Ranas of Gohad in British Records

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Author Edmund Burke

The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. 09 (of 12) eBook Reference - http://www.bookrags.com/ebooks/13968/40.html

Chap XIV.—Ranna of Gohud.

That on the 2d of December, 1779, the Governor-General and Council of Fort William, at the special recommendation and instance of Warren Hastings, Esquire, then Governor-General, and contrary to the declared opinion and protest of three of the members of the Council, viz., Philip Francis and Edward Wheler, Esquires, who were present, and of Sir Eyre Coote, who was absent, (by whose absence the casting voice of the said Warren Hastings, Esquire, prevailed,) did conclude a treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance, offensive and defensive, with a Hindoo prince, called the Ranna of Gohud, for the express purpose of using the forces of the said Ranna in opposition to the Mahrattas.

That, among other articles, it was stipulated with the said Ranna by the said Warren Hastings, “that, whenever peace should be concluded between the Company and the Mahratta state, the Maha Rajah should be included as a party in the treaty which should be made for that purpose, and his present possessions, together with the fort of Gualior, which of old belonged to the family of the Maha Rajah, if it should be then in his possession, and such countries as he should have acquired in the course of war, and which it should then be stipulated to leave in his hands, should be guarantied to him by such treaty.”

That, in the late war against the Mahrattas, the said Ranna of Gohud did actually join the British army under the command of Colonel Muir with two battalions of infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, and did then serve in person against the Mahrattas, thereby affording material assistance, and rendering essential service to the Company.

That, in conformity to the above-mentioned treaty, in the fourth article of the treaty of peace concluded on the 13th of October, 1781, between Colonel Muir, on the part of the English Company, and Mahdajee Sindia, the Mahratta general, the said Ranna of Gohud was expressly included.

That, notwithstanding the said express provision and agreement, Mahdajee Sindia proceeded to attack the forts and lay waste the territories of the said Ranna, and did undertake and prosecute a war against him for the space of two years, in the course of which the Ranna and his family were reduced to extreme distress, and in the end he was deprived of his forts, and the whole not only of his acquired possessions, but of his original dominions, so specially guarantied to him by the British government in both the above-mentioned treaties.

That the said Warren Hastings was duly and regularly informed of the progress of the war against the Ranna, and of every event thereof; notwithstanding which, he not only neglected in any manner to interfere therein in favor of the said Ranna, or to use any endeavors to prevent the infraction of the treaty, but gave considerable countenance and encouragement to Mahdajee Sindia in his violation of it, both by the residence of the British minister in the Mahratta camp, and by the approbation shown by the said Warren Hastings to the promises made by his agent of observing the strictest neutrality, notwithstanding he was in justice bound, and stood pledged by the most solemn and sacred engagements, to protect and preserve the said Ranna from those enemies, whose resentment he had provoked only by his adherence to the interests of the British nation.

That, in the only attempt made to sound the disposition of Mahdajee Sindia relative to a pacification between him and the Ranna of Gohud, on the 14th of May, 1783, Mr. Anderson, in obedience to the orders he had received, did clearly and explicitly declare to Bhow Bucksey, the minister of Mahdajee Sindia, the sentiments of the said Warren Hastings in the words following:

“That it was so far from your [the said Hastings’s] meaning to intercede in his [the said Ranna’s] favor, that I only desired him to sound Sindia’s sentiments, and, in case he was desirous of peace, to mention what I had said; but if he seemed to prefer carrying on the war, I begged that he would not mention a syllable of what had passed, but let the matter drop entirely.”

That it afterwards appeared, in a minute of the said Hastings in Council at Fort William, on the 22d of September, 1783, that he promised, at the instance of a member of the Council, to write to Lieutenant James Anderson in favor of the Ranna of Gohud, and lay his letter before the board.

That, nevertheless, the said Hastings, professing not to recollect his said promise, did neglect to write a formal letter to Lieutenant Anderson in favor of the said Ranna of Gohud, and that the private letter, the extract of which the said Hastings did lay before the board on the 21st of October, 1783, so far from directing any effectual interference in favor of the said Ranna, or commanding his agent, the said James Anderson, to interpose the mediation of the British government to procure “honorable terms” for the said Ranna, or even “safety to his person and family,” contains the bitterest invectives against him, and is expressive of the satisfaction which the said Hastings acknowledges himself to have enjoyed in the distresses of the said Ranna, the ally of the Company.

That the measures therein recommended appear rather to have been designed to satisfy Mahdajee Sindia, and to justify the conduct of the British government in not having taken a more active and a more hostile part against the said Ranna, than an intercession on his behalf.

