sleeping. Time to wake up my friends...

RK^2

[dndeswal]

Chinese have penetrated much deeper in India now through their CPM friends. Then they are getting stronger in Nepal through maoists. India is almost getting encircled by Chinese once again and Indians are sleeping. Time to wake up my friends...

RK^2

Not only that, China is sitting on our eastern borders - in Burma (Myanmar) and very near to Andaman & Nicobar. On the West, it has made friendly ties with Pakistan and helping it in anti-India activities. China has also helped Pakistan to develop the naval port of Gwadar in Arabian Sea, a potential threat to India. China is using the port of Karachi for some of its imports and then transporting the goods by road, through famous silk route, passing through Pak-occupied Kashmir. The enemies are getting stronger.
.

[yudhvirmor]

Not only that, stronger.
.

Off topic. However, I want to ask one thing. We have 3rd Largest army and we have hostile neighbouerers. Does that make sense to involve in Burma and try to show to the world that we support democracy.

I think this move will provide safegaurds from china in North East. I think its time to move ahead.

[chhillar]

It was India who attacked China and breached the peace, it was more of stupidity to have attacked them at a time when India should have focused on other better things, nor did they possess (ha ha ....not even today) what it takes to defeat the Chinese army. Anyways, the information now is public by Govt. Of India too as to who attacked who. Please check it out achieves on internet for facts.

Please take it easy Fouji Bhaiyo.

With Regards,

Amit

[rkumar]

Off topic. However, I want to ask one thing. We have 3rd Largest army and we have hostile neighbouerers. Does that make sense to involve in Burma and try to show to the world that we support democracy.

I think this move will provide safegaurds from china in North East. I think its time to move ahead.

I would agree to you. Time has come when we have to act decisively against chinese game plan. China is our enemy number one and better we teat them so. I think India sending army in Mynamar will do a great deal of good for our international image. Action has to be swift and decisive.

RK^2

[rkumar]

It was India who attacked China and breached the peace, it was more of stupidity to have attacked them at a time when India should have focused on other better things, nor did they possess (ha ha ....not even today) what it takes to defeat the Chinese army. Anyways, the information now is public by Govt. Of India too as to who attacked who. Please check it out achieves on internet for facts.

Please take it easy Fouji Bhaiyo.

With Regards,

Amit

Hi Amit,

Can you please let me have the links to this information.

Thanks
Rajendra

[chhillar]

Daac Saab Ram Ram!

I don't agree with spreading violence on the pretext of stopping it. Why would you to send down our kids to kill (OK at least say....keep peace) theirs for no reason and then you spend lacs on their funeral back home...why...why all this?

A

[yudhvirmor]

It
Amit

Chillar sir, Even i am not in a favour of direct confortation with China.
They have direct and strong involvment with Pakistan.. So Western borders are not safe.
North-East is China herself.
They are building army bases in Indian ocean. So, we have to act first and act fast for our safeguards.
We can't follow the model of Japan to be a puppet of America.

[rkumar]

Daac Saab Ram Ram!

I don't agree with spreading violence on the pretext of stopping it. Why would you to send down our kids to kill (OK at least say....keep peace) theirs for no reason and then you spend lacs on their funeral back home...why...why all this?

A

In that case we wait till Chinese and their maoist and CPM agents surround our homes and towns. They are doing it. Peace is a very expensive commodity and nation has to pay for it. India did not invite British. Stupid Mughals looked otherway to their activities and we all know what happened. We lost or respect and lives both.

RK^2

[bls31]

Who Attacked Whom

Extract from my Book Letters From the Border: BLS

SEALING THE LIE


The fact is that on the 19th evening India had no plan to attack across the river Namak Chu, If there was any plan, it was that of the Chinese, following the plan the Chinese told the world that
‘At 7 O’ Clock (Peking time) in the morning of 20thOctober the aggressive Indian forces, under cover of fierce artillery fire launched massive attacks against the Chinese Frontier Guards’

The Times of India dated 28 May 1998 had published a letter from me to editor titled ‘Sealing a Lie ‘ which highlighted the above fact. Quote, I was the signal officer of the late Brigadier J P Dalvi’s ill-fated 7 Brigade deployed in Namka Chu Valley in NEFA, and which faced the brunt of the massive Chinese attack in 1962.The then Lt Col K K Tewari, CO 4th Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, came to visit me in the Bde HQ on October 18,1962. He, among other things, asked me to work out the leave plans of my section. He was captured by the Chinese on the morning of October 20,1962,in the forward infantry battalion location which he was visiting.

The point to note is that formations that are planning attack do not plan leave for its personnel. The Commander Signals of the division also remains with the divisional HQ to control and execute the overall communication plan and does no go and stay with the forward most infantry battalion on the eve of the attack.
This should seal the Chinese lie-if it has not been sealed yet-that India attacked the Chinese Frontier Guards on October 20,1962.
Brig Lakshman Singh, New Delhi, -Unquote.

[bls31]

18th October 1962

The thinking of Young officers from the story of Young Kahlon( Now retired as Lt General) as recorded in my book "letters from the Border" BLS



Kahlon reached the Battalion HQ at Bridge I on Namka Chu in company of a link patrol on the evening of 16 October 1962. As generally happens in the Army so often, having just returned from the D&M course was appointed the IO (Intelligence Office) of the Battalion.


Gen Kahlon continued the narration: The whole battalion was huddled behind boulders in a small area, I wonder if any one was beyond 200 yards. We were at the lowest point of the valley with hand built 'Sangars' as our only protection from the enemy and the elements. Thagla rose Phoenix like, steep and tall just across the river. Was it the PM's instructions that ''Indian Army should occupy the forward most inch of Indian soil'' that had forced the commanders to sit in such a hopeless defensive posture or what. No ArmySchool talked about such defensive position. What then forced us in such a self-defeating position? With hindsight no one from political hierarchy to commanders on the ground took the Chinese that seriously. Hindi Cheeni Bhai Bhai was too seriously imbedded in our psyche. (Years later our PM's Lahore Yatra had similarly contributed to the Kargil fiasco)

The only support weapons of battalion 3'' Mortars were almost non-existent. Though our boys had carried four tubes all the way, we had no bombs. One Arty OP party had come in possibly the same morning. However with half the 17 Para field guns dropped to support the Brigade having been lost during the para drop there was no Artillery support available. So far as the communication was concerned, one telephone line ran along the river (Nullah) as an omnibus circuit when the phone ran it took us good 5 minutes to sort out who was calling whom. (Possibly he was referring to the lateral line to 9 Punjab. Many unconventional things were happening the Punjabis and the Grenadiers had 'Teed' in to the line running from the Brigade exchange to the Div TAC HQ in a clandestine manner. A fact that came to light only on the 20th October, when the Chinese launched their attack). Oblivious of all these snags I was happy to be home with the Paltan and spent the my day in going from Sanghar to Sanghar meeting officers and men and running errands for Maj Oscar Thomas, our Adjutant.

Bridge I was closest to the HatunglaPass over which crossed the old trade track. Next to us on the left were the Punjabis.

