History of the Jats:Dr Kanungo/Decline of the House of Bharatpur
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By K. R. Qanungo. Edited by Vir Singh. Delhi, Originals, 2003, ISBN 81-7536-299-5.
Chapter XIV. Decline of the House of Bharatpur
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Nawal Singh provokes fresh hostilities with Mirza Najaf Khan
[p.156]: May 1774 was the most unfortunate month in a year of Nawal Singh's misfortunes. Every week brought the news of some great disaster to him; Ballamgarh surrendered to Hira Singh Jat; Farrukhnagar opened her gates to Musavi Khan and General Somru hitherto the greatest terror to the enemies of the Jats, deserted to the imperial Court. All these heavy strokes of an adverse fate came down upon him in swift succession within the first twenty days of this month.1 Raja Nawal Singh bore these losses with equanimity. Though he was destitute of the cool courage and strong nerve of a Jat, he had that optimism and that perseverance verging on obstinacy which characterise his tribe.
Mirza Najaf Khan was well satisfied with the results of his late campaign against the Jats. He had no mind to risk his fame and fortune by besieging their impregnable forts which had baffled the energy, skill and resources of many a great conqueror. He considered the task of the subjugation of the Jats as well nigh finished, and now turned his attention to the other rebels against the imperial authority. He started from Delhi to co-operate with the Nawab of Oudh in his contemplated campaign against the Ruhelas. But the battle
1. According to the Waqa MS. p. 277) Ballamgarh and Farrukhnagar were surrendered by the Jats between the dates 19th Safar and 8th Rabi I, 1188 H. Somru had an interview with the Emperor on the 9th Rabi I (20th May, 1774), received khilat and was appointed faujdar of Panipat and other parganas (ibid, p. 278).
[p.157]: of Miran Katra (April 17, 1774) had been won by Shuja-ud, daula before he could arrive on the scene. He proceeded to Bisauli where a general treaty2 for the partition of the territories of the Afghans and of the Mian Doab was concluded with the wazir. He returned to the capital by the end of June with the determination of taking the field against Zabita Khan to enforce the conditions of this treaty and punish him for his late acts of rebellion. But the strange perversity of Nawal Singh drove him to fresh acts of hostility with the Mirza who was compelled to march into the Jat country soon afterwards. The Jat chief imprudently sought a war with a stronger enemy at the moment of his own absolute political isolation. The Sikhs were unwilling to hazard much for a lost cause and Shuja-ud-daula, who had proved a dubious ally, was now an active enemy and in league with Mirza Najaf Khan. The Marathas who would, in their own interests, have given him help against the Mughal general, were still preoccupied with their internal dissensions arising out of the murder of the Peshwa Narayan Rao. Nawal Singh acted like a gambler grown desperate by repeated failure and yet bent upon persisting in a losing game, allured by the hope of gaining all in the last throw.
During the absence of Mirza Najaf Khan, Raja Nawal Singh made an attempt to recover his lost ground. He issued out of Deeg with his army and began to expel the amils of Mirza Najaf Khan from the country. Not content with this, he threatened to march upon Delhi. Mirza Najar Khan decided to postpone the intended campaign against Zabita Khan till he had crushed the Jat power once for all. While the monsoon was still raging in its full fury, he started on his second campaign against Nawal Singh. The Jat army
2. Two conditions of this treaty were (1) the possessions of Najib-ud-daula and Zabita Khan, lying to the west of the Jamuna, such as Panipat, Sonepat, Maham, Gohana, Hansi, Hisar etc. should pass under the authority of Najaf Khan on behalf of the Emperor. (2) Should Zabita Khan submit to His Majesty the Emperor, and swear friendliness to the Amir-ul-umra and promise not to deviate by a hair's breadth from his authority, the chakla of Saharanpur was to be left to the Ruhela chief. (Ibratnama, MS. pp. 260-261).
[p.158]: retreated before the advance of the Mughals and hurriedly sought the shelter of the fort of Sankar3 (Sunukhar?) when the Mirza arrived at Barsana in pursuit of them. The Khan had no alternative than to besiege the enemy there, as any advance upon Deeg leaving the field army of Jats unbeaten in his rear was extremely dangerous. The heart of the Jat country now presented a formidable chain of strong forts, Sunukhar, Kama (the neutral territory belonging to Jaipur), Deeg, Kumher and Bharatpur.
