Indo-Pak wars and the Truth as per Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan

[rkumar]

Dear Friends,

I would request you all to spare some time and read the following which I have picked up from (http://www.dawn.com/2005/09/06/nat2.htm). Its really interesting how public is fooled by national goverments.
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Nur Khan reminisces ’65 war




By Our Special Correspondent

ISLAMABAD, Sept 5: Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan, the man who led the airforce achieve complete superiority over the three times bigger Indian airforce on the very first day of the 1965 war, had all but resigned the post the very day that he took command of Pakistan Air Force on July 23, 1965.

“Rumours about an impending operation were rife but the army had not shared the plans with other forces,” Air Marshal Nur Khan said. Sharing his memoirs with Dawn on the 40th anniversary of 1965 war, Air Marshal Khan said that he was the most disturbed man on the day, instead of feeling proud.

Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan while handing over the command to Nur Khan had not briefed him about any impending war because he was not aware of it himself. So, in order to double check, Nur Khan called on the then Commander-in-Chief, General Musa Khan.

Under his searching questions Gen Musa wilted and with a sheepish smile admitted that something was afoot. Nur Khan’s immediate reaction was that this would mean war. But, Gen Musa said you need not to worry as according to him Indians would not retaliate. Then he directed a still highly skeptical Nur Khan to Lt-Gen Akhtar Hasan Malik, GOC Kashmir, the man in-charge of “Operation Gibraltar” for further details. The long and short of his discussion with Gen Malik was, “don’t worry, because the plan to send in some 800,000 infiltrators inside the occupied territory to throw out the Indian troops with the help of the local population”, was so designed that the Indians would not be able retaliate and therefore the airforce need not get into war-time mode.

A still incredulous Nur Khan was shocked when on further inquiry he found that except for a small coterie of top generals, very few in the armed forces knew about “Operation Gibraltar”. He asked himself how good, intelligent and professional people like Musa and Malik could be so naive, so irresponsible.

For the air marshal, it was unbelievable. Even the then Lahore garrison commander had not been taken into confidence. And Governor of West Pakistan, Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh did not know what was afoot and had gone to Murree for vacations.

It was at this point that he felt like resigning and going home. But then he thought such a rash move would further undermine the country’s interests and, therefore, kept his cool and went about counting his chickens — the entire airforce was too young and too inexperienced to be called anything else then — and gearing up his service for the D-day.

The miracle that the PAF achieved on September 6, to a large extent, is attributed to Nur Khan’s leadership. He led his force from up front and set personal example by going on some highly risky sorties himself. But then no commander, no matter how daring and how professional, can win a battle if his troops are not fully geared to face such challenges and that too within 43 days of change in command.

The full credit for turning the PAF into a highly professional and dedicated fighting machine goes to Air Marshal Asghar Khan who was given charge of the service in 1957. Thank God, unlike the other service no darbari or sifarishi was given the job. And by the time he left on July 23, 1965, Asghar Khan had turned the PAF into a well-oiled, highly professional and dedicated fighting machine and had trained them on the then best US made fighters, bombers and transport planes. Those who flew those machines and those who maintained them on ground worked like a team, and each one of the PAF member performed beyond the call of duty to make a miracle.

The PAF performance had crucially allowed the Army to operate without interference from the Indian airforce.

“The performance of the Army did not match that of the PAF mainly because the leadership was not as professional. They had planned the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ for self-glory rather than in the national interest. It was a wrong war. And they misled the nation with a big lie that India rather than Pakistan had provoked the war and that we were the victims of Indian aggression”, Air Marshal Khan said.

When on the second day of war President Gen Ayub wanted to know how we were faring, Musa informed him that the Army had run out of even ammunition. That was the extent of preparation in the Army. And the information had shocked Gen Ayub so much that it could have triggered his heart ailment, which overtook him a couple of years later.

This in short is Nur Khan’s version of 1965 war, which he calls an unnecessary war and says that President Ayub for whom he has the greatest regard should have held his senior generals accountable for the debacle and himself resigned.

This would have held the hands of the adventurers who followed Gen Ayub. Since the 1965 war was based on a big lie and was presented to the nation a great victory, the Army came to believe its own fiction and has used since, Ayub as its role model and therefore has continued to fight unwanted wars — the 1971 war and the Kargil fiasco in 1999, he said.

In each of the subsequent wars we have committed the same mistakes that we committed in 1965.

