The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire/Chapter IX

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The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire
The book by Dr Girish Chandra Dwivedi, Edited by Dr Vir Singh 2003.
Chapter IX - The Jats in the Vortex of Hostile Forces-(I) (1753-1757)
Maharaja Surajmal

The Jats in the Vortex of Hostile Forces

[p.157]: Prince Suraj Mal's alliance of friendship with Safdar Jang was not an unmixed blessing. If it contributed to his fortunes and status, it also entangled him in the precarious court politics. Moreover, his wealth tempted the greedy, while his strength caused resentment to the ambitious and the aggrieved alike. All this coupled with his persisting ambitions worked to implicate him in tremendous trouble and yet, with his political sagacity, grim determination and courage he steered clear of it, baffling all his enemies. We shall now take up these developments.

Imad-Maratha Attack On The Jats (November 1753-May 1754): Its Causes

The Civil War, particularly its closing stages contained the seeds of portentous developments. Hardly two weeks had elapsed since its formal termination when Khandoji Holkar came to Delhi (21 st November) at the order of his father (who hearing about peace himself went to Jaipur) "to join the Bakhshi in his campaign against Suraj Mal"1 and the next week, operations were resumed against the Jats.

It is clear that the Bakhshi was furious at Suraj Mal and his men for their help to Safdar Jang.2 However, this alone cannot fully explain his attack on them. There were other deeper factors involved in it which have not been taken notice of. We have seen how the Wazir in league with Suraj Mal had in the last minute deprived him of the credit of settling peace. The decisive military triumph and the diplomatic success were both denied to him. Moreover, he could never relish Suraj Mal drifting close to his arch rival, the Wazir, as became evident during the closing stages of the Civil War. The Wazir and the Bakhshi knew that

1. TAH, 88a, 94a; Sardesai, Marathas, II, 390-391.

2. Shakir 76; Siyar, III, 335; Dow, Hindostan II, 323; Francklin, 3; Qanungo, Jats, 86; Tarikh-i-Majaffari (in Elliot, VIII, 321) says that Imad wanted to punish Suraj Mal for the part he had taken with Safdar Jang in plundering Delhi.

[p.158]: Suraj Mal was then the only person capable of containing the latter (the Bakhshi).3 Hence, the Wazir befriended and supported him (along with Safdar Jang),4 while the Bakhshi was out to destory him. The Wazir scrupulously avoided annoying the Jat Prince. The way he refused to entertain the entreaties to regain Ghasira by his (the Jat's) enemy's son, Fateh Singh, fully bears it out.5 The Wazir all through wished Suraj Mal's power to remain intact as a bulwark against Imad's ambitions and was, therefore, opposed to the Jat war6 (As we shall see, the news of the Jats discomfiture grieved him). Imad smelt it but he calculated otherwise. The powerful Marathas were already on his side, and now only Suraj Mal remained to be "extirpated"7 to clear his way to exclusive power, if possible to the very Mughal throne.8

Side by side, the proposed Jat campaign could also help to solve the appalling financial crisis. The treasury was empty and the starving soldiery persistently rioted to get their dues cleared.9 The Jats had usurped the Crown lands and Imad's own jagir of Faridabad. As such, he intended to get them vacated, realize rents and impose large tribute on the prosperous Jat state and thereby make payments to the soldiers. Imad devised a novel plan. He readily entertained the pretentions of Muhkam Singh, the inveterate enemy of Suraj Mal. On 11th December, 1753, Muhkam Singh supplicated (through Aqibat Mahamud) Imad's favour to regain his patrimony. On 24th, he went to Imad's residence from his camp at Khizrabad. Imad found this man most suitable to his designs against Suraj Mal and he lent him his support.10 He insisted on the Emperor to accompany him, suppress the Jats south of Delhi and collect the rents or else restore Muhkam to his ancestral zamindari in lieu of Rupees two crores, which that chief was willing to pay. The Emperor at first desired Muhkam Singh to forthwith pay five crores in cash apart from the 'nalbandi' at the rate of seven annas per Rupee.11 But later he reconciled to two crores.12 The execution of this plan was as difficult as its formulation was easy. Yet it enabled Imad and the Marathas to utilize the services of their protege against Suraj Mal.

3. cf. Sarkar, Fall, I, 531-532.

4. Srivastava, Oudh; 247.

5. TAH; 106b. We have no information whether or not he was approached for help by the more desperate Muhkam Singh as well but in case he was, he must have been turned away.