The task of dislodging Nawal Singh from his fortified retreat, protected in the rear and flank by the neutral territory of Jaipur, proved a task of exceptional difficulty to the Muslim army. No longer proud of his mercenaries, the regent became more considerate to the Jats. They too, thus cornered by the enemy and compelled to fight for their very existence, began to show their wonted courage and stubbornness. They sallied out daily and fought skirmishes with the Muslim troopers, who could no longer claim success in every encounter. The siege dragged on for many days without making the least impression upon the besieged, who were fed by supplies sent secretly from the fort of Kama. The Rajput princes became equally alarmed at the revival of the imperial authority and did not fail to realise that as soon as the Jat resistance would fall to the ground the victorious Mughal would again carry war into the heart of Rajputana and demand tribute from them. The old animosity between the Bharatpur Raj and Jaipur had been buried in oblivion with the banes of the haughty Jawahar and the sensitive Madho Singh. The regency which controlled the affairs of
3. The name of the place as written in a MS. of the Ibratnama warrants the reading of Sankar, Singar or Sunkar. There is one Singar (tat. 27°25'; long. 77°"20') in the Gurgaon district and about 20 miles north of Kaman (Kama). The same authority tells us that the besieged Jat army at this place could so easily draw their supplies from Kama that without first reducing Kama, operations against the former place proved futile. So this cannot be Singar, at such a great distance from Kama. Sunukhar (lat. 27°45',long. 77°18'), about 8 miles north of Kama and 12 miles west of Barsana and situated in a marshy tract answers the description best. About half a mile south of Sunukhar there is a ruined fort called Sabalgarh.
[p.159]: the Jaipur State during the minority of Maharajah Prithvi Singh II decided to help the Jats in their struggle with Najaf Khan. The amil of Kama under instructions from his Govt continued to supply secretly provisions to the army of Nawal Singh. Mirza Najaf Khan could neither storm the enemy's position defended by numerous guns, nor could he by any means induce his adversary to leave the shelter of the fort and give a pitched battle for the decision of the long drawn out issue. The siege continued for four months when Mirza Najaf Khan was called away to the capital by some intrigues of Abdul Ahad Khan. He left Najaf Quli in supreme command of the army, and after his return to Delhi sent the notorious Somru4 to reinforce the besieging army at Sunukhar.
Somru, who was well acquainted with the situation of the place, represented to Najaf Quli Khan that as long as grain and fodder would continue to reach the Jat army from Kama it was impossible to bring the siege of Sunukhar to a successful close. Najaf Quli wrote to the amil of Kama not to give any assistance to the Jats. This remonstrance having proved ineffectual, that impetuous soldier decided upon attacking Kama without reflecting upon the political consequence of his action. He sent a portion of his army to besiege that fort. Nawal Singh having left a strong garrison at Sunukhar withdrew with his army to Deeg. The Kachhwahas now openly joined hands with the Jats to resist the imperialists. Najaf Quli's guns made very little impression upon the walls of the fort of Kama, which are said to have been so broad that two carts could drive side by side on their top without the least danger. He held out the promise of giving that fort to the brave Ruhela chief Mulla Rahimdad
4. According to Khair-ud-din, Somru deserted to the camp of Najaf Khan during the siege of Sankar, i.e. at the end of the rainy season of 1774. He gives a dramatic touch to the whole affair at the sacrifice of accuracy. We have the unassailable testimony of the Waqa that on the 20th of May, 1774 (see ante) Somru was given leave to depart for his fief of Panipat. It is more likely that Mirza Najaf Khan recalled him from Panipat and sent him against the Jats to aid Najaf Quli with his intimate knowledge of the Jat country and their weaknesses.
[p.160]: if he would succeed in capturing the place by a coup. One day Rahimdad at the head of his dare-devils stormed it by a rush, unmindful of the tremendous cost in the lives of his followers. But Najaf Quli broke his word and appointed Somru to the charge of Kama. Mulla Rahimdad, vowing eternal enmity to both, marched away with his 12,000 Ruhelas, horse and foot, to seek service with Nawal Singh [Ibratnama, MS. p. 266].