That, though no consideration of good faith or observance of treaties could induce the said Hastings to incur the hazard of any hostile exertion of the British force for the defence or the relief of the allies of the Company, yet in the said private letter he directed, that, in case his mediation should be accepted, it should be made a specific condition, that, if the said Ranna should take advantage of Sindia’s absence to renew his hostilities, we ought, in that case, on requisition, to invade the dominions of the Ranna.

That no beneficial effects could have been procured to the said Ranna by an offer of mediation delayed till Sindia no longer wanted “our assistance to crush so fallen an enemy,” at the same time that no reason was given to Sindia to apprehend the danger of drawing upon himself the resentment of the British government by a disregard of their proposal and the destruction of their ally.

That it was a gross and scandalous mockery in the said Hastings to defer an application to obtain honorable terms for the Ranna, and safety for his person and family, till he had been deprived of his principal fort, in defence of which his uncle lost his life, and on the capture of which, his wife, to avoid the dishonor consequent upon falling into the hands of her enemies, had destroyed herself by an explosion of gunpowder.

That, however, it does not appear that any offer of mediation was ever actually made, or any influence exerted, either for the safety of the Ranna’s person and family or in mitigation of the rigorous intentions supposed by Lieutenant Anderson[4] to have been entertained against him by Mahdajee Sindia after his surrender.

That the said Hastings, in the instructions[5] given by him to Mr. David Anderson for his conduct in negotiating the treaty of peace with the Mahrattas, expressed his determination to desert the Ranna of Gohud in the following words.

“You will of course be attentive to any engagements subsisting between us and other powers, in settling the terms of peace and alliance with the Mahrattas. I except from this the Ranna of Gohud.... Leave him to settle his own affairs with the Mahrattas.”

That the said Anderson appears very assiduously to have sought for grounds to justify the execution of this part of his instructions, to which, however, he was at all events obliged to conform.

That, even after his application for that purpose to the Mahrattas, whose testimony was much to be suspected, because it was their interest to accuse and their determined object to destroy the said Ranna, no satisfactory proof was obtained of his defection from the engagements he had entered into with the Company.

That, moreover, if all the charges which have been pretended against the Ranna, and have been alleged by the said Hastings in justification of his conduct, had been well founded and proved to be true, the subject-matter of those accusations and the proofs by which they wore to be supported were known to Colonel Muir before the conclusion of the treaty he entered into with Mahdajee Sindia; and therefore, whatever suspicions may have been entertained or whatever degree of criminality may have been proved against the said Ranna previous to the said treaty, from the time he was so provided for and included in the said treaty he was fully and justly entitled to the security stipulated for him by the Company, and had a right to demand and receive the protection of the British government.

That these considerations were urged by Mr. Anderson to the said Warren Hastings, in his letter of the 24th of June, 1781, and were enforced by this additional argument,—

“that, in point of policy, I believe, it ought not to be our wish that the Mahrattas should ever recover the fortress of Gualior. It forms an important barrier to our own possessions. In the hands of the Ranna it can be of no prejudice to us; and notwithstanding the present prospect of a permanent peace betwixt us and the Mahrattas, it seems highly expedient that there should always remain some strong barrier to separate us, on this side of India, from that warlike and powerful nation.”

That the said Warren Hastings was highly culpable in abandoning the said Ranna to the fury of his enemies, thereby forfeiting the honor and injuring the credit of the British nation in India, notwithstanding the said Hastings was fully convinced, and had professed, “that the most sacred observance of treaties, justice, and good faith were necessary to the existence of the national interests in that country,” and though the said Hastings has complained of the insufficiency of the laws of this kingdom to enforce this doctrine “by the punishment of persons in the possession of power, who may be impelled by the provocation of ambition, avarice, or vengeance, stronger than the restrictions of integrity and honor, to the violation of this just and wise maxim.”

That the said Hastings, in thus departing from these his own principles, with a full and just sense of the guilt he would thereby incur, and in sacrificing the allies of this country “to the provocations of ambition, avarice, or vengeance,” in violation of the national faith and justice, did commit a gross and wilful breach of his duty, and was thereby guilty of an high crime and misdemeanor.