Lunch in the Brigade HQ

The very next day that is on the 18th I was summoned, along the IO's of the other Battalions by the Brigade Major.
'Come for a conference at the HQ, tomorrow morning at
10 O' clock. You guys are talking about so much Chinese movement opposite you. Let us take stock.' I called 2 Lt Naveen Kohli, a course junior to me, and the IO of the Punjabi .to guide me since I was new. We agreed to walk up together to the
Brigade HQ,
Naveen told me that he was not from an affluent family. Since his commissioning he was struck here in NEFA and had seen no life though he had ended up saving some money.''On 10th October during the Tseng Jong operations undertaken by the battalion I saw six foot tall Khalsas drop like bananas with a bullet through them realised how fragile a man is"
Two youngsters in early twenties discussing life!
As Naveen continued, he became philosophical,
' Now I believe that one should live life for the day one is alive, who knows if there is going to be a tomorrow. I am expecting to proceed on casual leave, this time I have decided to paint Delhi red. Little did he know that the sands of his life were running fast with just a couple of day's worth of particles left in the glass to flow down.

Sadly, his small wish to paint Delhi remained unfulfilled.
2 Lt Naveen died during the withdrawal on the 21 of October and was awarded VrC posthumously.

[bls31]

An extract from Kahlon's story from the book
BLS

One Death and the Bottle of Rum

Night over took us and brought with it additional chill and cold that a night of late October coupled with an altitude of 15-16,000 feet altitude can manifest. To top it, there was soon sleet and fresh snow and this was clearly the coldest night that we had spent in the open.
That night two things happened that will always live with me. One Ganpat died, he froze stiff, sitting in the snow, as he was. Before his death he cried and howled like an animal unknowingly, the rest of us yelling at him to keep quiet lest the Chinese pick up our trail. Rajamani Rai was 'B " Company barber and having 'managed' his enrollment, was much older, nearly 50 years of age. He had against all advice to accompany the Paltan to NEFA rather than take the easy way out and get posted to Centre.

The second was a coincidence when I ran into Hav Chhetri of 1/9 GR who only two months ago had taught me at the Army School of Mechanical Transport. Faizabad. He had been recalled to the unit to take his promotion test and destiny had made him cross my path. He was sitting in the snow, having recognised me he wished me. Surprised to see him in our midst I offered that he share my blanket as he had none. Huddled under the blanket, Chhatri some time later asked me if I would have rum. Imagine my surprise, he was prepared to share what could be life saving under the circumstances there were no barriers. The Saihab and the Jawan spent the night under the saihabs blanket taking swigs from the bottle produced by the Jawan.Both survived the ordeal.

For the next couple of days we were totally lost and kept wandering aimlessly. Oscar assumed the leadership of he group, as it was too much for Maj Balbir the senior most officer. I remember Oscar was enthused, as he had not seen his newborn daughter born after three sons. He kept mumbling to himself that he had to get out and see the child and thus ended up leading us all and those who survived to safety.

Courtesy All India Radio and a transistor radio which Capt Chander Nagarani had been presented by his brother, who was in the Navy, we were kept informed of the Chinese progress. The Chinese were by this time in Tawang using the old Bumla -Tawang. trade route.

[ravichaudhary]

A good writeup, about an excellent topic.

Properly this should be in the History section.

There are many many questions, about this subject, and this will raise much passion I am sure.

I read a book recently, " THE UNFORGOTTEN WAR" by Col. Saighal.

It is out of print now,

I will post full details later.

Col. Saighal was a Signals officer,or ASC If I recall corectly.

His version is markedly different from the official version, we were fed.

For one, he does bring out some points- how was it that the chinese, without any heavy arms, facing a powerful Indian army , who were in mountain country, in strong defensive positions, routed the Indians.

The strong defensive positions, e.g Se la
( the Se Pass), were adequately supplied. and should have been a veritable thorn in the side of the Chinese, who could only bypass it
on foot, with light arms.


The Indian Army had tanks,.

There was a panic and a rout.

One of my uncles, Col R S Sirohi( now retired) of 5th Dogra, also survived this ardous and dangerous trek out.

In Hindsight, there is always 20/20 vision and I must be diffident in raising these topics .

This is not questioning the bravery of the Individual soldier, and the junior officers, which needs no defence.

Mine, as some know, is a historical interest, and I do like going deep into a historical subject .

If Brigadier Singh,( who would have been a junior officer then) is able to shed some more historical detail, this would be much appreciated.

Best regards


Ravi Chaudhary

[bls31]

Sehgal was a Gunner . I cant say much about Sela debacle . I was the Signal officer of Seven Brigade on the tri junction of Bhutan Tibet and India , the are from my earlier book Letters from the Border and other Less Told stories. BLS

[captkalkal]

Chillar Bhai,

Some correction to what you said.

It was not the 'stupidity' of our soldiers; yes if there was some stupidity from any side it was from Mr Nehru (who was not aware of what's happening) and Menon, the defence minister. That was rather immaterial as the Chinese in any case were not sitting on the LC for singing 'bhajans'

You'll be surprised to know that the orders to 'evacuate Chinese' came from a defense secretary as both PM & RM were out of country at that point of time. It is high time we give what is due to our Army; till date it has never raised any question on the decision given by the govt. Otherwise there would have been no difference between India & Pakistan.

Brig Lakshman can correct me if factually something is wrong.




It was India who attacked China and breached the peace, it was more of stupidity to have attacked them at a time when India should have focused on other better things, nor did they possess (ha ha ....not even today) what it takes to defeat the Chinese army. Anyways, the information now is public by Govt. Of India too as to who attacked who. Please check it out achieves on internet for facts.

Please take it easy Fouji Bhaiyo.

With Regards,

Amit

[bls31]

Another extract from my book BLS



The Saturday Syndrome


It would be interesting to recall as to who was where on 8 September as information about the Chinese surrounding the Dhola post moved up the chain of command.

When the message was received in the Brigade HQ, both the BM and the DQ, along with the rest of brigade staff were guests at a Bara Khana in one of the battalions. The Brigade Duty Officer and I the Signal officer had gone for a post lunch walk. The Commander was at Tezpur en-route to Meerut, his leave station.

The Divisional Commander Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad was at Thakurbari Planters Club, enjoying a cinema show. Lt Col Manohar Singh the GSO I was away on a course. Other Officers at Corps and Command, I presume must also have been involved in recreational activities like others on a typical Saturday.

Lt Gen BM Kaul, the Chief of General Staff was on annual leave in Kashmir. DMO Brig Palit was preparing to go on a naval cruise the next morning with Members of Parliament. COAS General Thapar was unreachable, as he was entertaining guests at a dinner.

The Prime Minister Pandit Nehru was out of the country attending the commonwealth ministers conference in London with Morarji Desai his finance minister. The Defence minister Krishna Menon was preoccupied with his forthcoming visit to the UN It was an intelligence coup of the first order by the Chinese who seemed to know the habits of Indians in position not to take decisions on a Saturday.

Again it was a Saturday on the 20th of October when the Chinese attacked us across River Namka Chu. However, this time at least we- those of the Seven Brigade were not in a Saturday mood, albeit equally unprepared.

[ravichaudhary]

Dear Brigadierji

Could you please post details of book availability, price, publisher, book seller?

I would like very much like to have a copy.

In fact, I would be happy to send you the money, if you could post me a copy


Ravi Chaudhary

[bls31]

If you could give me your E mail I will ask n my distributor to post you a copy. possibly a few are still left. BLs

my e mail lakshman31@gmail.com

[raj2rif]

Dear Members,


It is an interesting topic and more so to a soldier. There are two issues here. One is historical perspective, which has been adequately elaborated by Birg Laxman Singh. The second one is the current and future perspective which probably would be more pertinent in todays context.