Nawal Singh gave a warm welcome to the Ruhela chief and his brave followers. He assigned suitable pay for every man and gave them large jagirs- in hort he showed them every consideration except trusting them within the gates of any of his forts. Prospects became more promising for the Jat at beginning of the year 1775. Mirza Najaf Khan had not only to fight with the sword the enemies of the empire abroad, but he had also to hold his own at the Court with the subtler weapons of diplomacy against the Emperor and His majesty' well-wishers like Abdul Ahad Khan. Scarcely had the Mirza succeeded in disentangling himself from the meshes of the Court intrigue, when he fell dangerously ill. The news spread abroad that he was dead, and thisencouraged the Jaipur darbar to make a vigorous effort for the recovery of the pargana Kama. Mirza Najaf Khan recovered from his illness, and on the 4th April, 1775 [Safar 2, 1189 H.] he took leave of the Emperor to march against the Jats and Rajputs (Waqa, 287). When the news of the coming of the Mirza became known, Raja Nawal Singh left Deeg with his army and came to Sunukhar which was still holding out. The forces of Jaipur also joined him, and the allied army encamped under the shelter of the fort and strongly entrenched their position. Mulla Rahimdad, now in the Jat service, was posted with his Ruhelas outside the fortifications of Sunukhar. Several petty actions took place in which the Afghans fought against their late comrades with all the vehemence of injured pride. Mirza Najaf Khan tried without success to win them back to his side, promising Kama and in addition several other parganas to Rahimdad as jagir. But Nawal Singh and his shrewd counsellors could not repose in peace on account of their Pathan ally whom they suspected to be in collusion with the imperialists. They
[p.161]: feared that Rahimdad was waiting for an opportunity to fall upon them at some unguarded moment. They now hit upon a clever device to avoid a breach with the Ruhela chief and yet relieve themselves of his distrusted presence in their camp. Rahimdad was asked to start on a plundering expedition against Hindaun and Bayana: all property acquired there as booty was promised to him as a free gift, and the districts conquered as jagirs to his troops. Rahim, without suspecting the motive of the Jat, readily agreed to this and at once began his march against those places [Ibratnama, MS. p. 267].
M. Madec, who held Hinduan and Bayana as jagirs from the Emperor, became extremely agitated at the news of Rahimdad's departure in that direction. He left, without Najaf Khan's approval his ost at Barsana and reached the neighbourhood of Fatehpur Sikri by rapid marches. At a little distance from this place his troops, while in the act of fording a small stream, were surprised by Rahimdad and Ambaji Maratha. The sepoys of M. Madec formed their ranks with great rapidity, but they missed the first volley owing to their cartridges being spoiled by water. Before they could reload, the Ruhelas fell upon them with drawn sabres and put some to death and others to flight. The rout was complete: M. Madec did not pause to breathe till he reached the fort of Agra. Rahimdad created such an uproar in that quarter that Najaf Khan was compelled to send against him a large detachment of troops under Muhammad Beg Khan Hamadani, who was appointed governor of Agra.
Nawal Singh and his Rajput allies decided to attack the army of Mirza Najaf Khan considerably weakened by the absence of two renowned chiefs like M. Madec and the Hamadani with their divisions. They came out of their entrenched position and offered battle to the Muslim army on the 18th of May, 1775 (17th Rabi 1, 1189 H.; Waqa, MS. p. 287). The superior generalship of the Mirza more than made up for the deficiency of the imperialists in number. The Jats and Rajputs sustained a defeat and fled to Deeg. ---
Death of Raja Nawal Singh
Raja Nawal Singh paid dearly for his folly in rekindling the
[p.162]: flames of war which did not subside even after consuming him to death. In spite of many disasters and defeats the Jat chief was as obdurate as ever. The victorious Mughal army has thundering before the gates of Deeg, demanding his submission or a fight to the end. But Nawal Singh coolly refused both. Fond hope whispered in his ear that he need not yet despair of success, Abdul Ahad Khan tried what diplomacy and intrigue could to baffle or divert the arms of Mirza Najaf Khan. He was instigating the Marathas5 to crush timely the formidable power of the Mirza - the more dangerous to their national safety on account of his alliance with the English who supported the pretensions of Raghoba. In the Deccan the battle of Arras had been fought (18th May, 1775), the issue of which was not very encouraging to the patrons of the usurper. Nawal Singh was heartened by the prospect of a Maratha invasion of. Hindustan after the rainy season which would surely compel the Mirza to retire from the Jat country. More hopeful was the news of an alliance of Zabita Khan with the Sikhs and their joint attack upon the imperial territories. The son of Najib-ud-daula looked upon the office of Amir-ul-umra and all the territories around Delhi as a part of his heritage from which Mirza Najaf Khan and the Marathas had ousted him under the pretence of restoring the authority of the Emperor. He aspired to play the dictator at the imperial Court like his father; the Ruhela confederacy having disappeared he relied on the Sikhs who were to be pitted against the Marathas. The Sikhs plundered and burnt Paharganj (the western suburb of Delhi between Qadam Sharif and Raisina), and the Ruhela chief himself was ravaging the Doab. The situation was menacing enough to create grave anxiety in the mind of the Emperor, who wrote to Nawab Asaf-ud-daula6 for help against the rebels. Mirza Najaf Khan refused to move leaving a half-conquered enemy to insult his rear and resolved not to turn his back upon Deeg without capturing it. God spared the Jat chief the mortification of witnessing the inevitable doom of his