Select Works of Edmund Burke

Reference - http://www.econlib.org/Library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv4c5.html

Speech on Fox's East India Bill - [December 1, 1783]

Mr. Burke's Speech, On the 1st December 1783 [Upon the Question for the Speaker's Leaving the Chair, in Order for the House to Resolve Itself into a Committee on Mr. Fox's East India Bill]

"Next, Sir, let me bring before you the pious care that was taken of our allies under that treaty which is the subject of the Company's applauses. These allies were Ragonaut Row, for whom we had engaged to find a throne; the Guickwar, (one of the Guzerat princes) who was to be emancipated from the Maratta authority, and to grow great by several accessions of dominion; and lastly, the Rana of Gohud, with whom we had entered into a treaty of partition for eleven sixteenths of our joint conquests. Some of these inestimable securities, called vague articles, were inserted in favour of them all. [4.5.53]

As to the first, the unhappy abdicated Peshwa, and pretender to the Maratta throne, Ragonaut Row, was delivered up to his people, with an article for safety, and some provision. This man, knowing how little vague the hatred of his countrymen was towards him, and well apprised of what black crimes he stood accused (among which our invasion of his country would not appear the least) took a mortal alarm at the security we had provided for him. He was thunderstruck at the article in his favour, by which he was surrendered to his enemies. He never had the least notice of the treaty; and it was apprehended that he would fly to the protection of Hyder Ali, or some other, disposed or able to protect him. He was therefore not left without comfort; for Mr. Anderson did him the favour to send a special messenger, desiring him to be of good cheer and to fear nothing. And his old enemy, Scindia, at our request, sent him a message equally well calculated to quiet his apprehensions. [4.5.54]

By the same treaty the Guickwar was to come again, with no better security, under the dominion of the Maratta state. As to the Rana of Gohud, a long negotiation depended for giving him up. At first this was refused by Mr. Hastings with great indignation; at another stage it was admitted as proper, because he had shewn himself a most perfidious person. But at length a method of reconciling these extremes was found out, by contriving one of the usual articles in his favour. What I believe will appear beyond all belief, Mr. Anderson exchanged the final ratifications of that treaty by which the Rana was nominally secured in his possessions, in the camp of the Maratta chief, Scindia, whilst he was (really, and not nominally) battering the castle of Gualior, which we had given, agreeably to treaty, to this deluded ally. Scindia had already reduced the town; and was at the very time, by various detachments, reducing, one after another, the fortresses of our protected ally, as well as in the act of chastising all the Rajahs who had assisted Colonel Camac in his invasion. I have seen in a letter from Calcutta, that the Rana of Gohud's agent would have represented these hostilities (which went hand in hand with the protecting treaty) to Mr. Hastings; but he was not admitted to his presence. [4.5.55]

In this manner the Company has acted with their allies in the Maratta war. But they did not rest here: the Marattas were fearful lest the persons delivered to them by that treaty should attempt to escape into the British territories, and thus might elude the punishment intended for them, and by reclaiming the treaty, might stir up new disturbances. To prevent this, they desired an article to be inserted in the supplemental treaty, to which they had the ready consent of Mr. Hastings and the rest of the Company's representatives in Bengal. It was this, "That the English and Maratta governments mutually agree not to afford refuge to any chiefs, merchants, or other persons, flying for protection to the territories of the other." This was readily assented to, and assented to without any exception whatever, in favour of our surrendered allies. On their part a reciprocity was stipulated which was not unnatural for a government like the Company's to ask; a government, conscious that many subjects had been, and would in future, be driven to fly from its jurisdiction. [4.5.56]

To complete the system of pacific intention and public faith, which predominate in these treaties, Mr. Hastings fairly resolved to put all peace, except on the terms of absolute conquest, wholly out of his own power. For, by an article in this second treaty with Scindia, he binds the Company not to make any peace with Tippoo Saheb, without the consent of the Peishwa of the Marattas; and binds Scindia to him by a reciprocal engagement. The treaty between France and England obliges us mutually to withdraw our forces, if our allies in India do not accede to the peace within four months; Mr. Hastings's treaty obliges us to continue the war as long as the Peishwa thinks fit. We are now in that happy situation, that the breach of the treaty with France, or the violation of that with the Marattas, is inevitable; and we have only to take our choice. [ 4.5.57]

My third assertion, relative to the abuse made of the right of war and peace is, that there are none who have ever confided in us who have not been utterly ruined. The examples I have given of Ragonaut Row, of Guickwar, of the Ranah of Gohud, are recent."

Note - The Rana of Gohad referred here is Maharaja Chhatra Singh Rana (1757-1785)

Author James Mill

Edition used: The History of British India in 6 vols. (3rd edition) (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826). Vol. 4. •Author: James Mill - Part of: The History of British India, 6 vols.