6. TAH, 106b.

7. Ibid, 106b; Mirat, 763.

8. TAH, 95b, 108b; Siyar, III, 335.

9. TAH, 87a, 88a-b, 102b-103b, 105a, 107a, 110a, l13b.

10. TAH, 94b, 98b.

11. Ibid, 102b-I03a.

12. Ibid, 131 b, also 103b.

[p.159]: Liquidating the State debts by dispossessing the Jar usurpers and realizing dues from them was a commendable proposition, if Imad had only the pious intention to serve the Empire. The fact that he himself misappropriated the proceeds from the khalisa and sarf-i-khas and even the amount (15 lakhs) given to him (by the Emperor) for paying the soldiers and yet incited them to daily riots against the Emperor and the Wazir,13 shows that while emphasizing the ill effects of the Jats acquisitions, he was merely invoking a legal ground to settle a personal score with Suraj Mal. We have no proof that Imad displayed the same ardour in restitution of lands under the other aggressors. It seems that the Emperor saw through the game and whatever his outward posture, inwardly on the advice of the Wazir, he kept back14 from Imad during the Jat war as he had done during the Civil war also.

Yet despite all his grievances, Imad with his crippled resources alone might not have dared challenge the might of the Jats but for the arrival and concurrence of his Maratha allies. Prone to lending their sword to any higher bidder, the Marathas had added incentive to serve Imad, whom they found to be a man of their own liking.15 They had, however, their own designs against Suraj Mal. To plunder rich lands and extort money from others had been a perennial feature of their policy. As such the growing riches and general prosperity of the Jat state naturally formed a big attraction for, what a contemporary calls, these "professional spoilers".16 To their insatiable greed was added the provocation offered to them by Suraj Mal.17 We know that more than once had the Bharatpur contingents joined the imperial banners in a bid to oppose their advance. Only a couple of months back Suraj Mal, in concert with the Rajputs, had attempted to form a joint front against them, offering to bear his share of expenses of the war to drive them out from the north.18 Again, in November, 1753 he entered into an understanding with the visiting Jaipur ruler, against them.19 Obviously, this anti-Maratha policy of the Jats deeply annoyed them, even though this in itself was the logical corollary of their (Maratha's) own doings. Malharrao Holkar's sarcastic remark before the Jat envoy, (Rup Ram Katari) that he had come (against the Jats) partly at his own

13. TAH, 103a-104b, 110a-IIOb, 113b, 120a.

14. cf. TAH, 133a, 92a, 92b.

15. Ibid, 88a, 93a, 94a, 98a.

16. cf. Memoires des Jats, 39.

17. Contra see Qanungo, Jats, 39.

18. See Ch. VIII, f.n.3.

19. From Delhi Madho Singh along with Jawahar Singh went to Kama (17th November) where from Badan Singh led him to Deeg. Having discussed the Maratha problem with Suraj Mal, he went to Jaipur. Sujan 202-203; TAH, 89h; Sarkar, Fall, I, 519; Contra see, Memoires des Jats, 48.

[p.160]: bidding and partly at that of the Emperor (impliedly Imad)20 fully bears it out. Suraj Mal had already attained much power and if he was not crushed right now he might prove dangerous later on, so the Marathas seem to have argued.

This apart, the importunities of Muhkam Singh also tended the Marathas to the same end. Hardly been in touch with the Marathas since at least l753,21 he entered the service and won the favour of Malhar Holkar.22 In 1753, a Maratha Sardar requested the Peshwa to send him and his brother Zul Qaran a consolatory letter asking them to meet the Marathas when they came to the Jat country and then their "problems would be-solved".23 Yet another contributory factor of the Maratha attack as Malhar Holkar gave it out,24 was their anger over Suraj Mal's killing of Rao Bahadur Singh Bargujar of Ghasira. Thus, in the light of the above analysis, it becomes clear that irrespective of Imad, the Marathas themselves would have brought sooner or later their force to bear upon the Jats. Fortunately, they had in their master, the Bakhshi, a man also determined to wreck his vengeance upon the same people. The operations against the Jats were thus undertaken by Imad and the Marathas after "perfect concord",25 as is also borne out by the statement of Khandoji mentioned in the beginning.

From a close perusal of the line of their campaign it would appear that Imad and his allies attempted to catch hold of Suraj Mal from two sides, Imad and Khandoji attacking from the less guarded north, while the main Maratha army from the west. In going to Jaipur, first Ragunathrao not only meant to collect dues from the Rajputs but also to separate Madho Singh from Suraj Mal. Till his arrival Imad and Khandoji were to attack the northern possessions of Suraj Mal, who for fear of the Maratha hordes being in his rear was not supposed to spare sufficient troops for their defence. Annihilation of the Jat power could not have been better planned.26

20. Sujan, 214.

21. S.P.D. XXX, 134.

22. Tawarikh-i-Hunud, 19b.

23. S.P. D. XXVII, 83.

24. Sujan, 214

25. Amira, 51; Akhbar-i-Muhabat in Elliot, VIII, 384; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari (in Elliot, VIII, 321), goes to the extent of saying that Imad was "urged on by the Marathas" to attack Suraj Mal. G.S. Sardesai (Marathas, II, 390-391) says that the Holkar sent Khandoji and Gangadhar Tatya to Imad to "arrange plans for the (Jat) campaign". Having reached Delhi they "decided to (immediately) conduct a war"; Ibrat, 15b.