5. See Mirza Najaf Khan's letter to the Governor of Bengal, entered under the date 24th January, 1775. (Pers. Cor. MS).
6. See ibid, letter of Asaf-ud-daula to the Governor dated 31st May, 1775.
[p.163]: country and people. Raja Nawal Singh, who seem to have vowed not to die on the battle-field, was happy enough to breathe his last on a sick-bed, two gharis after sunset on Thursday, 10th August,7 1775. He was sickly in constitution, cowardly in action and rash in speculation. He Was obstinate on the wrong side of it and brave in everything except what concerned his personal safety. As a soldier and patriot he was of the type of Demosthenes who could deliver Philippics at the forum of Athens, without courage to bear the sight of Philip's phalanx on the field of Charonea. Though he had disappointed his officers and troops at critical moments by his nervous timidity, they never ceased to believe that he would behave better next time. "He did not possess much administrative ability and generalship."s 8Nevertheless, he was loved by his people for his amiable virtues and generosity, and his death was sincerely mourned by all of them.
Rahimdad's treachery and his expulsion from Deeg by Ranjit Singh Jat
Mulla Rahimdad, after his successful raid in the Bayana and Agra districts, had returned to Deeg at the beginning of the rainy season, and pitched his camp under the shelter of the fort-guns along with other commanders of the Jat army. He proved faithful to his paymasters while nothing very covetable tempted his fidelity. On the very night of Nawal Singh's death the Ruhela determined to try his luck by a bold piece treachery. "Having come to learn that the men inside the city had given themselves up to mourning and were neglecting the defence of the place, Rahimdad Khan considered this to be the most opportune moment, and got four or five thousand of his Ruhela soldiers ready for action. At first he himself with a few chosen companionswent to the gate of the city which lay opposite to his camp, and secured entrance under the pretence of taking a mere stroll. He seized that gate, and with the assistance of hisveteran soldiers, made himself master of the whole city. He posted RuhlaS at every gate to keep watch over it, and
8. 12th Jamda 11, 1189 A H.; Waqa MS. p. 289.
9. Ghulam Ali's Shah Alam Nama MS. p. 4.
[p.164]: going to the door of Jawahar Singh's [palace] got hold of the person of his infant son Kheri Singh by deluding the ladies of his harem with smooth words of deception. He seated Kheri Singh on the masnad, and got himself appointed his Deputy" [Ibratnama, MS. p. 270]. He established his authority over every department of the State after expelling from Deeg those officers of Nawal Singh who showed hostility to him. Rahimdad took into his pay and confidence a considerable number of Jat soldiers and made preparations to give battle to the Amir-ul-umra. His attitude was a strange one; he determined to hold Deeg in independent authority against the Emperor as well as the sons of Raja Suraj Mal. A counter revolution was being planned against him in the fort of Kumher, where Ranjit Singh secretly assembled all the loyal chiefs of his tribe and intrigued with those in the city of Deeg for the expulsion of the usurping mercenary leader: One night he started for Deeg with a select body of troops. He himself entered the fort with a few companions and directed Awllia (Inglia?) Maratha, who had 2,000 horse with him, to attack the encampment of the Ruhelas outside the walls of Deeg. They executed their task with skill and bravery, and falling unawares upon the Ruhela camp threw it into utter confusion. Rahimdad on hearing this news hurridly went out to the rescue of his camp without suspecting the trap laid for him by his clever enemy. In his absence the whole city of Deeg rose against his followers. Reassured by the presence of the prince even those Jats whom Rahimdad had taken into his service joined their brethren in destroying the faithless Ruhelas. Fighting men who had hitherto remained in concealment among the town folk issued out simultaneously from every street and lane and within a short time cleared the City of the Afghans killing many and capturing a considerable number of them. Rahimdad,9 seeing that fortune would no longer befriend
9. Khair-ud-din says that Rahimdad after his expulsion from Deeg again rejected the offer of Mirza Najaf Khan to re-enter his service, that he attached himself to Abdul Ahad Khan and that he attacked Bashir khan, the Lieutenant of Najaf Khan in charge of Hisar and Hansi (Ibratnama, pp. 286-289). But one mutilated sentence seems to throw doubt on the above statements of Khair-ud-din.
Under the date 11th Ziqada 1189 A H. (3rd January, 1776) we have the following fragment "Khabar rashid ke Mullah Rahimdad Khan HAMRAH-I-MlRZA NAJAF KHAN...." i.e., news reached that Mulla Rahimdad Khan in the company of Mirza Najaf Khan....This perhaps warrants us in inferring that Rahimdad was with the Mirza-and certainly as a friend on that date i.e., 3rd January, 1776. So he must have been expelled from Deeg at some date prior to it.