While it would be of great interest to Ravi who is known for his passion for historty to know the historical perspective, it would be of equally imprtance to the future generations to know the current and futuristic view.


History is very important for it lays down the path for future. While defeat may be bitter, it is defeat that probably teaches us more lessons than the victory. What went wrong?


I can keep writing on this subject. But to put the things in simplest form, I would say only one thing. We need "TIGERS" to commnad us and not the "COWS" to command us. It is the duty of a soldier to obey the order given by his seniors, but a good soldier should question that order atleast once to inform the senior that it probably is not the best order. How many of our distinguished military leaders did that in 1962? Probably a good question to discuss.


While Mr. Nehru might have said to occupy the forward most inch of ground of the Nation, a good military commander needs to analyze the order and implement it to get the desired result. If physical occupation of the forward most piece of ground results in a tactical disadvantage, then the good officer must occupy a tactically strong position that can defend the forward most inch of the ground. That is the true implementation of the order.

The point here is that I am neither Nehru's fan nor I am a diehard cirtique. What I want to bring out here is that the tactics is some thing that a soldier is trained for and while Political leadership may be supreem it is the soldier who needs to educate the political leaders about the tactical situation. If there is a confrontation that results at this time, then a true soldier must resign his position rather than becoming party to the loss of thousands of lives of the soldiers who trusted him. Probably that did not happen, it probably may not happen in most cases as many in higher ranks in past, currently as well as in future will look for green pastures after retirement.


We can keep blaming the politicians, but, the commanders at ground probably have to share equal responsibility for the disaster for it was their duty also to put their foot down. We as a soldier have our loyalty to the nation, then to the soliders we command. Our own personal interests come last always and every time. That is the oath an Indian Army Officer takes when he takes the last step at Chetwood Building at IMA. By obeying a tactically and strategically wrong political order, a commander has failed in his duty. To me it is betrayal of faith of thousands of soldiers whom we command and who give their life on our orders. I personally feel that as an officer our responsibility is much beyond following the orders. We do need to analyze them and weigh them rationally in a strategic and tactical scenario that is practical.


Time permitting I shall continue. It had happened to me during my service and I am very proud till date that God gave me enough strength to take such steps. The good thing is that the senior officers not only listened to me, but also appreciated when such views were expressed. More often than not it is our own weakness that prevents us from speaking the truth. To achieve that one needs to be professionally competent and that not only requires burning of midnight oil, but also a keen eye on your profession.

[raj2rif]

It was India who attacked China and breached the peace, it was more of stupidity to have attacked them at a time when India should have focused on other better things, nor did they possess (ha ha ....not even today) what it takes to defeat the Chinese army. Anyways, the information now is public by Govt. Of India too as to who attacked who. Please check it out achieves on internet for facts.

Please take it easy Fouji Bhaiyo.

With Regards,

Amit

Dear Amit Ji,


I really don't know from where your facts are coming from or that matter what you mean to say about violence and other thing you have mentioned in your other post on this subject.

The issue are here different.


45 years have passed since 1962. There will always be different versions of the account from different people. That is why you call a phrase " The war as I saw it"? There will always be different perceptions. The one of Intelligence Officer of an Infantry Bn would be different than of a Commanding Officer of the Bn. Similary it will be different of a Signal Officer and Arty OP than a Infantry Company Commander or a Tank Regiment's Squadren Commander.

The problem here is that many sitting thousands of miles away in cozy room in a metro, make most authentic version and some times challenge the soldier's version.


It really does not matter, as to who attacked whom? The fact of the matter is that our senior leadership both Political as well as military failed us. As Field Martial Sir, William Slim has said in his famous book "Defeat into Victory", that "Defeat is bitter, but terribly bitter for a commander. A soldier can comfort himself with the thought of doing his duty with best of his ability in a war, no matter on which side he lands up. But for commander if he has been defeated, than he has not done his duty. It is so true.


Some times when I read different versions, a famous quote comes to my mind:


"the trouble with the world is that Stupids are cocksure and intelligents are full of doubt".

[anrtish]

It really does not matter, as to who attacked whom? The fact of the matter is that our senior leadership both Political as well as military failed us. As Field Martial Sir, William Slim has said in his famous book "Defeat into Victory", that "Defeat is bitter, but terribly bitter for a commander. A soldier can comfort himself with the thought of doing his duty with best of his ability in a war, no matter on which side he lands up. But for commander if he has been defeated, than he has not done his duty. It is so true.


Some times when I read different versions, a famous quote comes to my mind:


"the trouble with the world is that Stupids are cocksure and intelligents are full of doubt".

so nicely written, Sir

[anrtish]

One road is there in delhi after brigadier Hoshiar Singh who died in this war.

[bls31]

Speaking of History and its importance an extract from the prologue of the book BLS



There is a very scanty coverage of Signals in the so far recorded history and other accounts of the Sino-Indian conflict. Even the Corps of Signals History dismisses the whole operation in half a paragraph.

Maj Gen KK Tewari the then CO of 4 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, in his book ‘A Soldier’s Voyage of Self Discovery’ has been more than modest about the achievements of his Regiment. Possibly because the theme of his book is more on the spiritual aspects of his experience, of-course he has been more than kind to me and the men of 7 Infantry Brigade Signal Section.

A well-recorded history inspires and motivates the later generations. The sacrifice of officers and men deserves to be remembered, as otherwise their effort would have been in vain.

[itsnavin]

Here is the govt. version of Sino-India conflict in 1962:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/index.html

It's a study done by experts from Min. of Defence. I don't know how authentic it is but worth reading if you want to know what really happened. I did read some of its important chapters 3-4 years back.

Happy reading!

[raj2rif]

Here is the govt. version of Sino-India conflict in 1962:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/index.html

It's a study done by experts from Min. of Defence. I don't know how authentic it is but worth reading if you want to know what really happened. I did read some of its important chapters 3-4 years back.

Happy reading!

Dear Navin,

Thanks a lot for posting it.

Virendra

[raj2rif]

One road is there in delhi after brigadier Hoshiar Singh who died in this war.

Dear Members,

There are two Brig Hoshiyar Singh who became the National Hero, one in 1962 and another in 1971

I was in First Grade when 1962 war took place. I remember Brig Hoshiyar Singh, MVC since then. As luck could have it, I was commissioned in the same battalion as Late Brig Hoshiyar Singh, MVC. Brig Hoshiyar Singh Commanded 2 Raj Rif twice. There was a very famous photo of his that was published in news papers during 1962. I am very proud to share the same rouge's gallary in the Battalion.

Another Brig Hoshiyar Singh is from Granadiers. He won the PVC in 1971. I missed him in IMA. When I joined IMA, he was just posted out from there. We heard so many stories about him at IMA. He was also an outstanding Volleyball players. I don't know where he has settled down, but if he is reading this website, we would request him to contribute his experiences of 1971.

[bls31]

I had a cursory look at the official history, the facts appear to be correct but the deductions questionable. Dalvi , the brigade commander has his both hands tied, it stands to reason no commander if given half a chance would like to deploy his troops while being dominated by the enemy on high ground ,in so far as defensive deployment the troops had no digging tools, no barbed wire and no mines, there was no artillery support and the close air support was conspicuous with its absence even though we had FOOs, GLOs and ground to air communication sets.