Air Marshal Khan demanded that a truth commission formed to find out why we failed in all our military adventures. It is not punishment of the failed leadership that should be the aim of the commission but sifting of facts from fiction and laying bare the follies and foibles of the irresponsible leaders in matters with grave implications for the nation. It should also point out the irregularities committed in training and promotions in the defence forces in the past so that it is not repeated in future.

Mr Khan believes that our soldiers when called upon have fought with their lives but because of bad leadership their supreme sacrifices went waste. And after every war that we began we ended up taking dictation from the enemy — at Tashkant, at Simla and lastly at Washington.

He said at present Pakistan is engaged in another war, this time in Waziristan. This war can also end up in a fiasco and politically disastrous for the federation if it is fought with the same nonchalance and unprofessionally as we did the last three wars.

He, therefore, called for an immediate change of command at the GHQ insisting that President Gen Pervez Musharraf should appoint a full-time Chief of Army Staff and restore full democracy in the country. He suggested appointment of an independent chief election commissioner in consultation with all the political parties.

“Look at India. There a religious party comes in power and nobody cries foul and it goes out of power and nobody alleges rigging. We can also do this,” he added.

And we must make unified efforts to restore the country in the vision of the Quaid-i-Azam. Turn it into a non-theocratic and truly democratic state. And all the three forces should model themselves on the lines set by Asghar Khan when he was commanding the PAF, he suggested.
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RK^2

[raj2rif]

Dear Rajendra Ji,

The article is good and does give an insight what Pak Commanders of Services other than Army may have thought about the Wars Pakistan has fought with India. Most of the information given in the article is known to us since ages. Operation Gibraltor was on the lines of operations launched in 1947-48 by Pak. Since it is the army wing in the Pak armed forces that controls the operations, it is natural that the commanders of other forces may feel dejected for not knowing what they should have known. I don't think any army would plan any operation however small it may be that it runs out of ammunition on the second day of war itself, for all the armies work on a national reserve of Oil, Ammunition and all other war material including rations of every category and clothing. So, to that extent, Air Marshal Nur Khan's statement about Pak army running out of ammunition may not be true.

There has always been problem in maintaining surprise and letting the people know what they should about a military operation. There are so many battle indicators that come to light whenever a nation is preparing for the war. First one is restricting the leave of soldiers, or even cancelling it. Keeping every one on call at a short notice. Dumping of essential items on the front line supply bases etc. To that extent to know about what is going on, one really does not have to be Air Marshal.

I feel this must be a good interview by the Air Marshal probably promote himself.

Any way, it is a good piece of information to read specially those young members who may not have read much about 65 War.

[jagmohan]

Dear All,

I don't believe a word what these Pakistani Generals or for that matter what our Generals say about the wars in 1965 & 1971. They somehow find wisdom and speak after they retire or just before publishing their books.

The only worthwhile book on 1965 War was 'War Despatches" by Gen Gurbaksh Singh (Hope the name is right). This book hit the stands in 1989 or 1990 but was promptly banned from circulation in the Indian Army. I was officiating Education Officer in a Brigade HQ when this book arrived. I read it in quick time. All those interested in military history must read this book. It describes the blunders by a weak Chief of Army Staff (Gen Chaudhary) and as to how he could not take a single 'Manly' decision during the war. You will be surprised to know that attack on Sialkot was delayed and later called off because the Indian Army Generals had no idea about the amount of artillery ammunition we had in reserve. It is not that only the Paki Generals lacked vision, even their friends on this side of the border were no less in doing so. Can't blame them actually for they were trained together!!!

3 JAT Bn under a very able Commanding Officer, then Lt Col MV Hyde (later Brig MV Hyde, MVC, called lovingly as Haid Ram by JAT troops) captured BARKI, in what was a truly epic battle. But our able Generals did not keep up the momentum and the brave JATS had to leave captured ground and retreat. There are many such facts that lie buried because we have not yet come out with any official history of any of the wars fought by us after independence.

I would rather believe what Kissinger had to say in his book 'White House Years'. He called the 1971 war as a 'Riot Control with Tanks'. The BBC too covered the war impartially.

Regards,

JS Malik

[rkumar]

Interestingly, it was on this very day that the Indian army crossed into Pakistan in 1965. This is what Mr. K Subrahmanyam, the doyen of India's strategic thinkers has to say on 1965 Indo-Pak war;

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1965 decided fate of the subcontinent

September 06, 2005


Though the 1965 Indo-Pak war was only a medium-scale, limited war that lasted less than three weeks, it resulted in the Tashkent Agreement that brought about exchange of territories occupied by both sides.