Reference - http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=843&layout=html

James Mill, The History of British India, vol. 4 [1817]

CHAP. III - Connexion with the Ranna of Gohud

Sir Eyre Coote, who had been appointed to succeed General Clavering, both as Commander in Chief, and as a member of the Supreme Council, had arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of April, 1779; and without showing an unvarying deference to the opinions of the Governor-General, commonly supported his measures. Early in November of that year, in consequence of an application from the Rajah of Gohud, commonly known by the name of the Ranna, a Hindu chieftain or prince, who governed a hilly district of considerable extent, lying on the Jumna, between the territories of Scindia and the Nabob of [BOOK V. Chap. 3. 1780.] Oude, the Governor-General proposed a treaty, by which the Ranna might be empowered to call for the assistance of the English against the Mahrattas, of whom he stood in constant danger, and should agree to assist the English with his forces, when they should undertake any enterprise against the contiguous powers. The Governor-General, who contemplated the continuance of the war with the Mahrattas, proposed this alliance, both as a barrier against an invasion, in that direction, of the territory of the Company or their allies; and as an advantage for invading the territory of the Mahrattas, and operating a diversion in favour of the enterprises which might be undertaken on the side of Bombay. The measure was opposed by the opposite side of the Board, both on the ordinary and general ground of the importance of abstaining from war, and also in consideration of the weakness of the Ranna, who had few troops, and not revenue to pay even them; whose aid, in consequence, would be of little avail, and his protection a serious burden. In the objections of the opposing party the General concurred; and even transmitted his protest against the terms of the connexion. But, as he was absent, the casting vote of the Governor-General gave his opinion the superiority, and the treaty was formed.

In the mean time intelligence arrived by a letter from General Coote, dated the 20th of November, of an invasion of the territory of the Ranna, by a body of Mahrattas, whom his want of resources made it impossible for him to resist. Instructions were dispatched to afford him such assistance as the exigency of the case might require, and the state of the English forces permit. A detachment of the company’s army had been prepared in that quarter, under the command of Captain Popham, for the purpose of augmenting the forces of Goddard; but from the[BOOK V. Chap. 3. 1780.] consideration, partly that they could not arrive in time on the Bombay coast, partly that they might contribute to the success of his operations by an attack upon the part which was nearest of the Mahratta frontier, they had not been commanded to proceed; and in the beginning of February, 1780, they were sent to the assistance of the Ranna of Gohud. Captain Popham found means in this service of distinguishing his enterprise and talents. With a small force, and little assistance from the Ranna, he expelled the Mahrattas from Gohud; crossed the Sind, into their own territory; laid siege to the fortress of Lahâr, the capital of the district of Cutchwagar; and having effected an imperfect breach, which the want of heavy cannon enabled him not to complete, he, on the 21st of April, successfully assaulted and took possession of the fort.

It had, however, been importunately urged, both by Coote and Goddard, and was acknowledged by the Governor-General, that the force employed on the Mahratta frontier under Captain Popham was far from adequate to any such important operations as could materially affect the result of the war. After some fluctuation of plans, and great debate and opposition at the Superior Board, in which Mr. Francis in particular vehemently opposed the extension of military efforts, it was determined that a detachment of three battalions, stationed at Cawnpore, under Major Carnac, with a battalion of light infantry, under Captain Browne, should threaten or invade the territories of Scindia and Holkar. In the mean time Captain Popham, with the true spirit of military ardour, after securing with great activity the conquest of the district of Cutchwagar, turned his attention to the celebrated fortress of Gualior, [BOOK V. Chap. 3. 1780] situated within the territory of the Ranna of Gohud, but wrested from his father, and now garrisoned by the Mahrattas. This fortress was situated on the summit, three coss in extent, of a stupendous rock, scarped almost entirely round, and defended by a thousand men. By the princes of Hindustan it had always been regarded as impregnable. And Sir Eyre Coote himself, in his letter to the Supreme Council, dated the 21st of April, had pronounced it “totally repugnant to his military ideas, and even absolute madness,” to attack it with so feeble a detachment, and without a covering army to keep off the Mahrattas in the field, and preserve the line of communication. Captain Popham moved to the village of Ripore, about five coss distant from Gualior, and employed his spies in continually searching if a spot fit for escalading could be found. After many and dangerous experiments, they at last brought him advice that one part only afforded any appearance of practicability. At this place the height of the scarp was about sixteen feet, from the scarp to the wall was a steep ascent of about forty yards, and the wall itself was thirty feet high. “I took the resolution,” says Captain Popham, “immediately. The object was glorious; and I made a disposition to prevent, as much as in my power, the chance of tarnishing the honour of the attempt, by the loss we might sustain in case of a repulse.” At break of day, on the 3d of August, the van of the storming party arrived at the foot of the rock. Wooden ladders were applied to the scarp, and the troops ascended to the foot of the wall. The spies climbed up, and fixed the rope ladders, when the Sepoys mounted with amazing activity. The guards assembled within, but were quickly repulsed by the fire of the assailants. The detachment entered with rapidity, and pushed on to the main body of the place. In the mean time the[BOOK V. Chap. 3. 1780.] greater part of the garrison escaped by another quarter, and left the English masters of one of the greatest and most celebrated strong holds in that quarter of the globe. This brilliant achievement, for which Captain Popham was rewarded with the rank of Major, struck the Mahrattas with so much consternation, that they abandoned the circumjacent country, and conveyed the alarm to Scindia in his capital.1