About the Sela debacle i lost my friend Capt Mann the Signal officer to Brigadier Hoshiyar Singh. Fortunately , another friend Ratan Singh his G3 survived BLS

[ravichaudhary]

Brigadier Sahib

my email is

Ravichaudhary2000@yahoo.com

I will,l send you a personal e mail

Could I invite you to join our little History group, URL below

Ravi Chaudhary

[ravichaudhary]

Sometimes things go wrong, terribly wrong.

In a nutshell that is my view of the 1962 disaster on the war with the Chinese. Things just went terribly wrong.

They were not done with intent, and the officers who led our troops, were not incompetent. They had had successful careers. Many were decorated soldiers.

Things just went wrong.Tragically so.

Sometimes this happens!

I cannot help but review, some thoughts, that creep up now and then.

When the 1962 events occurred, I was in school, all of 15.

The events were even then to me a shock, each day we would read, how our troops were withdrawing to “prepared positions.” Names like ‘Se la’, Bomdila’ became part of our vocabulary. I sometimes wondered why they called it the Sela pass, when ‘la’ meant a pass.

We had news of wave attacks by an indefatigable Chinese army, whose soldiers appeared to be like supermen. Waves that simply could not be faced, and these supermen would throw away their lives until our troops ran out or ammunition.

There was news of Tezpur in Assam being evacuated, with the civil servants fleeing to safer cities. It appeared the Chinese juggernaut would never stop.

All of a sudden it ended- the Chinese withdrew.

One my school friends, Michael Dalvi’s father Then Brigadier Dalvi, was reported captured, and for all of us it came a very personal issue.

Time passed, and for a school boy, other priorities continued,- the war then drifted into the background.

We heard of how the Indian army was outgunned. Our troops had no supplies, no ammunition, and worse they were in their plains uniforms made of cotton, having been rushed up to defend our motherland.

Reports were being written, the name Henderson Brookes, came into the fore, but no report ever came.

Some of my family who had survived the debacle, told us accounts of the difficult time they had trying to escape to safety. I was just glad they had survived.

My education continued, and in 1965 I was in 2nd year university in St. Stephens, Delhi, and 1965 came. The 1965 war with Pakistan put 1962 into the shadow, and the performance of our armed foes, made the memories of that disaster, fade away.

Later came 1971, a success story. The ghosts of 1962 had been laid to rest.

The Indian armed forces following 1962, reorganized, new weapons introduced. In the north, a new arm, Mountain Divisions were created.

Not many may know this, but there had been many Chinese incursion, attempts in the north, and they were soundly beaten back- 1967, 1984.

Our armed forces, the shield of our nation, had reorganized themselves and were once more a force to be reckoned with.

In a nutshell that is my bird’s eye view, looking back over the last four decades.

Today,almost 50 years later, as a nation, I think we have the confidence, we can look into these past events, and bring matters into the open.

[bls31]

I will ask my distributors Knowledge world to get in contact you for the book
Knowledge World 5A/12 Ansari Road New Delhi 2
Jagat@del2.vsnl.net.in

Regards Brig lakshman BLS

[bls31]

I am more of technical staff officer with a MSc and five years with DRDo and thirty years with the corps of signal. also as a fellow of IETE and Council member responsible for the E learning. if interested you may like to visit he Portal developed under my guidance iete-elan.ac.in

It would be be a privilege to join your history group but I am much of a historian I have written my personal account in both the books.

Yes Sela was a shame and I felt ashamed on 21 st Non of 1962. Though Seven Brigade was trounced right and proper n I never felt ashamed of my self and the troops that too part in the OP Leghorn.

Let me once again post 'The Plastic Soldier'

The Plastic Soldier

The other day while in the Noida Golf Course for an evening of socialising; now long retired, then Captains and Lieutenants all veterans of the 1962 Sino Indian conflict in NEFA, the conversation somehow veered to our personal experiences of those days.
I was the Signal officer of Seven Brigade that faced the brunt of the Chinese attack, commanded by Brig JP Dalvi and I casually mentioned about my book, ‘Letters from the Border’, about my experiences of the Operation Leghorn as the Seven Brigade operation was named .
Looking at me one of us queried, ‘How was Brig Dalvi?’ ‘He was a nice person.’ I spontaneously responded.
‘No,’ he insisted ‘but how was he as a Soldier?’ Even before I could respond, another present injected, ‘He was a ‘Plastic Soldier.’
Having been a close witness to what had been happening to him as the commander of the ill fated brigade and his troops beginning the 8th of October and culminating in the decimating of the Brigade on the 20th October 1962, this sudden and unexpected assault took me aback, I wondered as to what was implied by the sobriquet ‘Plastic Soldier.’ Was Dalvi ever allowed to do ‘Soldering’ and what soldering is as the brigade commander’s level? Forget about soldering, the question remains was he even allowed exercising command? Dalvi, in any case had done enough soldering in his life at the level where real soldering is done; serving with Baluch regiment during the Second World War being also mentioned in despatches for gallantry. And later having two command tenures first that of the 4th Battalion of Guards and later the 1st Guards.
If he was at all plastic it was not by character but by the constant battering from the higher commanders that made him in to a thin foil with no elasticity left. In their wisdom, the higher-ups ensured that Dalvi remained divorced from his HQ, staff and communications. He was either on move or sitting in wilderness with his GSO 3, the intelligence officer, the rover radio-set operator, the cipher operator and the radio mechanic for company for days together. The man pack Radio Set no 62 which could be operated only when static on the Brigade Command net was his sole link with the out side world. He was denied any decision making authority, even the brigade was moved forward from the concentration area at Lumpu to Tsangdhar and the valley of River Namka Chu with out his knowledge by the new Corps Commander
As the matter stood the command of the brigade was being exercised, even a day earlier to 20th October, from thousands of miles away from the place of operation by the Corps Commanded lying on his sick-bed in Delhi. This view is reinforced by what Capt HS Talwar, the trop commander of 17 Para Field, who had drifted that evening in the brigade HQ had to say: ‘That night (19 October) I had a meal in the Brigade Mess bunker in the company of six to seven officers. The gathering included the Commander Brig Dalvi, the Brigade Major Rex Kharbanda, the DAA & QMG Pereira the IO Capt Tushar Gupta, the Signals officer Capt Lakshman and the OC Mortar Battery Maj Balraj Nijjer. In the midst of this setting, the shrill ring of the Telephone Type J, interrupted the proceedings to indicate that the GOC, Niranjan Prasad, wanted to speak to he Brigade Commander Dalvi. The GOC wanted another company strength or so to be moved to Tsangle, besides the platoon of 1/9 GR which was already on the way. Dalvi was seemingly not prepared to accept this order on grounds that Tsangle out-post had no Tactical significance and was an additional drain on the stretched administrative resources of the Brigade. Some hot words were exchanged and in exasperation Dalvi offered to resign from the command of 7 Brigade. I was a complete outsider and witnessed the whole drama with a degree of detachment.
If this makes Dalvi ‘Plastic’, he definitely was of that genre, but that makes ever one up the chain of command ‘Plastic’ starting from the Division, the Corps the Command and right up to Army HQ.

Brig Lakshman Singh VSM (Retired)
P 539 sector 21 Noida

Lakshman31@gmail.com

[ravichaudhary]

Contrast, the actions of a commander like Sundarji those of the 1962 top brass.