It is largely seen as a stalemate in Pakistan and the rest of the world, but the 1965 war generated very significant consequences that decided the fate of the Indian subcontinent.

The Pakistani leadership carefully planned the war. It was meant to lead to a massive uprising in Kashmir engineered by sending in Pakistani infiltrators. Further, by clandestinely raising a second armoured division of relatively sophisticated Patton tanks, Pakistan aimed at a breakthrough in Punjab against the weak and obsolete Indian armour and wanted to cut off Jammu and Kashmir from India.

Field Marshal Ayub Khan also was planning to demonstrate -- in the wake of the Indian Army's debacle at Sela-Bomdila in Arunachal Pradesh in November 1962 -- that one Pakistani was equal to 10 Indians in terms of military prowess.

His conviction was that the Hindu, when struck a timely and decisive blow, would not be able to stand up. His confidant Altaf Gauhar has recorded this in Ayub Khan's biography.

Pakistan had China's support. When Islamabad appealed for support, Beijing did try to apply pressure on New Delhi by delivering a not very credible ultimatum to India.

The Americans were well informed about the possibility of Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir and the subsequent offensive months in advance, as has been recorded by the then Central Investigative Agency operative in India, Duane Claridge, in his book A Man for All Seasons.

The American military and political establishment had concluded that in case of a war, Pakistan would win.

The Pentagon and Harvard University played a war game at the Institute of Defence Analysis, Washington, DC, in March 1965. The war game and its results were available in a book, Crisis Game by Sidney Giffin, by the spring of 1965.

The total failure of the Kashmir uprising, the complete destruction of the Pakistani Patton Armoured division at Khem Karan in Punjab and the Pakistan Army running out of ammunition and being saved from total humiliation through the UN ceasefire constitute a turning point in the history of India-Pakistan relations.

Having engineered the war and seen it result in a disaster, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto turned against his benefactor Ayub Khan and blamed him for the Tashkent Agreement. His propaganda was that Ayub Khan threw away a military victory.

The Pakistani people were not informed about the failure of Operation Gibraltar, the attempted infiltration into Kashmir and thereafter of Operation Grand Slam, the attack on Jammu. The Indian counterattack in the Lahore sector was depicted as Indian aggression. The decimation of the Pakistani armoured division by a poorly armed Indian armoured brigade through superior tactics at Khem Karan was also not told to the Pakistani people.

But all these attempts at obfuscation did not deceive a leader like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, considered the father of Bangladesh. When the question was raised about the security of what was then East Pakistan vis-à-vis India in case of another war, Bhutto, as foreign minister, implied in his answer that Pakistan depended on Beijing to ensure the security of that part of its territory.

That led Rahman to ask for greater autonomy from Islamabad and to formulate his six points which became the basis for the subsequent secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan.

The 1965 war also led to an embargo of US arms supplies to Pakistan. Islamabad's use of American arms against India was against the assurances given by President Dwight Eisenhower to Jawaharlal Nehru that in case Pakistan used US-supplied arms against India, necessary corrective action would follow.

Though the US bureaucracy and the Pentagon were prepared to look the other way if Pakistan had won the war, they found it difficult to overlook the miserable performance of Pakistani armour at Khem Karan. Pakistan therefore turned to China and France for re-equipment of its forces. After 1965, China became the foremost supplier of arms to Pakistan.

From Bhutto's death cell testimony, it also becomes clear that Pakistan initiated its discussions with China on acquiring nuclear weapon technology around 1965. Bhutto talked of completing his 11-year-long negotiations successfully in 1976. It would not be incorrect to say that the Chinese-Pakistani strategy of containing India began in the aftermath of 1965 war.

Pakistan drew correct lessons from the failure of Operation Gibraltar when the Kashmiris did not rise against India in consequence to large-scale infiltration of Pakistani commandos into the Kashmir valley. They bided their time and in the late 1980s trained disaffected Kashmiris, who crossed over into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, in arms and infiltrated them back.

That this strategy too did not wholly succeed is a different story but it did begin the prolonged proxy war against India in Kashmir.