26. Imad-Maratha-Jat war which began in November, 1753 and continued till May 1754 was one long event. It would be improper to study campaigns at Mewat or Aligarh in isolation from those at Deeg or Kumbher. For the former as much formed the part of Bharatpur State as the latter did.

[p.161]: In the last week of November 1753,27 Suraj Mal despatched his agent, Rup Ram Katari, to the Maratha camp at Jaipur to know their real intentions and strength and if possible to negotiate an honourable settlement. Malhar Holkar demanded two crores, but the envoy offered him merely four lakhs. The Holkar rejected it and when he repeated his threat to destroy the Jats, the envoy quipped, "you cannot assault the Jat forts even with the help of four lakh men".28 When the talks were still going on, Rup Ram informed Suraj Mal about the Maratha determination "to force a war" adding that he should, therefore, duly prepare himself." Accordingly Raja Badan Singh called his courtiers for consultation at Deeg. All of them preferred an honourable war to an ignominious surrender. Preparations for war were taken up with added vigour. Assisted by his brave compatriots, Suraj Mal provided strong defence to the main forts of Deeg, Bharatpur, Kumher and Wair because ultimately the fate of the Jats was to be decided there.30

Attack On The North And East

The departure of the Jat Vakil to Jaipur almost coincided with the commencement of Imad-Maratha offensive in Mewat. On 26th November, 1753 (29th Muharram, 1167 A.H.), Imad sen this chief agent, Aqibat Mahmud Khan, with 500 Badakhshi and 20000 Maratha soldiers to reconquer Faridabad, which was in his Jagubut had been in Balram's occupation for some time. On being demanded revenue and tribute, Balram became ready for a fight. Imad then sent 700 additional troops and 30 pieces of high artillery and rockets. After some resistance Balram decided to submit. Hence, he met Aqibat, presented him asharfis and promised to clear the dues.31 Aqibat sent his men to Suraj Mal also demanding the peshkash due from him but that chief, "pround of his beg forces", ignored him. At the same time, Aqibat found the peasants at Palwal evasive in paying the revenue. They pretended that Balram might demand it again. Santosh Rai, the Qanungo of the place (Who on account of his expulsion by Balram has become his mortal foe) asked Aqibat that unless he killed Balram he would fail to recapture the district. A thanahdar despatched by him to Fatehpur was expelled by the local peasants who stood by Balram.

27. Sujan (203-204) does not give the date. But since it puts Balram's murder (29th Nbvember, 1753) just "a few days" after Rup Ram's departure, we infer that the latter left early in the last week of November.

28. For details see Sujan 203-204, 206-207, 215, 226; Sarkar, Fall, I, 520; Following Bakhar, a later source Qanungo (Jats, 88) and Pande (Bharatpur, 58) make a doubtful assertion that Malhar demanded one crore while Rup Ram promised 40 lakhs and that Suraj Mal haughtily sent cannon-balls and gun powder to the Marathas.

29. Sujan, 206.

30. For details see Sujan, 217ff.; Also Memoires des Jats, 39.

31. TAH, 89a-90a.

[p.162]: On 29th November (2nd Safar), Aqibat, therefore, returned to a plain at Ballamgarh and sent for Balram. He arrived along with his one or two sons, his diwan and 250 sawars and foot.32

Murder of Balram

The authorities differ regarding the manner of Balram's murder. The Court historian says that Aqibat insisted on Balram to pay the promised tribute, saying that Imad had made the peace for him (although it was incorrect) and that Imad was reproaching him for the delay in collections. Balram replied that he had not brought "the money in his pocket" which he had promised to give only after collecting the rent and that if he (Aqibat) wanted to wrest this tract he would have to fight for that. Aqibat got displeased over this reply and heated arguments followed. When Balram put his hand to his sword, the Badakhshis under Aftab Khan fell upon him and killing him along with his son, the diwan and nine others, losing two of their colleagues in the process.33 Sujan Charitra on the other hand says that Aqibat sent his agent to Balram, taking most solemn oaths to lull his suspicion. When the Jat arrived Aqibat spoke "sweet words" but the assassins, hiding close by, fell upon and cut the heads of Balram and his sons.34 Whatever the truth, both these sources agree that Balram's family, fled to Suraj Mal. Aqibat then got hold of the fort along with its artillery, treasures and other goods. The name of Ballamgarh was changed to Nizamgarh and the head of Balu was ordered to be exposed on a pillar near Faridabad, so that it might serve as a deterrent to other rebels. The news of the fall of Balram and his fort made the Wazir "unhappy".35