Contrast the actions of rajiv Gandhi with those of his father J . Nehru

Decisive leadership has no substitute

Ravi



http://www.geocities.com/siafdu/sundarji.html


Sundarji's place in history will probably rest on the lesser-known "Operation Falcon".


Spooked by the Chinese occupation of Sumdorong Chu in 1986, Sundarji used the air force's new air-lift capability to land a brigade in Zimithang, north of Tawang. Indian forces took up positions on the Hathung La ridge, across the Namka Chu river, the site of India's humiliating 1962 defeat and manned defences across the McMahon Line. Taken aback, the Chinese responded with a counter-build-up and in early 1987 Beijing's tone became ominously similar to that of 1962. Western diplomats predicted war and prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's advisers charged that Sundarji's recklessness was responsible for this. But the general stood firm, at one point telling a senior Rajiv aide, "Please make alternate arrangements if you think you are not getting adequate professional advice." The civilians backed off, so did the Chinese.

[ravichaudhary]

[
If this makes Dalvi ‘Plastic’, he definitely was of that genre, but that makes ever one up the chain of command ‘Plastic’ starting from the Division, the Corps the Command and right up to Army HQ.

Brig Lakshman Singh VSM (Retired)

He was not plastic. Just put into an impossible situation.

His superior Niranjan Prasad, performed badly then and badly in 1965.

One supsects, that the Indian Army generals of the time, the Intelligence, the bureucrats, either agreed with the political leaders ( Nehru, Menon etc) policies, or did not have the nerve and courage to stand upto them.

Ravi Chaudhary

[bls31]

Niranjan Prasad lives in NODA,He had no authority during the whole of OP Leghorn, It was Kaul who had browbeaten every one from the poor major, the BM of the 7 Brigade, moved the brigade in to the valley of death with out the knowledge of The Commander. Kaul was also responsible for the Death of Maj Choudhry and other brave solders of 9 Punjab for the failed operation against the Chinese on 10th October. Yes Prasad could have resigned, a difficult proposition for a solder Bls

[ravichaudhary]

On Gen. Niranjan Prasad, let me correct myself.

I do not wish to judge him.

The public perception, was that he did not perform well in both actions.

He was blamed for not continuing beyond Ichogil. OTH, if his instructions were not to continue, then he would be correctly be just following his instructions.

Ditto for 1962, everyone was confused, as direction from the top was severely lacking.

Sometimes this is just bad luck.


Ravi

[bls31]

I was too young and too junior at that time to pas any judgment on any one . Even though I wrote Letters from Border as a brigadier it is from the point of view of a Captain, without taking the benefit of hindsight.I quote from the preface BLS

I have endeavoured to narrate the factual accounts of the events along with my personal feelings and impressions culled from the sketchy diary,

now in tatters after forty years, that I had kept to fill my lonely hours at Towang away from my young wife.

…….


I do confess that my reflections are that of a young Captain, fleeting in nature. I saw little, understood less and heard only bits and pieces of conversation between the commanders and staff. This in a way was a blessing in disguise; it left me unawares of the dangers to life and limb. Ignorance and lack of experience of war can be of advantage at times, leaving one free to concentrate on the task in hand.


Being the Signals officer of the brigade did help me in the perception of the events as they unfolded rapidly and had become totally distorted due to the unreal atmosphere prevailing. It was a make believe war till 20thOctober, when suddenly it became real with a devastating suddenness and catastrophic effect.

Notwithstanding this, I still saw, heard and understood more than any other officer of my rank at that time. Being the Sparrow (Code for Signal officer) of the Brigade, all messages passed under my eyes. ….in addition my proximity to the Commander and Staff and the constant stream of visitors to Towang also helped.

[raj2rif]

Niranjan Prasad lives in NODA,He had no authority during the whole of OP Leghorn, It was Kaul who had browbeaten every one from the poor major, the BM of the 7 Brigade, moved the brigade in to the valley of death with out the knowledge of The Commander. Kaul was also responsible for the Death of Maj Choudhry and other brave solders of 9 Punjab for the failed operation against the Chinese on 10th October. Yes Prasad could have resigned, a difficult proposition for a solder Bls

Dear Sir,

While it is interesting to know the perception of a young Signal Officer, we are analyzing the actions that took place and lessons one can learn from them.

1. I don't agree with the statement that "Niranjan Prasad had no authority during the whole OP Leghorn". If GOC does not have the authority, then I wonder who would? I have seen a spineless GOC during my own career and I did give him a food for thought as a Brigage Major, that I shall talk a little later. Guess what, he could not harm me.

2. While Gen Kaul would have done what he did, it was the responsibility of the GOC to protect his men. If he did not do that for whatever reasons, he was not competent enough to be there in first place.

3. The irony is that we had him again 3 years later to repeat his incompetence if I may say so.

[spdeshwal]

Col Sahib

I would like to share with you all that Colonel Hoshiar Singh Dahia PVC was never promoted to the rank of a Brigadier( could be on fitness grounds) but retired as a colonel and probably had settled in jaipur. He died in 1998 and was cremated in the school grounds of his native village Sisana. You are right, he was a good volleyball player and had represented Punjab University. Legendary Volleyball player Mehar Singh was his younger brother. In fact Village Sisana has given many International volleyball players including Mahabir singh who had captained Indian Team.

Please follow the link:

www.tribuneindia.com/1998/98dec09/chd.htm


with regards

sateypal

[bls31]

what to say of the GOC even the Corps Commender 33 Corps Lt Gen Umrao Sing was sacked for insisting that the task given to the brigade to throw out the Chinese was beyond its current capabilities. That is why Kaul was appointed. Yes the GOC 4 Div could have resigned,but how does one feel about resigning while in field ,possibly only those who have faced such situations can better say. BLS

[ravichaudhary]

If one may explore this :

Much of the information we have is quite general-

The brigade was given an impossible task.

There was no direction from the high command. There was no logistical backup.

The brigade was then abandoned, and 3000 lives sacrificed..
.
The battle of Namka Chu took place on 20th October 1962. The battle was over the same day.

There is no question of the bravery of our troops, who performed well, under fire.

There does not appear to any detailed account of the battle, that I can find.

If Gen. Lakshman Singh is willing, one would like to have a detailed account of the battle, seen through his eyes, and he was at the epicentre.- the eye of the storm.

Chronology, The build up, March to the Valley, Siting of HQ, etc etc switch from Offensive to Defensive action, Defence preparations, withdrawal, etc


Ravi Chaudhary

[bls31]

As and when you receive m book from the distributor possibly some of the questions raised by you will be answered. i suggest you read Himalayan Blunder by Brig Dalvi the commander of the brigade.Possibly the two books ,one by a capt and the other by a brig, read together may complete the picture bLS

[anrtish]

my best regards to u.

[bls31]

[quote=raj2rif;152742]Dear Amit Ji,


45 years have passed since 1962. There will always be different versions of the account from different people. That is why you call a phrase " The war as I saw it"? There will always be different perceptions. The one of Intelligence Officer of an Infantry Bn would be different than of a Commanding Officer of the Bn. Similary it will be different of a Signal Officer and Arty OP than a Infantry Company Commander or a Tank Regiment's Squadren Commander.

This is from the perspective of a Jawan of 2 Rajput BLS

The scene now shifts to the 20th Morning when the Chinese launched a massive attack on the 7 Inf Brigade.