Pakistan also discovered it was not difficult to run rings around the conditions of American arms supplies and hide things from US inspection teams. They were able to covertly raise a second armoured division in 1965. Unfortunately for them it did not give them the victory in Punjab they expected. The second armoured division met its defeat at Khem Karan.

Pakistan used this experience of getting around US procedures in the 1980s to divert American arms -- meant for Afghans fighting Soviet forces -- to arm the various jihadi militias and to install the Taliban regime in Kabul.

On the Indian side too, the 1965 war led to significant results. The Indian Army failed to assess intelligence effectively in respect of construction of aqueducts under the Ichogil canal (that runs from India to Lahore) and on Pakistan covertly raising a second armoured division. Thus, the external and internal intelligence collection and reporting were bifurcated. A dedicated external intelligence agency – the Research and Analysis Wing -- was created.

An ill-advised reorganisation proposal in respect of Indian armour – increasing light armour and reducing medium armour –- strongly espoused by General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri before the war, was given up. The Indo-Soviet arms supply relationship got reinforced and the Soviet Union became the sole supplier of arms for India.

Though it is not much written about, India intensified its support to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League in their demands for greater economy from Islamabad.

The 1965 war demonstrated that the 1962 debacle was not a reflection on the Indian Army but was the result of inadequacies in a few top inexperienced generals. It also proved that Indian unity was solid while Pakistan was vulnerable to divisive forces. It brought out that American short-term Cold War calculations overrode Washington's commitment to democracy.

It also highlighted that the US establishment had very wrong assessments about the Indian leadership, the Indian Army and India's ability to survive as a Union and grow into a major power.
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RK^2

[ravichaudhary]

Col Malik is correct in his assessment.

The Pakistani General’s comments must be taking with some salt.

There was plenty of air activity from the Pakistani side on the first and subsequent days of the 1965 war. Operation Gibraltar was a brilliant plan, to push Militants, mixed with Pakistani Army troops across the Kashmir border, and seize Kashmir. The Indian reaction seizing Haji Pir and the Kargil heights was unexpected.

The attack on Chamb, the Chicken’s neck,was well planned and supported by Pakistani air.

The Pakistani air force was equipped with F 86 Sabres, which were far more advanced than anything the Indian possessed. The Indian were equipped with antique Vampires, Canberras, Mysteres, Hunters. The Gnat, which was to prove the decisive weapon, had barely entered production and was untested in combat.


In fact on the F86 Sabres devasted the Inadian Airforce Vampires, and Mysteres.

The lucky induction and arrival of the Gnat saved the day


The facts that the old adage holds true, “that battle plans last only as long until the first shot is fired:” held true here again.

The quick reaction of the Indian Political leadership, Hon. Lal Bahadur Shastri, then Prime Minister, who proved his greatness and courage , by his quick and decisive actions, belaying his deceptive diminutive size, and the equally quick reaction by the Indian Military- Air, army, and Navy broke the Pakistani back.

The Jats proved their mettle as usual, and Col Hayde’s book is outstanding, and must in everyone library.

The background to the attack has to be looked at in terms of the cold war Pak – American Axis.

The Pakistanis were flush with the latest armament, Patton tanks, F 86 Sabres, and ammunition.

The Indian armed forces had just faced the Chinese debacle three years earlier. They were now getting around to modernizing their Military. At that time, 1965, the Indian Military was as weak as it was going to be.

Once the pace of modernization, re-equipment, retraining picked up, as time would prove the case, the Pakistani advantage would deteriorate.

1965, was then from a strategic point of view, the best time to attack India, and seize Kashmir for starters.

The gamble failed.

The rest was history.

The question to be asked is why the Pakistani Government is releasing such comments at this time and today-( 2005) .

The 1947 conflict, the 1965 conflict, are all being described as an ill-conceived adventures, initiated by a ROGUE group within the Pakistani Army So too are the 1971 Bangladesh conflicts, and the 1999 Kargil conflicts, all the work of small rogue element, in an otherwise reliable ally in terror.

Achieving this positioning would absolve, the US Government, the US State Department, the CIA, and Musharraf, and Co, of the cynical terror that they have heaped on the Indian subcontinent, is support of their erstwhile Paki ally, since 1947- for whom Kashmir was to be the reward.




This statement of Nur Khan appears to bea Public relations exercise, to coddle up to the US, and bolster their claim to being the US’s chief and principal ally in the “War on Terror”.

One should not be terrible surprised if this latest hot air balloon , is a spin , and was crafted by the State Department.