CHAP. XII British government and its allies

CHAP. XII. - James Mill, The History of British India, vol. 6 [1817]

Reference - http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=845&chapter=79975&layout=html&Itemid=27

Of these cessions it was agreed, between the British government and its allies, that the territory, situated to the westward of the river Wurdah and the southward of the hills on which were the forts of Gawilghur and Nernulla, together with the territory between the Adjuntee hills and the river Godavery, should belong to the Nizam; that Ahmednuggur and its territory should belong to the Peshwa, to whose capital it so nearly approached; and that all the rest should belong to the English. The minor princes, in the region of the Jumna, who formerly bore the yoke of Scindia, and whom it was the policy of the Governor-General now to render dependent upon the British government, and to form of them a sort of barrier on the British frontier against any aggression of the Mahratta powers, were the Rajahs of Bhurtpore, Jodepore, Jyepoor, Macherry, and Boondee, the Ranah of Gohud, and Ambagee Rao Englah.

With the first five of these minor princes, who were already in possession of acknowledged sovereignties, treaties of alliance were formed, on condition that the English should take no tribute from them, nor interfere in the affairs of their government; that, in case of the invasion of the Company's territory, they should assist in repelling the enemy; and that the Company should guarantee their dominions against all aggression, they defraying the expense of the aid which they might receive. The case of the remaining two chieftains required some further arrangements. The Ranah of Gohud had been dispossessed of his territories by Scindia; and all of them, [BOOK VI. Chap. 12. 1803] together with the neighbouring districts, had been consigned to Ambajee, one of Scindia's leading commanders, as renter. Ambajee had deserted Scindia during the war; and it was now determined to make a partition, in sovereignty, of the territories which he rented, between him and the Ranah of Gohud, reserving the fort and city of Gualior to the Company. The same condition was contracted, as in the case of the other three princes, respecting mutual defence; but it was appointed that three battalions of the Company's sepoys should be stationed with the Ranah, and paid for by him, at the rate of 75,000 rupees a month.1

To understand the nature of the power of Scindia, in this quarter of India, a short history is required, not only of the peculiar composition of his army, but also of the territorial acquisitions which he there retained. Deboigne, though not the first Frenchman who was admitted into the army of Scindia, was the first who obtained any considerable degree of power. Born a Savoyard, of parents respectable, though poor, after having served some time in the army of his own prince, he entered the more splendid service of France, in quality of an ensign in the Irish brigades.2 In the vicissitudes of his early life, we must content ourselves with effects; the causes very frequently remain unknown. We find him, next, an ensign in a Russian army, serving against the Turks. He was here taken prisoner; carried to Constantinople; and sold as a slave. After the war, being redeemed by his [BOOK VI. Chap. 12. 1803.] parents, he repaired to St. Petersburg, found means to recommend himself, and was made a lieutenant. He was detached to some Russian post on the Turkish frontier, and had the fortune to command the escort which attended Lord Percy in a progress among the Grecian islands. In consequence of the impression which he must have made upon that nobleman, and the views which he must have disclosed, Lord Percy furnished him with two letters of recommendation, one to Mr. Hastings, Governor of Bengal, and another to Lord Macartney, Governor of Madras, to whose acquaintance, it is said, he had already been admitted, during the residence of that nobleman as British ambassador at St. Petersburg. It is surmised, that he obtained the consent of the Empress to make a voyage to India, from which he was to return by way of Cashmere, Tartary, and the borders of the Caspian Sea. Be that as it may, he arrived at Madras in the year 1780, and engaged as an ensign in the service of the Nabob of Arcot. In 1782 he repaired to Calcutta, where the letter of Lord Percy procured him a favourable reception from Mr. Hastings. Without disclosing his connection with the Russian government, he described to that Governor the journey by Cashmere, and the shores of the Caspian, as the object which he now had in view; and was furnished by him with a recommendation to the Nawaub of Oude, and the British resident at Lucknow. It is said; that he was accommodated by the Nawaub of Oude, and the British resident at Lucknow. It is said; that he was accommodated by the Nawaub with a bill of exchange on Cashmere for 6,000 rupees, with which, instead of prosecuting his journey, he purchased arms and horses, and entered into the service of the Rajah of Jeypoor; that upon intelligence of this proceeding he was ordered down to Lucknow by Mr. Hastings, whom he thought it his interest to obey; that he found the means of exculpating himself in the mind of that ruler, and was [[BOOK VI. Chap. 12. 1803.] permitted to return to Lucknow; that he now engaged in trade, which he prosecuted with success; that he came to Agra, in 1784, at which time the Rana of Gohud was closely besieged by Madajee Scindia; that he suggested to the Rana a plan for raising the siege, but Scindia intercepted his correspondence, and, impressed with the proof of military talents which it displayed, consulted Mr. Anderson, the British resident, on the propriety of taking him into his service; that Mr. Anderson, to whom he had letters of recommendation, sent for him, introduced him to Scindia, and procured him the command of two battalions, to be disciplined in the European style. The terror which Scindia found to march before the grape and bayonets of Deboigne's battalions, and the effects which they produced in the battles of Lallsort, Chacksana, and Agra, from 1784 to 1789, made him eager to increase their number to eight, then to sixteen, and afterwards, it is said, to twenty battalions, at which amount they remained. A battalion complete, consisted of 500 muskets, and 200 gunners, with four field pieces and one howitzer. The military talents of Deboigne, and the efficiency of his troops, were the grand instrument which facilitated, or rather produced, the victories, and enlarged the dominions of Scindia, in the region of the Jumna. In 1792, with eight battalions, he fought the desperate battle of Mairta against a great army of Rattores, a warlike tribe of Rajpoots. In the same year, and with the same force, he defeated, after an obstinate conflict at Patun, the formidable army of Ishmael Beg. In 1792, he defeated the army of Tuckojee Holkar, containing four battalions disciplined and commanded by a Frenchman; and at last made Scindia, without dispute, the most powerful of the native [[BOOK VI. Chap. 12. 1803.]] princes in India. Deboigne was a man above six feet high, with giant bones, large features, and piercing eyes; he was active, and laborious to an astonishing degree; understood profoundly the art of bending to his purposes the minds of men; and was popular (because men felt the benefit of his equitable and vigilant administration), though stained with three unpopular vices, jealousy, avarice, and envy.1