Bhairon Singh continues, I was part of a three men patrol which had gone out on the night of 19th and we had returned to our company location say at about 3 AM, we had made tea and were resting, it was still dark when the Chinese firing started.

The company was deployed with the number one platoon well forward, right on the river line, number two on the left. The no three platoon alongwith the Company HQ was right at the back. Lt Ravi Sahib, who had taken over the command from Mangat Sahib at the time of the company taking defensive position and Subedar Phool Singh the Company JCO were in the company HQ.

Heavy firing continued, after about one hour Ravi Sahib came down to the number one platoon location. We were deployed right on the river line with the Chinese on the other side, so near to us that a strong man likes me could easily lob a grenade at them. We were still in bunkers and there were not many casualties as yet. ‘Fire the moment you see the enemy, don’t fire at random’. Ravi Sahib told the jawans.

At about 8 AM, I was called by Ravi Sahib. He ordered me to go to Bn HQ and bring verbal orders from the CO. The company was now cut-off from the Bn HQ and none of the communication links were working. The telephone line to the Battalion HQ had been cut earlier by the Chinese, the Radio was also not through (The Signals bunker at the Bn HQ had already been destroyed due to Chinese fire) He also sent a young boy, Govind Singh to accompany me. Even before we could get out of the company-defended locality, a mortar bomb landed directly on Govind Singh killing him on the spot. Now I was left alone and was on my own.

On reaching the Bn HQ what do I see : After all the men of his protection platoon had been killed Rikh Sahib had carried three LMG’s in side his bunker along with all the ammunition. Keeping his pistol aside he would, fill, load and fire the LMG’s him-self. He should have been awarded the PVC; there is no justice in this world. If some one will ask me I will tell him all about Rikh Sahib. To this I (Author) responded by the question to him that the book written by Maj Gen Verma does not mention this.
‘Sir No one ever asked me. No JCO or Officer knows as much about Rikh Sahib as I do because I was on the ground and no one else had reached there till then those who wish can say any thing they want.’
He continued, behind the CO’s Command Post there was a cutting and the Chinese were attacking from there from the rear. The attack did not come from the front, the riverside, but from the rear. He had turned the LMG around and was firing at the Chinese. There was fog and it had also started to snow the low visibility making it difficult for the Chinese to pinpoint from where the fire was coming. I was also finding it difficult to locate Rikh Sahib and reach near him. I had taken position. Now only one LMG was firing. Ultimately the Chinese fired a burst aiming at the muzzle flash of the LMG, smashing his right arm. Undaunted he continued to still fill the magazine with his left hand and also fire by the same hand. He had not fallen down and was still standing.
By that time a Chinese soldier had crawled up to the bunker and he lobed a grenade in the bunker. I had also reached near by this time. There was a hissing sound from the grenade, Rikh Sahib caught hold of the grenade and threw it out side. It needs courage to do what he did. As you know, you are a senior officer (author) one is scared of even touching a grenade. The grenade burst before hitting the ground and one splinter hit Rikh Sahib breaking his Jaw and he fell down. The Chinese now approached the bunker, angry that this particular man had inflicted the maximum damage to them they dragged him, he was not wearing the badges of rank, out of the bunker pulling him by his legs. What I am telling is the reality, the facts no one knows as much about the incident as I do. Because of the casualties they had suffered at the hands of Rikh Sahib the Chinese were furious and tried to bayonet him. Luckily he escaped, as he was about to be bayoneted, I fired and the bullet went through the hand of the Chinese who fell ahead of Rikh Sahib with the bayonet missing him. By this time some of our men and Maj Gurdial Singh Sahib, the 2 IC, were also being escorted to the same place as prisoners. Seeing him, I started shouting loudly ‘Commanding Officer ko mar rahain hain.’(They are killing the Commanding officer) Gurdial Singh Sahib came running others had not yet reached there, even though his hands were tied. He stood with his two feet astride Rick Sahib lying injured on the ground. ‘ If you want to shoot, shoot me, he is already injured what is the purpose of shooting him’ said Gurdial Singh Sahib in an emotionally charged voice. By that time a senior Chinese officer has also arrived there. There was some discussion between him and Gurdial Singh in English, some heated words were also exchange but ultimately the Chinese cooled down and asked ‘What do you want’. Gurdial Singh ‘We want to carry him, he is our CO’. The Chinese officer acceded to the request. Gurdial Singh Sahib shouted towards me in a loud voice ‘You go back and tell your Company Commander to move to the location of the company (1/9 GR) deployed near the Bde HQ on the mountain side join them and fight along them’

[jitendershooda]

BLS ji, bahut aacha likhya hai apne.

I have also written the summary out of a book read on 1962 war by Neville Maxwell (who was South Asian correspondent of The Times). Here is the link of thread for you to go through ...

http://www.jatland.com/forums/showthread.php?t=9803

1962 INDO CHINA WAR


Recently I gone through some papers and India’s China War by Neville Maxwell (who was South Asian correspondent of The Times) from IIM library published in 1970. By this I came to know that it was a total failure of Indian policies.

Here is the summary of the whole instances that lead to the collision.

Instead going directly to the War part, first let us clear the issues. What were the issues that lead to War?

1. Aksai Chin. (It is the No-Mans land beyond Ladhakh)
2. NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) which is the part Of Arunachal pardesh and above it.

India and China were both having claims on these two parts. Aksai Chin is on the western part and NEFA is on the eastern.

What is the history of these two areas? And whom claim is stronger?

First Aksai Chin, this is the no mans land of white rocks and a plateau 17000 feet above sea level where nothing grows and no one lives under the killing winds. An ancient route lay across it; in brief summer when for few hours only the ice melts and the caravans of Yalks crossed it from Sinkiang to Tibet carrying silk ,salt and wool. So it was the no mans land having an old way to move from the Eastern Tibet to the Western Part of Tibet to Khotan. In 1846-47, Maharaja Gulab Singh who was put on the Muslim and Sikh people of Kashmir as Raja by the British invaded Ladakh and he captured up to the Mansarover lake and to the Spiti River and British asked him to stop there. At that time Russia was the main threat in that reason for the British and they don’t want the Russians to stop beyond the China to protect the plains of India those were the main source of income to British. For this British played a tactics and had friendly relations with the weak govt. of china that time and used this region as the buffer region.

Several British went to this area to make the boundary line and each of them proposed their own lines e.g. W.H Johnson. The British kept on changing the maps depending on the situation in that region and in 1842 they showed it in their territory and in 50’s again left it, in 1877 Atlas they showed it again under them and again till 1914, it was left to please China. As in 1914 the Chinese Govt. was very loose and Tibet became sovereign region, British again claimed that region and also now Tibet was under British but only for the foreign policies.

In 1842 when British did a treaty with the Tibet officials and not with the Chinese govt. regarding the Western region and they forced the Tibet officials to keep it under British Territory. But the Chinese govt. had never accepted that treaty at all.