[p.165]: him in that country, marched away towards Delhi. Ranjit Singh was installed at Deeg as Raja in the place of his infant nephew Kheri Singh, whose claim was set aside in view of the great danger to he Jat nation.
The Glory of Deeg
Deeg, the deserted capital of the Sinsinwar Jats, is now a sleepy provincial town of sombre look, situated 44 miles w.n.w. of Agra and 22 miles north of Bharatpur. Though humiliated by the neglect of more than a century, and overpowered by enemies, she still keeps erect her Lakwa Burj lifting its head high into the sky like the haughty crest of Jawahar. The town and its neighbourhood have lost their awe-aspiring martial look under British peace. It is situated in a level plain, having nothing noticeable except its beautiful sheets of water which add to the charm as well as strength of the place making it almost inaccessible to the enemy, especially in the rainy season. Whatever human efforts could do to remedy the defects of nature were not spared by the Jat for strengthening this place. The huge mud-Wall with bastions encircling the town was so prodigious in height and breadth that it appeared at the first sight "like a long range of hillocks utilised for the purpose of enclosing the city"(Le Nabob Rene Madec, see. 48). A broad and deep ditch runs all around the city except near the Shah Burj which commanded the main entrance. This Shah Burj was almost a fortress by itself with "an area of fifty yards square on the inside, for the use of garrison, and presenting four commanding bastions facing the four cardinal points .... About a mile from this place, and nearly in the
[p.166]: centre of the town, stands the citadel, which is strongly built.. ... The ramparts are high and thick, furnished with bastions and surrounded by a deep ditch faced with masonry.10 The approaches to the outer fort were rendered extremely difficult by a number of fortified outworks and small garhis strewn all over the surrounding plain. Among these the largest and strongest was Gopalgarh, a small mud-fort which stood at a short distance opposite the Shah Burj. Though the countryman11 of Vauban could perhaps with justice ridicule the engineering skill of the Jat, Deeg and Bharatpur were then admittedly the strongest and most carefully fortified cities in India.
Within these formidable fortifications was a flourishing city, the wealth and magnificence of which mocked the decaying grandeur of the proud capitals of the Great Mughal, Delhi and Agra. The honour and wealth of the Hindus were considered nowhere more safe than at Deeg. Merchant princes and "nobles of the robe" of the Mughar Court built there large and handsome mansions for the better security of their treasure and families. Traders of all communities flocked there and turned Deeg into one of the main arteries of commerce by establishing their depots of merchandise within its wall. The beautiful was not altogether neglected by the Jat in his pursuit of the useful. The architect whose skill was no longer in demand at the impoverished Court of Delhi sought the patronage of the wealthy Jat and transformed a robber-chief's retreat into a city of palaces worthy of the capital of a powerful nation. Thakur Badan Singh lavishly spent his great wealth in decorating Deeg with a splendid suite of palaces now own as the Purana Mahal. Raja Suraj Mal; thoghh unjust to himself like some pious and charitable Seths, dd not grudge any expnditure towards the building of several noble edifices, such as Suraj Bhavan, Kishan Bhavan, and Gopal Bhavan, bearing the impress of a new
10. Memoir of the War in India by Major William Thorn. p. 414.
11. M. Madec speaking about the fortifications of Bharatpur remarks : "These people are so simple that they well believe that they have found out the true manner of fortifying!" (Le Nabob Rene Madec, sec. 47).
[p.167]: style of architecture which experts are disposed call the Jat style,cacterised by a graceful combination of Jat solidarity with Mughal elegance. Maharaja Jawahar Singh, envious of the inimitable grace and symmetry of the Kachhwaha capital, sought to turn his own into a veritable paradise of his dreams. Large reservoirs of water for boating and beautiful gardens intersected by canals fed by artificial fountains immeasurably heightened. the Charm of the royal palaces. Such was the noble city of Deeg, great in beauty and strength, which was now coveted by the conqueror of the Jats to crown his victory.