Who is the publisher of Gurbaksh Singh's book?

[ravichaudhary]

An article by Maj Gen Bajwa on the Battle of Dograi and the 3rd Jat

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/JatHistory/message/1911

[amitdahiya]

C
Dear Col Malik,

I have always beleived that the significant achievement of 3rd Jat was the capture of Dograi which if exploited in time could have opened up much of the western theatre. But a failure to manouver aggressively and exploit this incredible achievement of the 3rd Jat Batallion . I am unable to find any reference for the capture of Barki . Do you have any further details please or is it a typing error?

[jagmohan]

Dahiya Saheb,

I have said that the failure to exploit the victory at Dogri was that of the Generals and not 3 JAT. Mr Ravi Chaudhary has given the link of this battle. Just few lines from the write up though:

"The enemy had suffered heavy casualties. Around 900 dead bodies of
Pakistani soldiers were counted, and 108 soldiers, including the commanding officer of 16 Punjab, were captured. The casualty equation of eight Pakistani soldiers to one of the Jats was incredible, considering that the probability of casualties to the attacking Jats as against the Pakistanis in defence ought to have been much greater. A Pakistani party that came to retrieve their dead and wounded found the intrepid Naik Siri Ram still alive, though grievously wounded. Taking him to be one of their own, he was taken to their hospital,
where Islamuddin, a Pakistani soldier who had once served in 3 Jat, identified him as a soldier from 3 Jat. Siri Ram survived to tell tales of Dograi to his village audiences while enjoying a well-merited pension. Islamuddin had come to the west bank of the Ichhogil canal on the afternoon of 23 September and shouted across, "Only my old battalion could have done this!"-one of the finest tributes that an enemy could pay to the magnificent performance of 3 Jat in the recapture of Dograi against incredibly heavy adverse odds.


This magnificent achievement of 3 Jat is magnified when we consider the edge of superiority that Pakistani defenders enjoyed in numbers as well as in firepower against the attacking Jats. Even in the basic infantry section Pakistan had two light machine guns against one of ours. 16 Punjab, strengthened with additional elements from 8 and 12 Punjab and 8 and 18 Baluch, was holding the defences of Dograi extending to Mile 13. 3 Baluch and 12 Punjab provided depth and fire support from across the Ichhogil Canal. One squadron of 23 Cavalry was located within the defences; 15 Sherman tanks were captured in the attack. An augmented artillery brigade provided artillery fire support. Defences were based on a built-up area with a profusion of concrete pillboxes and well developed strong points. In the face of these odds, 3 Jat had successfully defied the principle that an attacker should have a superiority ratio of two to one or even more over the defender.

The Dograi battle was fought in cold blood with unwavering determination and guts. The outstanding leadership, high morale and an unflagging fighting spirit despite the risks decided the final outcome. In both battles for Dograi, 3 Jat suffered 5 officers killed and 9 wounded, involving practically all officers of the battalion; 1 junior commissioned officer killed and 8 wounded and 82 other ranks killed and 214 wounded. Gallantry awards given were 3 MVCs, 4 VrCs, 7 Sena Medals, 12 Mention-in-Dispatches and 11 Chief of Army Staff's
Commendation Cards. The casualty figures and the decorations bear ample witness to the outstanding performance by the indomitable 3 Jat in the face of very heavy odds stacked against them.


When evaluating the battle for Dograi, it must be borne in mind that a reinforced infantry battalion with augmented resources of automatic weapons, holding well prepared and compact defences in a built-up area, supported by a couple of dozen artillery fire units of six guns each, and its approaches raked by infantry fire from the west bank of the canal, was overwhelmed by a somewhat depleted 3 Jat. The battle for Dograi is unique for the very high quality of determined leadership displayed at all levels, and the exceptional cohesion, valour, grit, grim resolve and fighting spirit with which the battalion recaptured Dograi. The sterling fighting spirit of this
battalion stands very tall in the background of six out of seven battalions of 15 Infantry Division that wilted under the initial shock of battle.


In the Battle of Dograi 3 Jat wrote a military saga that would be a source of inspiration whenever soldiers are called upon to fight against very adverse odds. Decades have since gone by, but the cry still spontaneously comes from the heart, "Bravo the gallant 3 Jat!" - I had the proud privilege of once serving with 3 Jat."

A great feat indeed.

Regards,

JS Malik