Getting the news of the death of Balram, Suraj Mal sent a message to Jawahar Singh, then at Deeg, to call up troops and proceed towards Barsana apparently to watch the enemy movements.36 Meanwhile, heartened by his success, Aqibat stiffened his offensive. Early in December, he plundered the villages of Mitraul and Hathin (12 miles south west of Palwal). The villagers stoutly resisted him all day long but evacuated their places in the night. Then he raided other villages around Palwal. On 20th December, he went to Delhi at Imad's call. On 27th December (1st Rabi I) he despatched Gangadhar and Sukh Ram towards Faridabad and he himself followed the same day, taking Khandoji with all his troops, to resume operation against the Jats. But the situation there had changed during his absence. Taking advantage

32. Ibid, 90b-9Ib.

33. TAH., 91b.

34. Sujan, 204.

35. TAH., 91 b-92b, 106b; Also Sujan 205; Dow, Hindostan, II, 324.

36. Sujan, 205.

[p.163]: of the soldiers' defiance of the jamadar, whom Aqibat had left behind, the Jats recaptured Garhi Hathin and other places. Unable to cope with the situation, Aqibat and the Marathas requested Imad to come in person and so he rushed from Delhi to Ballamgarh, without waiting for the reticent Emperor to accompany him.37

According to their mutual understanding, Khandoji and Imad put simultaneous pressure on the Jats along both sides of the Yamuna, while Suraj Mal apprehending the onrush of the Maratha myriads any day, was not in a position to reinforce his struggling tribesmen. Making Hodal his base, Khandoji, towards the close of December, 1753 ravaged and occupied various Jat 'garhis' including Garhi Hathin, Jorgarhi (?) and Panah Garhi. He moved on to Nandgaon and Barsana which Jawahar Singh had evacuated earlier. On the other side, the Marathas uprooted the Jat outpost at Shikohabad.38 Fateh Ali Khan (whom Suraj Mal had saved against Asad Khan in 1745) with 10 thousand men occupied Kol following its evacuation by the Jat garrison.39 These successes enthused Aqibat Mahmud. On 5th January, 1754 (10th Rabi I, 1167 A.H.), he surprised the Jat village of Ghangaula under one of the brothers of Balram. Aqibat despoiled the village, killed the Jat, imprisoned 6 others and established his own outpost there.40

On 8th January (l3th Rabi I), Imad with Aqibat moved on from Ballamgarh to Palwal, while he sent Muhkam Singh to Khandoji at Hodal. Imad granted a splenddid khilat to Suraj Mal's sworn enemy, Fateh Singh appointed him to his father's estate with orders to plunder, kill and imprison the Jats around.41 About the middle of the month, Imad sent Aqibat, Muhkam Singh and Fateh Singh with 5 to 6 thousand troops towards Narnaul and Rewari in Mewat and Saifullah Khan, Zahid Beg and others with big numbers towards Kol, Sikandarabad and Jalesar. Thus, extensive Jat areas on both sides of the river fell into his hands. On 3rd February (9th Rabi II), it was learnt that the Maratha forces, having expelled the Jat officials, were busy subduing the country around Mathura and Agra. Khandoji was made 'hakim' there.42 Multitudes of evacuees out of terror fled from those areas and sought shelter with the Jat Raja.43

37. TAH., 93b, 94b, 97a, 102a, 104b-I05a.

38. TAH., 105a, 105b; cf. Sujan 215-217.

39. TAH., 105b-I06a

40. TAH., 106a.

41. Ibid., 106a-I06b.

42. Ibid., 107a, 108b, 111a also 109a-109b. On this occasion Imad misappropriated Rupees 50,000 realized by Aqibat from Sarf-i-Khas mahal (Rewari and others).