The Siege of Deeg (May, 1775-April, 1776)
Mirza Nazaf Khan had withdrawn his main army to Farah (on the bank of the Jamuna, half-way between Mathura and Agra) from the neighbourhood of Deeg during the rainy season, leaving only a small detachment to watch the enemy. At the end of the rains he started to resume the siege and pitched his camp at a distance of one kos and a half from the Kama gate. He passed some days in reconnoitring the defences of the fort; his heart misgave himat the closer view of its strength. So numerous were the guns and matchlockmen manning its walls that Deeg appeared to him a living volcano, every inch of which seemed to emit fire and send forth an inexhaustible flood of molten lead. The fortifications were so extensive that his whole army was considered hardly sufficient to blockade effectively even one side of it. At last his soldier's eye descried the Achilles's heel in this apparently invulnerable monster of war. He assigned the task of erecting batteries against the Shah Burj (where the ditch terminated) to half his men, and himself with the other half besieged Gopalgarh12 to cover their operations [Ibratnama, MS. p. 274]. The soldiers in their batteries dug trenches to protect themselves from the galling fire of artillery and musketry from the walls of Deeg. Several thousand Naga foot-soldiers were encamped in the
12. It is interesting to observe that in 1804 Lord Lake also did exactly the same at the siege of Deeg : "On the right of our battery [against Shah Burj] was Gopalgarh an old mudfort .... crowded with matchlockmen who by their constant firing annoyed working parties very much and did us considerable damage." [Memoir of the War in India - Thorn, p. 408].
[p.168]: intervening ground between Deeg and Gopalgarh. As they knew no fear or anxiety, their leaders would very often with a few of such followers boldly attack the Musalmans in the battery and drive off from the way the bullocks bringing grain to the army of the Mirza. This caused scarcity of foodstuffs in his camp and alarmed his troops. Shortly after Muhammad Beg Khan Hamadani and Najaf Quli who had been sent to reduce the surrounding country to order and obedience, returned to the camp with large convoys of grain and materials of war. The arrival of their victorious troops revived the courage of the besieging army. Mirza Najaf Khan having been thus reinforced, decided to drive away the enemy troops encamped in the open ground between Gopalgarh and Deeg.
One morning the Nawab, with his whole army arrayed for battle and his guns placed in front, marched to his chosen ground. All the Naga Gosains fully equipped for fight and carrying matchlocks in their hands came out to resist the Muslim army. Thousands of Jat soldiers poured in from every direction and rapidly formed ranks of battle. Ranjit Singh himself accompanied by all his brave and renowned chiefs descended from the fort and taking his post in one of the murhalas [redoubts] gave an order for attacking the enemy. At the same time the guns of Deeg and Gopalgarh kept on firing incessantly upon the troops of the Nawab, who were also exposed to a heavy fire of zamburaks, jazail and muskets from behind the redoubts. From all directions the Jat horse and foot began to press them hard and the furious Gosains dealt out martyrdom to many a Muslim. The troops of the Nawab were losing their ground; many were slain and the knees of others began to shake. The few who had hitherto tenaciously kept the field out of a sense of honour in spite of the deadly fire were at last about to flee. The Nawab, seeing the desperate condition of affairs, dismounted, and his choice companions and guards followed suit. At their head he charged the enemy with great intrepidity. His example spurred the disheartened Muslim troops to one gallant effort to break the enemy's lines. But Raja Ranjit Singh, who had prudently kept himself beyond the danger zone, made no exertion to support his men, and he seems
[p.169]: to have left the field at this critical moment. The Jat army, unable to stand the determined charge of the army of the Nawab, were forced to withdraw. The Gosains who had so long scorned the shelter of the fortifications of Deeg, entered the town with their baggage. Muhammad Beg Khan Hamadani pitched his camp on the ground formerly occupied by them.
Mirza Najaf Khan found that the capture of Deeg, by force of arms was almost impossible. He ordered Najaf Quli to encamp with his troops, at a convenient place between Deeg and Kumher, and to be vigilant day and night in intercepting the food-supplies sent from Kumher to the besieged and cutting off communications between these two places. One night two thousand men and women carrying grain from the district of Kumher and escorted by a party of Jat foot-soldiers, fell in with the patrol of Najaf Quli's camp. At the sight of the enemy, they threw down their loads and fled to the jungles; a few were captured and sent to Mirza Najaf Khan. His advisers suggested that these men should be deprived of their noses and ears and sent away to their homes, so that the people of Kumher might know the risk of such an enterprise. But the Mirza refused to punish the helpless and innocent people for the crime of one obstinate rebel. He set them free only with the warning that they should not make any such attempt in future [Ibratnama MS. pp. 266-267]. Najaf Khan's kindness proved more effective in disarming the hostility of the Hindu villagers than the usual frightfulness of mediaeval warriors. His exalted character inspired confidence in the hearts of the mass of the Hindu people and his wise and humane policy removed for a while the general feeling of repulsion against Muhammadan rule, a legacy of the age of Aurangzeb augmented by the bloody conquests of the Abdali.