Now for the NEFA region, The Nepal and Bhutan both were having their own Rule but they were bound to the British for their Foreign policies. Sikkim and Darjeeling were taken by the British from Tibet because of their climate and natural beauty. There is Tawang having a great Monastery and Buddhist population overall in that region full of thick forests and here in 1844 British restrict themselves at Udalguri that is lower down the hills of Tawang region. Again here British didn’t invade so as to please the Chinese. In this region also survey’s done. There were two boundaries proposed one is at the foot of the hills and the other one was above. British were angry at the killing of Noel Williamson by the tribes and also when in may 1910 Chinese occupied Rima which is at the right uppermost corner of Arunachal. They decided to occupy up to outer boundary but that also was not having Tawang under it. Later MacMohan in 1914 surveyed that area and proposed the boundary that is shown in the Indian maps these days and also known as MacMohan line. And After the fall of Chinese govt. in 1914 and arise of the Tibet as a sovereign region British again had a treaty with the Tibet officials now for the NEFA and they agreed upon the MacMohan line to be the boundary. The Tawang region as it was totally Tibetian by people, Culture and geographically also so in 1938 Atlas, British showed it as part of Tibet. Here one thing to be noted that Chinese govt. was never agreed upon this new marking of the region and claims that area up till foot hills to be its own but due to week govt. they couldn’t did anything.

At the time of Indian freedom, India got Tibet which was dependent on India for her foreign policies, same as Bhutan.

People’s Republic of china was established on 1st Oct. 1950 and soon after that they announced attack on Tibet and to take it under china again. Here comes the week policy of Nehru first time, Indian Ambassador in Tibet K.M Pannikar had exchanged files with the Chinese there and Chinese soon take over Tibet. That time Truman even asked Nehru to provide all possible Air and field help to take Tibet under full control. Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel who was deputy prime minister wrote NEHRU a long letter in Nov. 1950; he implied that Pannikar had had the wool pulled over his eyes by the Chinese whom he accused of perfidy and malevolence for changing the word “sovereignty” to “Suzerainty” and not even holding the independent status of Tibet.

Now Indian Govt. occupied the NEFA region full to the MacMohan line in Feb. 1951 and even captured Tawang despite of opposing by the civilians and providing direct notice to Tibet and not the Chinese who had now taken Tibet under them.

1. In Sept. 1951 Chou En lie suggested the Indian ambassador to clarify all the boundaries with India, Nepal and china and further confirmed that china is willing to accept MacMohan line as the boundary in the east but for that first of all a joint survey and discussion on bench is required. Indian govt. accepted but never followed.


2. China in July 1952 again proposed to fix any pending boundary issues. Mr. G.S Bajpai India’s first Secretary-General wrote a letter to PM stating that there are some issue related to the boundaries in Aksai Chin and NEFA that Chinese govt. had never accepted as they had been between the Tibet and British and not with China. So it’s better to talk to China once as they are now ready to accept the MacMohan line also. But the think tank of NEHRU – Krishna Menon refused badly and it was decided that nothing would be discussed with China related to the NEFA as they felt that they are at better position now and after that they have to leave some parts to China.


3. After the death of Sardar Patel, author told that the whole govt. was NEHRU, MENON and later KAUL joined them. And these three took each and every decision without even consulting the cabinet and even sometimes they didn’t call the panel of Home minister and other senior leaders like Kriplani and lalbahadur.

4. BK Nehru was Ambassador in US (cousin of Nehru) and one more cousin RK Nehru was Sec. Gen. of ministry of external affairs. KAUL was a military person who once gone to Burma with army and never had any experience of wars and enjoying the friendship and power in Delhi.

5. NEHRU is well known for its PanchSheel which he introduced after coming from Indonesia and originally he took two rules out of these from the foreign policy of China itself.

6. Up till 1954 Sikkim was not part of Indian Constitution though it was shown in Indian map of that time; this was accepted by Congress in 1967.

7. Indian Map in 1954 now showed the MacMohan line as Indian boundary in East and in west they showed a color wash instead of any particular boundary in that region as Indian territory, means included the Aksai Chin but without and specific boundary and the same case in some areas with Nepal.

8. The most advance post in the west region was chusul and in 1952 Indian petrol was sent only up to Lanak Pass.

9. NEHRU gave a slogan of HINDI CHINI BHAI-BHAI and had friendship with Chou En Lie according to PanchSheel.

10. July 1954, when army asked about the scene of the disputed boundary near to Himachal, Nepal and china border then the think tank asked them to move forward and so in 1954 Indians rushed into disputed boundary.


11. Author tells that Nehru was “a poor debater, his speeches too long and more like soliloquies than communications, he was a parliamentarian by commitment and not by temperament. Enjoying his dominance in house. ‘Childish’ and ‘infantile’ were favorite words to rebuke the other members. But was afraid of Kriplani and the left leaders during 1957 when kriplani was in opposition as he left congress.


12. In Sept. 1957 the Indian Ambassador in peeking sent a magazine showing some road in Aksai Chin part build by China. Now Nehru Came out of sleep and in 1958 only India Formally claimed Aksai chin as part of India.

13. Interestingly China claimed that even in the Discovery of India Written by Nehru in 1946. He himself had not included Sikkim and NEFA in India.

14. Here one thing to be noted that Nehru was such a big liar that according to the Author he hides many things from the parliament and even lies about the conversation between him and Chou En Lie which were later came out of his letters. The same he did when He was aware and knowingly let the march of Chinese army from Eastern to Western Tibet through so called Indian Aksai Chin in 1953. For 4 years he had hidden this thing from the parliament.

15. He wrote even a single telegram by himself in that period being a single man foreign ministry.

[jitendershooda]

16. During this friendship period NEHRU and CHOU EN LIE both visited each other countries and both were given great regard.

17. In 1956 during their meeting Chou En Lie again raised the Mac Mohan Line issue by telling that they had accepted MacMohan line as boundary with Burma and now he wants to accept it with India and so have a discussion on table on that also. This time again Nehru escaped.

18. In 1959 China attacked Tibet Lama and Dalai Lama from the NEFA region run into India and India accepted him and provided DharamShala as his place to establish his territory.


19. Nehru’s diplomatic knowledge can be judged by this statement only. In Sept. 1959 in LokSabha he openly told that,” MacMohan line is by and large fixed except in some parts in Subansiri area and some where varied by us. Even before the war he openly stated that China cannot do such being India not so strong”.


20. By the autumn 1959 Indian troops despite of Chinese opposition fired at them and captured Longju, Migyitum, Tamaden and Khuzemane and established posts there.

21. By this time the pressure in parliament and election made NEHRU a different person and now he started openly saying that Chou cheated him.


22. Looking back at the Indian Scene, Menon and Kaul created such situations that General Thimayya was forced to resign. After that General ManekShaw was blamed and enquiry was applied on him.


23. Overall Letters are there even just before the war China asked to settle disputes and they were openly saying that they can apply the status quo (means jo jahan hai wahan rahe but Nehru and his team never gone on table with them for these issues and now NEHRU in the pressure of elections made sharp and volatile statements that We will not give and inch to China and a great hatred environment was created against China in India. Nehru again won by majority).


24. Now comes the time of 8th Sept. 1962 Nehru was out in common wealth PM’s conference in London and Kaul was away in Kashmir on long leaves even in such tensed situation. And back in Delhi now PM was MENON. Menon on his own called up a meeting (ha ha not of the cabinet and congress leaders) but of SS Khera Cabinet sec. SC sarin and one official Malik. He solely took decision of Eviction and appointed KAUL as the leader in Command bye passing ManekShaw and other seniors than KAUL and it was clear that KAUL has no experience.


25. KAUL immediately called up but he didn’t listen to Menon and he was only brought back after NEHRU came back. He joined Tejpur to command.