43. Memoires des Jats, 40; Also Sujan, 223; cf. TAH. 107a.

The Siege Of The Jat Forts

[p.164]: Amidst these reverses poured into the heart of the Jat country the huge Maratha army under Raghunathrao on 16th January, 1754.44 Khandoji, Har Govind Natani (of Jaipur) and Imad also joined it to swell the number to formidable 80,000 men, consisting of the "best troops" then in the country.45 Suraj Mal however, remained undeterred,46 even though his numerical strength fell short of the enemies. As suggested above, his foes had devised a clever scheme against him but still cleverer was the one matured by the sagacious Jat veteran, which enabled him to withstand successfully "the hoppers of the Deccan"47 for full four months. Having known the aggressive designs of the Marathas as early as November, Suraj Mal wisely refrained from moving out to confront Imad-Khandoji combine (in the north and east, as there was dual risk in it; the heart of his kingdom could have been surprised likewise and he himself could have been caught between two fires. His strategy was commensurate with his means. He apparently wished to draw his enemies in front of his forts, which formed his main strength, in the same way as the formidable number did that of his foes. He, therefore, employed the short time at his disposal in stockpiling provisions and fortifying his forts to confront such a massive threat. Elaborate arrangements for the defence of the Capital, Deeg, were made under the personal guidance of the King, Badan Singh, his Minister Gaj Singh and Jawahar Singh. It was well fortified and provided with guards on all its ten gates and five marhalas. The prodigious number of evacuees and foragers were camped in the dense jungles adjoining the fort of Bharatpur and the ramparts with bastions hurriedly put up there. The defence of this fort was entrusted to the Diwan Chain Singh and that of the fort of Wair to Bahadur Singh.48

Suraj Mal personally decided to stay at Kumher, which until then was an "ordinary fort".49 This decision reflects the commendable shrewdness of the great Jat general. Now Kumbher, besides being midway between Deeg and Bharatpur was situated in the centre of a great "sandy plain with no spring of fresh water. "50 In selecting it he obviously wished to keep

44. S.P.D., XVII, 79 (Raghunathrao encamped on 16th January at Nagar; from 17th to 19th at Jalukhar (both the places near Deeg); from 20th January to 27th Febrary at Pingora (near Kumbher); from 28th February to 22nd May at the plain before Kumbher; S.P.D. XXI, 60; TAH; 109b; Memoires des Jats, 39; Mirat, 763; Amira, 51; Siyar, III, 335; Sujan, 224-225 (announcing their coming only); Tartkh-i-Muzaffart in Elliot, VIII, 321.

45. Memoires des Jats, 39; Sujan (2206) and Tarikh-i-Muzafjari (in Elliot, VIII, 321) put the Marathas at 60,000.

47. Memoires des Jats, 39.

48. Memoires des Jats, 43.

49. Sujan, 217tf; Memoires des Jats, 39, For a discordant note see TAH., I09b.

50. Ibid., 39.

[p.165]: himself free to fall upon from behind on either side, in case the enemies, considering their greater importance, concentrated on Deeg or Bharatpur. And if in view of his presence here, they converged on Kumher, (which he presumably wished and the Marathas did it also) there remained the scope for harassing the enemies on both sides, Deeg and Bharatpur, while their encampment on a sandy and waterless plain would have fully exposed them to the fort artillery as also to nature's fury in the coming hot months.

And yet, considering the overwhelming strength of the combined opponents he would not take any chances at Kumbher either. Incredible though it might sound, it was during the preceding two months that the Jats advanced the "fortifications" in such a way that Kumbher became bigger than before."51 The provisions stocked there were in such abundance that no other fort in India could rival it. Its formidable ramparts ere literally lined up with small and big pieces of artillery.52 A few long-range heavy cannons placed atop were such as would not permitinemy to come any where near the walls, thus rendering effective investment, even by the Maratha swarms, impossible. As it was, he made the enemy exert mainly on the place of his choice and with what reults is narrated below:

Soon after their arrival the Marathas made an onrush on the forts only to be driven back by the gunfire. Later, Suraj Mal came out and a sanguinary battle ensued, in which both sides had big numbers killed or wounded. Then according to his strategy, he retired to Kumbher, which becoming the main target was besieged along with Deeg and other places by the Marathas.53

Thus commenced the siege which dragged on for four months. But the impregnability of the forts proved to be the undoing of the Marathas. Their best exertions remained absolutely ineffective for want of suitable cannons. With their huge numbers they, however, succeeded in devastating the countrysides.54

Tawarikh-i-Hunud records an interesting incident that Malharrao Holkar, in an apparent attempt to assuage the feelings of Muhkam Singh, ploughed the site (of the demolished fort) of Thun with elephants and

51. Ibid., 40

52. Ibid, 40 including Its footnote.

53. TAH; 109b; SP.D. XXI, 60; Memoires des Jats, 40; Amira, 51; Siyar, Ill, 315; Chahar Guizar Shujai and Tarikh-i-Muzaffari in Elliot-Vlll, 208, 321; Mirat 763; Scott, Dekkan, II, 229.

54. S.P.D. (XXI, 60) wrongly says that Suraj Mal "Plundered the whole city in Kumbher". TAH., I10a; Memoires des Jats, 40; Mirat, 763; Chahar Guizar Shujai in Elliot, VIII, 209.