M. Madec who had rejoined the army of Najaf Khan after his defeat by Rahimdad, proposed a night-attack upon one towers of the town where the guards were observed to have grown slack in their watch and duty. He offered to lead a party for the surprise, consisting of seven picked companies of grenadiers [Sipahian-i-garandil] with two guns; the Nawab was to stand ready in the camp with his
[p.170]: army and was to start for the appointed place as soon as he should hear the sound of a volley of muskets which was to be fired as a signal by the storming party. M. Madec and the sepoys concealed themselves in the trench of the battery till midnight. When the guards appeared to have retired to rest, they silently made their way to the foot of the wall and began to ascend it making foot-holds in the wall with their bayonets and daggers. About one hundred men gained the top; M. Madec, owing to his nervousness and perplexity without waiting for others to climb up ordered the sepoys to fire a volley of their muskets as signal for the Mirza. But it served no less as an alarm to the negligent watch who at once fell upon the sepoys on the wall without giving them time to reload their muskets. Most of them were killed and a few jumped down on the ground below to save themselves from the enemy's sword [Ibratnama MS. pp. 269-270]. As soon as the signal firing was heard Mirza Najaf Khan rode with a loose rein and stopped only at the foot of the tower. By this time the day had broken, and the garrison of Deeg throwing open the gates of the fort attacked the troops of the Nawab who found themselves caught at a disadvantage. The army of Najaf Khan was exposed to a terrible fire from the fort-guns and the matchlocks in the smaller garhis. Veterans of the Nawab's army fell down at every steps; horses became restive and threw down their riders. "Soldiers and officers who had for years fought valiantly in many a battle were unable to keep their feet firm on that field of Resurrection and fled without a moment's thought, carrying confusion even to their camp-followers. The defenders of the fort became bolder in their attack; it was a strange sight to see one wretched Jat foot-soldier armed only with a spear, rushing upon ten troopers of the Nawab and the latter standing paralysed [with fear] and motionless like pictures and statues, none having the courage to resist the infidels." [Ibid.] The cruel-hearted enemy seeing the plight of the army of Islam gradually closed upon them. Out of three or four thousand soldiers only a small number of men held together fighting resolutely around their brave general. When the Nawab found even his companions inclined to turn back, he wavered as to what course he should take. At
[p.171]: this critical moment Somru with one battalion of sepoys arrived with great speed to the assistance of the Nawab and interposed his detachment between the two armies. He ordered his guns to be loaded with grape-shot which dealt out death to hundreds at a time in the rank of enemy. The progress of the Jats was arrested and at last they were driven into the fort. Mirza Najaf Khan did not relinquish the ground so bravely won; he ordered a battery to be constructed on that spot [ibid p. 281].
Everyday the prospect became more and more gloomy for the besieged. The army of Najaf Khan was being swollen daily by the arrival of fresh troops. Raja Himmat Bahadur joined him with five or six thousand horse and foot, and thirty guns. The Nawab Asaf-ud-daula sent Latafat Ali Khan13 with three battalions of sepoys to the help of the Mirza. Najaf Quli completely cut off the food-supplies of the besiegers. It was not the task of feeding a small garrison but providing food to every soul in a populous city (of fifty thousand mouths at the lowest computation) that confronted Raja Ranjit Singh. The inevitable came at last, and the Jat was forced to yield but not a day too soon. Famine spread in the City and in its train came epidemic and lawlessness. "Every street and lane was strewn with hundreds of deadbodies of men and beasts. The distressed people made no distinction between clean and Unclean food. Anything that came to hand was thrown into the mouth of everybody without hesitation." [Ibid, p. 28214]. Under the stress of such a calamity Ranjit Singh permitted the citizens to go out, and a stream of wretched humamty passed through the dismal gates of Deeg towards the Muslim camp. The officers of Mirza Najaf-Khan urged him to drive these refugees back into the fort by opening fire upon them so that these people
13. On the 8th of Muharram [1190 H; 28th February, 1776] Latafat Ali Khan with three battalions [paltan] sent by Nawab Asaf-ud-daula, presented nazar to His Majesty, and receiving khilat, went to the haveli of Safdar fang (Waqa, 291).
14. Khair-ud-din perhaps transgresses the bounds of credibility when he says "Hanud az hurmat goshi i-gao igmaz kardah' dar zabuh-i-gao b;- Musalmanan ham-dasi o iksar dar-manandgan ba-khordan-i-murdah-ba- murdar khawaran ham-kassa shudand." [Ibratnama, MS. p. 282].