Perron came into India as a petty officer of a ship, either with Suffrein, or about the time of Suffrein's arrival. Having travelled into the upper provinces, he first received employment in the army of the Rana of Gohud, where he served under the immediate command of an Englishman. After the destruction of the Rana, he joined, in quality of quarter-master-serjeant, a corps commanded by a Frenchman in the service of Scindia. Though he soon raised himself to a higher command, his corps was reduced, upon the return of the army into cantonments; and he was even unsuccessful in an application for employment in the army of the Begum Sumroo. When the brigade of Deboigne began to be formed, the prospects of Perron revived. He received the command of the Boorhanpore battalion; and had an opportunity of distinguishing himself in the battle of Patun. He commanded the detachment of Deboigne's army which besieged. Ishmael Beg in Canoor; and it was to him that Ishmael Beg surrendered. To the honour of their European education, Deboigne and Perron resolutely protected their prisoner from the death which Scindia, who had suffered from his prowess, thirsted to inflict upon him; and he remained in the fort of Agra, with a considerable allowance for his [BOOK VI. Chap. 12. 1803.] subsistence. When the corps of Deboigne became sufficiently numerous to be divided into two brigades, he gave the command of the first to M. Frimont, and that of the second to M. Perron, who, accordingly, upon the death of Frimont, became second in command. When the ambition of Scindia to establish a control over the Peshwa carried him to Poona, it was the brigade of Perron which attended him thither, and formed the principal part of his force. Perron, thus about the person of Dowlut Rao from the moment of his accession, and one of the main instruments of his power, easily succeeded to the whole authority of Deboigne, when, in 1798, that commander withdrew with his fortune to Europe.1

M. Deboigne had received a large track of country, in the region of the Jumna, in assignment for the maintenance of his troops. Not only the territory as well as the army which had devolved upon Perron required his presence upon the departure of Deboigne; but the presumption of the Governors, both of Delhi and of Agra, had so much increased by the long absence of Scindia in the South, that it seemed to be high time to reduce them to obedience. In the month of October, 1798, Perron sent two battalions, commanded by Colonel Sutherland, one of the Englishmen who helped to officer Scindia's regular brigades, with an expectation that the Kelledar would deliver up the fort; but disappointed in that hope he sent three battalions more, and the place was invested. Though, from a humane regard to the aged Mogul and his family, who were kept as a sort of prisoners in the fort, much caution was used in firing at the [BOOK VI. Chap. 12. 1803.] place, it was ready for assault in nineteen days, when the Kelledar capitulated and surrendered.1

This was the occasion, on which, for the first time, the custody of the emperor was placed in the hands of a Frenchman. He had now, during ten years, been subject to the power of Scindia, under which he had fallen, by the following means.