[p.166]: sowed there "pearls instead of grain" Thereafter he "fought great battle with the Jat forces posted at the fort of Deeg."55

The Siege of Kumhert Fort in 1754

In Jamadi I (24th February to 25th March), Imad-ul-Mulk, followed by Aqibat Mahmud, came from Mathura to Kumher at the call of the Holkar. He also put up "daily exertions" to make an assault on the fort, but in vain.56 Meanwhile, the Holkar had been unsuccessfully trying through Imad to get the big size guns from the Imperial arsenal at Delhi and Agra. The Wazir was, however, opposed to Suraj Mal's suppression by Imad and his allies for reasons already explained. He, therefore, prevailed upon the Emperor not only to refuse the guns but to write secret letters to the Jat Prince, assuring that the Mir Bkhshi was fighting against his (the Emperor's) will. A few of these letters were apparently intercepted by Imad and the Holkar. Imad now sent Aqibat to terrorize the Emperor into yielding the guns but to no avail.57 The Marathas, however, were not wholly dependent on the imperial arsenal. Early in March, Naro Shankar was ordered to bring 4 big guns, gunpowder and lead in sufficient quantity from Jhansi to Kumbher.58 Similarly, Muzaffar Khan was also reported to be dragging in some places from Malwa.59 But even these pieces, if and when brought, failed to create an impression on the fort walls.

Khandoji killed at Gangarsauli

Meanwhile, a tragedy befell the Marathas. One day (middle of March) Khandoji (earlier summoned from Hodal) riding a palaki was inspecting his advance trenches60 at Gangarsauli (4 miles north on Kumher), when the fort artillery opened fire and he was killed by a chance zamburak shot. The tragic sight of the corpse of Khandoji overwhelmed Malhar Holkar with grief. The incident touched the heart of Suraj Mal also. He sent "the mourning robes" to the bereaved Holkar and expressed his profound condolences, forgetting the deep hostility of the Holkars. However, in spite of this gesture, the death of his lone son enraged the Holkar and he swore "to extirpate" the killers of Khandoji. The siege was pushed on more vigorously than before61 The

55. Tawar ikh-i-Hunud, 19b. In employing elephants and pearls, the Holkar seemingly meant to purify and honour the former chiefs seat, which we know had been desecrated by Jai Singh's ploughing it with asses.

56. TAH., 114a.

57. Ibid., 109b-110a, 114b, 120a, 131b, 133a; S.P.D. XXI60; XXI 60; Shakir, 76. Amira, 51; Memoires des Jats, 41-42; Siyar, III, 335-336; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari in Elliot VIII, 321; Mirat (763), assigning different reasons says that the Emperor wrote to Imad to desist from war, cf. Dow, Hindostan, II, 324-325.

58. S.P.D. XXVII, 81 also 134.

59. S.P.D. XXI, 59.

60. There is a shrine containing the marbel statue of Khandoj: in Gangarsauli, suggesting that he was killed there.

61. TAH, I 17a-117b; 121b, SP.D. XXI, 59; Memoires des Jats, 41; Tawarikh-i-Hunud, I9b; Chah Guizar Shuja: and Tarikh-i-Muzaffari in Elliot Vlll, 209, 321; Also Francklin, 3.

[p.167]: indomitable defenders replied with making frequent sorties and forays. Thus, they created diversion for the besiegers and prevented them from stiffening the siege. They put in "untiring labour" in repairing occasional damage to the fortwalls by the enemy artillery. Wendel adds that a breach made in the day was so soon and so well filled up the following night that it was difficult to discover the marks next day.62

Battle with Marathas

Yet, on the basis of Bhau Bakhar it is said that the destruction of Suraj Mal now appeared only a matter of days; that Rani Hansia encouraged his despondent husband; and that Jayappa Scinde's eagerly sought favour contributed in rescuing Suraj Mal from his impending doom.63 It is likely that the Jats came in touch with the Scinde whose estrangement with the Holkar was well-known. But the rest of the version seems to be over-drawn. The forts, which in point of their strength evoked the lavish praise of all the contemporaries and which fifty years later were to baffle the mighty British for two long years, were not going to succumb to the Holkar's wrath only. Suraj Mal was a courageous man, he retained his habitual calm and poise even in most desperate situations. In the present case, Kumher, to use his own words, was "almost impregnable" and it contained provisions sufficient to last "more than a year". All this militates against his supposed increasing despair. The fact, as borne out by the ontemporary sources, is that despite the enemy "deluge" the Jats made persistent forays and thus kept the enemy in "great alarm". There was no night when their raids were not sure, just as no day passed by when the enemy convoys were not attacked. Backed by the fort artillery they hovered round "as if there was no enemy in the environment or capable of harming them at all."64 The Marathi letters and the court history generally support this defiant spirit of the defenders. Thus, we learn that Naro Shankar had to seek safety in flight before a Jat force from Deeg.65 Another letter alludes to an encounter having taken place between the Marathas and the Jat foraying party from Deeg. The latter, however, disappeared when Dattaji arrived on. the spot.66 On the night of 1st April, 1754 (7th Jamadi II), Suraj Mal interviewed the Jaipur general, Natani, outside the fort of Kumher.