The placement of battalions was as follows:

1. On the Namka Chu : 9 Punjab, plus one company of two Rajput.

2. At lumpu : HQ 7 Brigade and 2 companies of Rajput,1/9 Gorkha rifles and a troop of heavy mortar and remainder of machine gun company.

3. At Tawang : 1 Sikh + 4 Garhwal rifles + 4 artillery brigade.

4. Rest of NEFA: under 5 infantry Brigade.

5. 5 JAT infantry was posted in the front in Ladakh.



General Umrao Singh of XXXIII corps and Brigadier Dalvi were leading there and they were very well aware of the situation. Umrao Singh even went back to Lacknow and asked them to reverse or stop the order of Eviction as the situation was totally against them. He had written back to HQ and Ministry but he was not listened. Also adding to this during 1959 crush military demanded of ammunition but NEHRU denied directly that the foreign exchange is very short and they can’t afford.


Umrao Singh was not listened and plans were to shift him back to some other post near to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) but later orders cancelled as his full battalion was there.

When General Prasad and Sen ordered of Eviction Brig. Dalvi told the same as Umrao. According to Dalvi, Prasad told him in Lumphu, “Look here Old boy, no one is interested in your bloody appreciation. They only interested in your D-Day for eviction the Chinese”

The operation was Named Leghorn and they were willing to launch it by Oct. 10. The 7th brigade were having 50 rounds per man and in summer clothing and only one blanket during that winter season. Ammunition and ration was dropped by air but due to bad weather and area only 30% was picked. When Dalvi told Kaul about this Kaul barked on him, “Either picks the rest or Starve”.

Kaul after his air round and looking the situations on the posts went back to Delhi to request NEHRU personally on night 11th Oct. but again Menon and others asked him to go and carry on the operation at the earliest. All were concentrating only on the eastern part and assuming that China will not attack on the western part. This was later accepted by Nehru in Parliament.

War begun and by 25th Oct Tawang was in hands of China in the east and in west on 27th they took Demchok.

Now can you guess where KAUL was? He got bronchitis at once after 4 days of clash and was back to Tejpur and then Delhi and Commanding on Phone from his Delhi residence.

Also after that IV corps got their new commander l-General Harbaksh Singh, Prasad was replaced by General A S Pathania and 62 Birgade was given to JAT Brigadier Hoshier Singh Rathi (Sankhol Wale) who was at BomDi La.

Truth was put forward by General Thimayya when he said, “Every Sepoy in the Army knows that Kaul has never been a combat soldier, you can’t hide that sort of thing in army”. On the other hand our Great PM CHACHA NEHRU JI told in parliament,” I want to mention his name especially because quite extraordinarily unjust things have seen about him. Some people say that he had not experience of fighting. That is not correct.”

Kaul was back to Tejpur on Oct 28th. Each and every Indian Soldier fought bravely lacking full clothes, half ration and even ammunition under the command of good generals now e.g. Brig. KK singh, Dalvi, Umrao Singh, Hoshier Singh and Pathania.

Mahan JAT:


When Pathania proposed withdrawal from Se La, Hoshier Singh Protested that his troops could hold out and the gorkhas were also with them to block the Chinese. But Pathania’s reports also were found unmatching after the war?? Though Hoshier Singh denied withdrawing but under pressure he starts withdrawal and told that it would be disastrous to do it. Wahi hua jo JAT ne kaha tha ….. Chinese attacked by machine guns and the only Party who tried to knock out the Guns was that of Our JAT Leader Hoshier Singh but failed lacking strength. And after a brave fight, this great Soldier Shot Dead at Phutang on November 27th.


After reaching the foot hills China herself declared Cease Fire and by December 8 – 15th were back to their original position but they remained the same in west.

After that Lady Bhandarnaeke of Ceylone(Srilanka) become mediator and even at that time China called a table conf. and written a letter to PM to finalize the boundary disputes but again NEHRU said that first CHINA should withdraw the forces from Aksai Chin and long back to upper MacMohan then only he will talk.

Still now it is unresolved and INDIA is showing both of them in her territory. Aksai Chin is totally in china now and Do not know what is the situation in the East??

This is how INDIA was controlled and ruled by three people up till 1962 (NEHRU, MENON and KAUL).


According to defense ministry released figures:

Killed: 1383
Missing: 1696
Captured: 3968

UN SAB VIRON KO SAT - SAT PRANAM

[ Please correct if anywhere found something ambiguous ]

[ranjitjat]

Dear BLS Sahib
Have you got any contact with 5 Jat BN in 1962 War ?
Have you got any contact with Brig Hoshiar Singh in life.
Any chapter in your new book about them.
Cheers

[bls31]

Sorry Sir

I was not in contact with 5 Jat

The Signal officer of Brig Hoshiar Singh Capt Man , a friend of mine , was killed at Sela. Brig Ratan Singh , who lives in Bombay was the G3 of Brigadier .
Regards Brig lakshman

[raj2rif]

http://us.a2.yahoofs.com/groups/g_19744422/8335/__sr_/2255.jpg?gro6ecHBXMulO2.o

The Hero of 1962 Brig Hoshiar Singh commanded my Battalion 2RAJRIF. Here is his picture that we have in our CO's Gallary

[asuhag]

http://us.a2.yahoofs.com/groups/g_19744422/8335/__sr_/2255.jpg?gro6ecHBXMulO2.o

The Hero of 1962 Brig Hoshiar Singh commanded my Battalion 2RAJRIF. Here is his picture that we have in our CO's Gallary

The URL seems to be broken. Getting a page not found... :-(

[vijay]

The URL seems to be broken. Getting a page not found... :-(

You do not have permission to get the requested URL from this server.

Seems password protected by the specific yahoo group :)

[raj2rif]

Dear Members,

Sorry, Yes the link is password protected. Let me try again to get you the picture:

2452

[bls31]

A few copies of the book Letters from the Border and other less told stories are still available If anyone is interested I can give the name of my distributor Brig lakshman singh

[asuhag]

A few copies of the book Letters from the Border and other less told stories are still available If anyone is interested I can give the name of my distributor Brig lakshman singh

I'd like it sir.

Thx,
Ashish

[cooljat]

It'll be a pleasure to read them,
I also need'em :)

thx!

Rock on
Jit

A few copies of the book Letters from the Border and other less told stories are still available If anyone is interested I can give the name of my distributor Brig lakshman singh

[bls31]

Sorry for the delay in responding . The title of the book is 'Letters From The Border and Other Less told Stories " By Brig Lakshman Singh

The address of the distributer is as under:

Knowledge World
5A/12 Ansari Road
Darya Gang
New Delhi 002
Tele 011 23257714
e mail jagat@del2.vsnl.net.in

[asuhag]

Sorry for the delay in responding . The title of the book is 'Letters From The Border and Other Less told Stories " By Brig Lakshman Singh

The address of the distributer is as under:

Knowledge World
5A/12 Ansari Road
Darya Gang
New Delhi 002
Tele 011 23257714
e mail jagat@del2.vsnl.net.in


Thx. I've emailed him & hoping I can get one :-)

[bls31]

For those technically intersted this was the equipment with me during the operations

Year of issue 1945
Purpose GP Bde, Div Truck/ground station
Frequency 1.6-10 Mhz
Range (miles) CW 25, R/T 15[/B
Power output (watt) CW 1, R/T 0.8
Transport Vehicle, man-pack, animal pack

We were operating at times at distances more than 200 KMs

, of course there was the advantage of height 14000 ft or so
Bls