In 1782, when Mr. Hastings so eagerly made peace with the Mahratta powers, their dominions were bounded, on the north, by that great chain of mountains, which extends in a direction nearly east and west, from Cuttack in the Bay of Bengal to Ajmere, and forms a great boundary between the southern and the northern portions of the Indian continent. This physical barrier, against the dangers to which the English dominions in the north of India were exposed from the vicinity of the Mahrattas, was not all. On the western half of this chain of mountains, on its northern side, and immediately bordering upon the Company's frontier, or that of their dependant, the Nabob of Oude, were placed, forming another line of defence, a number of small independent states, all jealous of the Mahrattas, and all dreading any extension of their power. The whole of that wide expanse of country, which extends from near Allahabad on the east to the river Sutledge on the west; bounded on the south by the mountainous ridge just mentioned; on the north, as far as Shekoab, by the Jumna; thence by a line passing near Secundra to the Ganges, and by the Ganges to Hurdwar; was, by the policy of Mr. Hastings, left open to the ambition of the Mahrattas. This country contained, among other principalities, the territory of Bundelcund and Narwar; that of Gohud, including [BOOK VI. Chap. 12. 1803.] Gualior and Bind; and the great provinces of Agra and Delhi, including the Jaat country, and nearly one half of the Dooab, subject chiefly to the Emperor Shah Aulum, and a few other Mahomedan chiefs. Scindia was the Mahratta prince, who, from the vicinity of his territories, and from his power, was best situated for availing himself of the offered advantage; and he did not allow the opportunity to escape. Another Mahratta chieftain, indeed, found means to get a partial possession of Bundelcund, while Scindia was engrossed with the business of other acquisitions; but all the rest of that extensive country was wholly appropriated by the latter chieftain.1

Note - Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. Copyright information: The text is in the public domain.

Author Edward Terry - Voyage to India in 1616

Volume 9, Chapter 11, Section 7b -- Relation of a Voyage to India in 1616, with Observations respecting the Dominions of the Great Mogul, by Mr. Edward Terry, part 2

Reference - http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/kerr/vol09chap11sect07b.html

• 22. Narwar, its chief city being Gohud, is watered by a fair river that falls into the Ganges.

--This province of Narwar, now called Gohud, from its chief city, is to be carefully distinguished from Marwar to the westwards.--E.

• 22. Gualior, with its chief city of the same name, in which the Mogul has a great treasury in bullion. In this city likewise there is an exceedingly strong castle, in which state prisoners are kept.

--Gualior is, properly speaking, in the same province or district with Gohud.--E.

Author George Forrest

A History of the Indian Mutiny, 1857-58: Reviewed and Illustrated from ... By George Forrest

Reference - A History of the Indian Mutiny

This book discusses about early history of Gwalior Fort and its occupation by Rana of Gohad from page 24-26. It writes on page 24 that on the disruption of the Mughal Empire it fell into te hands of a petty prince known as Rana of Gohad. It describes how the Gwalior fort was captured by Major Popham on 3 August 1780. It writes further on page 26 that the Rana claimed possession and we gave back to him. (So easily?)

Author H. G. Keene

The Fall of the Moghul Empire of Hindustan

by H. G. Keene, September, 1998 [Etext #1470

CHAPTER II.

A.D. 1765-71.

Reference - http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext98/tfmeh10.txt

There is also a thriving little principality — that of Dholpur — between Agra and Gwalior, under a descendant of the Jat Rana of Gohad, so often met with in the history of the times we are now reviewing (v. inf. p. 128.) It is interesting to note further, that some ethnologists have regarded this fine people as of kin to the ancient Get, and to the Goths of Europe, by whom not only Jutland, but parts of the south-east of England and Spain were overrun, and to some extent peopled. It is, therefore, possible that the yeomen of Kent and Hampshire have blood relations in the natives of Bharatpur and the Panjab.

Author Allen Foster

Thomas Legge, Irish Adventurer turned Fakir

by Allen Foster Reference - http://www.alphalink.com.au/~agilbert/legge2.html

Thomas Legge, Irish Adventurer turned Fakir

by Allen Foster

Thomas Legge, from Donaghdee in Ulster (Northern Ireland), developed an interest in Indian alchemy and divination and ended his days as a fakir, living naked in an empty tomb in the deserts of Rajasthan outside Jaipur. A life like that of his father, a respectable businessman who ran a modest shipping business, did not hold any attraction for the youthful Legge. At heart he yearned for excitement and adventure and spurned his father’s attempts to set him up in a business. Wanderlust got the better of Thomas and he ran away from home and joined the Swallow, a sloop of war heading for Madras.