Thereafter a Jat artillery force came out and attacked the enemy trenches in the plain. The battle was even with casualties on both sides.67 Again,

62. Memotres des Jats, 40.

63. Qanungo, Jats, 89-91. Tawarikh-i-Hunud, 19b and Chahar Guizar Shujai (in Elliot, VIII, 209) make us believe that the death of Khandoji despaired of the Marathas instead. This is also misleading.

64. Memoires des Jats, 40 also footnote, 41.

65. S.P.D., XXVII, 96.

66. S.P.D., II, 38.

67. TAH, l2lb; The Maratha doubt that Natani was in a secret collusion with the Jats (See SP.D., XXVII, 94) does not appear baseless in the light of the above event.

[p.168]:on 30th April (1754), a Jat squadron surprised Shivdeo, killing 41 Maratha soldiers and wresting his total sum of Rupees 29,500.68 Earlier (c. late in March) a Jat force from Wair under Bahadur Singh, fell upon a Maratha detachment and grabbed "a lot of money" along with a few (two or three) distinguished Maratha ladies of the Holkar's family. Malhar justly felt humiliated at this boldness. Suraj Mal was, however, courteous enough to send the ladies back honourably.69 These sporadic instances suffice to belie the fancied despair of Suraj Mal and his imminent destruction.

All the same, there was certainly no reason for Suraj Mal being complacent either. By far the most formidable foes in their myriads were waging war against him. His countryside, already ravaged by them still lay at their mercy. Besides, the daily skirmishes were causing him recurring losses, whereas in the ultimate analysis he "did not expect anything from this war."70 Finally, Imad's persistent efforts to secure the big cannons must also have made him anxious for its early termination. He, therefore, wrote to the Wazir and the Emperor, submitting that if Imad in league with the Marathas succeeded in his designs, it would turn his head and he would cast his eyes upon the throne itself and ruin the Empire as well as the Wizarat. He suggested to them to move out of the Capital and, forming a joint front of the Rajputs and Safdar Jang, drive out the common oppressors, the Marathas, from northern India. He was himself to join the proposed front, once he became free from the Maratha menace.71 This proposition, no doubt, reflected his cleverness to get rid of his immediate problems. But side by side this also agreed with the stand that he had taken just two years before. It appears that he also wrote to his old friend, Safdar Jang. This was probably the reason why Raghunathrao, in an obvious attempt to discourage the Nawab, sent him the false information of his victory over Suraj Mal.72

Imad and Marathas Fed up in war with Jats

Meanwhile, Imad and the Marathas themselves had become "fed up" with, and "felt ashamed" over, undertaking a war which even after all their efforts, had failed to turn in their favour. It had already incurred them huge expenses and all the procurable supplies in the environs. In addition, their encampment in the open, sandy plain of Kumbher, with the burning sun on their head and the scarcity of water, food and fodder in their immediate neighbourhood, had reduced them to dire straits,73

68. S.P.D., XXVII, 81 also 94.

69. Memoires des Jats, 41.

70. Memoires des Jats, 40.

71. Siyar, III, 336; Akhbar-i-Muhabbat in Elliot, VIII, 384; Scot, Dekkan, II, 229; Ibrat, 15b; Also Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, in Elliot, VIII, 321; Srivastava, Oudh, 248; Qanungo, Jats, 92-93; cf. Amira, 51.

72. Rajwade, I, 35.

73. Memoires des Jats, 40-41.

[p. 169]: while the impregnability of the enemy forts and the tenacity of their proud defenders ridiculed them even now as before. Besides, the rainy season was close by, which would have rendered military operations impossible in the coming months. It was in this background of helplessness ignored by the scholars that the besiegers also got smell of the proposed counter-offensive. This naturally made them anxious to extricate themselves from the elusive war. At length peace was made on or just before 18th May, 1754. Harnath Singh Jat participated in the negotiations with the Bakhshi. It was settled that Suraj Mal would pay Rupees 30 lakhs to the Marathas over the above Rupees two crores, which had been previously imposed by Imad as tribute due from the Jat to the Emperor but was now to be paid to Imad and the Marathas instead. Rup Ram furnished a written bond to the Marathas to pay 30,00,001 in installments in three years.74

With his cool undaunted courage, masterly defensive strategy and sagacious diplomacy, Suraj Mal succeeded in thwarting the designs of a formidable combination of 80,000 men. This fetched him "high reputation" all over India.75 The revengeful Imad and the extortionate Marathas had left no stone unturned to wipe out his existence, but they utterly failed in their avowed objective. The extortionate hostility displayed by them ran deep into the Jat bosom and duly influenced the Jat policy towards them, both in the succeeding days and also during Panipat.