[p.172]: might increase the horror of famine within and render the air of the fort pestilential. But the Nawab abhorred this ruthless though clever device of stewing the Jat in his own juice, and said "I do not wish that these poor and destitute people should be caught in adversity along with the rebels and oppressors." He treated them very kindly and provided for their comfort and security. He planted an imperial standard [alam] half way between the city and his own encampment and issued a proclamation that those who would take shelter under that standard would in no way be molested. This welcome message brought every day hundreds of refugees to that standard. It so happened that even rich merchants and money-lenders wearing tattered dress and concealing valuable jewels and gold coins in their clothes began to slip out in the company of the poor. The camp-followers and wicked characters of the Muslim army, who used to lie in wait and sometimes rob the refugees before they could reach the standard, discovered this trick. When an accidential search revealed jewels in rags, even the Mirza's soldiers secretly joined them in this business and deprived the poor refugees of every piece of cloth on their bodies. The report having reached the ears of the Mirza, he summoned these soldiers and their officers and severely reprimanded them for their ignoble act of oppressing men in misery. From this time the refugees were ordered to wait under the wall of the fort, and when a large number of them had assembled, the Mirza himself with his guards escorted them to the imperial standard and appointed a strong detachment of troops to protect them. Within a few days almost all the non-combatants left the city.
Insufficient food began to teli upon the spirit and health of the Jat soldiers, who weret becoming weaker every day. Still Ranjit Singh would neither evacuate the fort nor offerbattle to the enemy. The chiefs of his army and members of his household becamedisgusted at his indecision and pressed him strongly to make a choice between the two alternatives now open to him: if he cared for honour, he should at once lead them, hall dead as they were, against the Musalmans with the resolution either to conquer or to die; or if he wished to wait for any change of fortune by prolonging the
[p.173]: struggle he should retire to Bharatpur or Kumher before it was too late. Ranjit Singh descended from the fort one dark night at a spot near the battery of Raja Himmat Bahadurand eluding the pursuit of the enemy safely reached the fort of Kumher. A considerable number of Jats remained behind guarding the women and children, and being resolved to die in defence of the citadel. Next morning, on the 10th Rabi-ul-awwal, 1190 A.H. (29th April, 1776), Mirza Najaf Khan entered the town. But the garrison, who had retreated with their families into the mansion of Badan Singh and the citadel, did not allow the Muslims to taste the joy of victory, rather "made it more bitter than the wine of death" [Ibratnama MS. p. 284]. They kept up an incessant and terrible musketry fire upon the troops of the Nawab, many of whom died in the attempt to dislodge them. The Mirza forbade the plunder of even the deserted houses of the town and posted strong guards everywhere. Impressed by the undaunted spirit of the Jat garrison, he expressed his willingness to grant them pardon and a safe conduct. They rejected his generous offer and persisted in their hostility. At length the Nawab ordered Somru to bombard these places by erecting batteries against them. Towards sunset breaches were made in the walls of the mansion and of the inner fort, rendering them untenable. In the darkness of the night the Jat grimly prepared himself for the last awful journey of life, steeling his heart against all sentiments of love and affection. His near and dear ones were sent ahead by the sword to a region where his own spirit, free from earthly bondage, would seek theirs on the morrow. With the first gleam of dawn the warriors threw open the gates of the citadel and fell upon the battery and the sepoys of Somru. Whoever came in their path instantly fell victims to their sword, sharpened by hatred and despair. Somru's guns loaded with grap-shots opened a destructive fire; but wound had no pain, death no terror, nor life any charm for these heroes, each of whom attacked thirty or forty enemies and piercing the ranks of the sepoys struck the guns with the sword in blind fury. Glutted with the slaughter of their enemies and covered with many wounds they fell gloriously
[p.174]: fighting to their last breath. Deeg,15 dyed crimson with the best blood of her children and her foes alike, awaited her fate at the hands of the conqueror.
15. Khair-ud-din has done full justice to the valour of the Jats in this last phase of their struggle with Mirza Najaf Khan. He says "Not a single man tried to save his life. If they had fought unitedly they would have slain many more and safely made their way [out of the fort]." No johar seemed to have been lighted at Deeg; women and children were "put to the sword" according to Khair-ud-din, M. Madec notices that three wives of Nawal Singh prayed to the palace-eunuch to kill them after the capture of the city by Najaf Khan. "They lay on the carpet and he cut off the heads of all the three of them one after another, and ended by killing himself on their corpses [Le Nabob Rene Madec, Sec. 48]. There is nothing unusual in the slaughter of females by the Jats at Deeg.
Speaking of the Jats in the reign of Akbar Manucci says "In order to defend themselves these villagers hid in thorny scrub or retired behind the slight walls surrounding their villages. The women stood behind their husbands with spears and arrows. When the husband had shot off his matchlock, his wife handed him the lance, while she reloaded the matchlock. Thus did they defend themselves until they were no longer able to continue. When reduced to extremity, they cut their wives and daughter's throats and then in desperation, they threw themselves against the enemy's ranks and several times, they succeeded in gaining the day by mere reckless courage." [Storia do Mogor, tr. by Wm. Irvine, i. 134].
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