After several months at sea, Legge realized that the tough life of a British marine was not for him and he deserted as soon as the ship docked in India. He tramped his way northwards across central India to Hyderabad in the Sindh, supporting himself by begging. This was about 1775. He stayed in the area for another five or six years before heading through the great Rajasthan desert to Jaipur. He stayed there a while before becoming a mercenary in the service of the Jat Rana of Gohad, under another European adventurer called Major Sangster. This Scotsman was a master of the art of casting cannon, which rivalled the very best the East India Company could turn out. He could also make excellent muskets at a cost of ten rupees each, and was a brilliant raiser of troops. This skilful soldier must have recognized in Legge something of a kindred spirit, for he taught the Irishman everything he knew. But once again Legge’s desire to travel got the better of him. Armed with the knowledge gained from Sangster, he said goodbye to his mentor and set off on his travels once again.

Author John Gorton

A General Biographical Dictionary

By John Gorton

Reference - http://www.books.google.co.in/books?id=3_gDAAAAYAAJ...

BOIGNE reached Delhi in 1783. There he gave up all idea of returning to Europe, and offered his services to the Rajah of Gohad against Scidhia, then to rajah of Djipoor,and finally to Scindia himself, the head of the Marathas. To him he rendered great services and was nominated a general commanding infantry.

Author George Bruce Malleson

An Historical Sketch of the Native States of India in Subsidiary Alliance with the British government, Elibron Classics.

By George Bruce Malleson

Reference -http://www.books.google.co.in/books?isbn=1402184514

Chap X - page 93

The ancestors of Dholpur were, about a hundred and fifty years ago, zamindars or Landholders of Gohad, then a small village 28 miles north east of the fortress of Gwalior. They belonged to the Jat caste, they were industrious and of a very warlike disposition.

By the exercise of these qualities the family brought themselves between the years 1725 and 1740 to the prominent notice of the Peshwa, Bajirao, and amid the lawlessness and disruptions of the times, managed to assume a quasi independence as lords of Gohad under suzerainty of Marathas. The chief, (Bhim Singh Rana), who accomplished this feat died about the middle of the 18th century, and was succeeded by his nephew. He, (Chhatra Singh Rana), being likewise a clear headed man, contrived to enlarge his borders. With a wise prescience he held aloof from the struggle for empire between the Marathas and warriors from the north and when the fatal day of Panipat 1761 had completely overwhelmed the former, he showed his sense of the importance of defeat by proclaiming Rana of Gohad and seizing the fortress of Gwalior. That independence remained unquestioned for six years. But in 1767 Raghunath Rao, afterwards Peshwa, being then in Hindustan thought to teach a lesson to Rana of Gohad. Accordingly he marched with the army to attack Gohad. But the Rana had in the meanwhile strengthened his defence; he had drilled his troops; and being a hardy man himself, with an especial

Page 94

dislike to be ridden over roughshod, he gave the assailants some very hard and unpleasant work. He defended himself so valiantly that Raghunath Rao proposed at last to treat. An accommodation was agreed upon, by which, for a consideration of Rs 3 lakhs, the Marathas agreed to retire, and to recognize the independence, under their suzerainty, of the Rana Lokindar Singh.

I have been unable to trace when Rana of Gohad lost Gwalior, but it was probably about this period. It fell into the hands of Mahadji Sindhia.

It was in his possession when British Govt. entered into an alliance with the turbulent tributary^[1], of the Marathas, the Rana of Gohad.

Marathas and the English Company 1707-1800

Reference http://san.beck.org/2-10-Marathas1707-1800.html

Marathas and Hastings 1767-84

Another Bengal detachment led by Captain Popham helped the Rana of Gohad capture Gwalior in August 1780. Hastings sent more forces, and in 1781 Eyre Coote defeated Haidar at Porto Novo. General Camac also defeated Mahadji Sindia at Sipri. After these English victories, Sindia proposed a new treaty between Puna and the English, recognizing young Madhava Rao Narayan and giving Raghunath a pension. This treaty of Salbai was signed in May 1782 and ratified eight months later by Nana Fadnavis; it called for the Peshwa to make Haidar 'Ali relinquish his conquests and prisoners within six months of ratification. Haidar 'Ali was elderly and had died of cancer in December 1782; but his son Tipu continued the war. Bombay brigadier Mathews and his men captured Bednore and Mangalore in 1783 but surrendered to Tipu after he withdrew troops from the Karnatak. Lord Macartney at Madras recalled Col. Fullarton, and the 1784 treaty of Mangalore restored conquests and liberated prisoners.

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