The Jat war continued to be an important issue in the Court politics. The Wazir and the Emperor, dreading Imad, themselves thought along the lines of Suraj Mal. The Wazir had written secret letters to Safdar Jang, Suraj Mal and Madho Singh, inviting their help against the Marathas. He arranged that the Emperor should go out of Delhi to Kol and there effecting a junction with Safdar Jang (who had come upto Mehdighat), move on to Agra. Suraj Mal and the Rajput Kings were to join there and then anti-Maratha campaign was to be commenced.76 But formulating the scheme was different from its execution. The Emperor with most shabby equipment moved out of Capital and roamed about Sikandarabad. On the other side, on 18th May, Imad left Kumher and

74. TAH., 128a, also I3lb; S.PD., XXVll, 81, XXI, 60; Also Memoires des Jats, 42; Ibrat, 15b; TAL., 9 cf. Amira, 52; Siyar, Ill, 338; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari in Elliot, VIII, 322; Qanungo, Jats, 96 speaks of Rs. 60 lakhs to be paid to the Marathas which is not correct.

75. Memoires des Jats, 42, 43.

76. TAH., 133a, 125b, 126b; Tarikh-i-MuzaJfari in Elliot, VIII, 321; Scott, Dekkan, II, 229; Memoires des Jats, 42, 43; Srivastava, Oudh, 248-249; cf. S.PD. XXI, 60; Amira, 51.

[p.170]: encamped at Mathura. On 23rd, Raghunathrao followed him and he remained at Mathura till 25th. The same night his vanguard under the Holkar moved towards Sikandarabad and subsequent developments there (26th May) dashed all hopes of the formation of the proposed coalition. Suraj Mal, or for that matter no other sounded potentate, was responsible77 for whatever befell the cowardly Emperor and the Wazir at Sikandarabad. A week later at Delhi, Imad usurped the Wizarat and replaced Ahmad Shah with his creature, Alamgir II.78

Suraj Mal And The Imperial Wizarat

Suraj Mal's policy following Imad-Maratha invasion centred round three broad objectives, namely to recover' his former possessions and grab his share of fresh territories amidst worst anarchy; to see an amicable candidate assume the Wizarat; and to get the common oppressors, the Marathas, expelled from the north. The first of these has already been narrated in the V Chapter and hence needs no repetition. We shall discuss the last two here.

The developments at the imperial Capital evoked lively interest of all the ambitious personages of the day because their trend made or marred their respective fortunes. In case of the Jats, their association with the powerful elements at the Court had been an important condition of their rise and growth ever since the days of Churaman II. Munim Khan, Zulfiqar Khan, Khan-i-Dauran, the Sayyid brothers, Qarnar-ud-Din, Javed Khan, Safdar Jang and Intizam-ud-Daula had in one way or the other been helpful in the growth of the Jat fortunes. Generally serving as a shield, these dignitaries procured them royal favours and also legalization (in case of Badan Singh) of their usurpations. It is true that by the middle of the century the imperial ministers (except Safdar Jang) had been reduced to shadowy phantoms, and now they themselves (Safdar Jang, Intizam and later Imad) looked for help to the redoubtable Jat Prince. Nonetheless, they, especially the Wazir, still commanded a reckonable prestige and authority. However, with the replacement of Intizam by his ruthless foe, Imad, Suraj Mal for the first time confronted a hostile Court at Delhi. As we shall see, Imad's Maratha props, especially Malhar Holkar also bore deep grudge against him. This set-up ran contrary to his aspirations. He seems to have calculated that friendly Wazir might serve as a convenient instrument to imparting legality to his enterprises and also add to his prestige. Hence, he wished to have a person of his liking at the helm of affairs at Delhi.

77. Qanungo, Jats, 94-95; Oudh, 249.

78. For details of the above developments, see TAH., 125b till the end; Also S.P.D, XXVII.

[p.171]: First, he explored if his trusted well wisher Intizam could be propped up to counterbalance Imad. On 22nd October, 1754 his envoy, Rup Ram, met and held discussions with the Holkar's diwan, Gangadhar, at Jaisinghpura (Delhi). Both these contended that Ballamgarh should be retained under Suraj Mal as before and Intizam be allowed to wait on the Emperor but on the condition that Imad's men in the fort be replaced by those loyal to the Emperor. But the domineering Imad never wanted the Emperor to slip out of his hands. He, therefore, rejected the proposition, left Jaisinghpura and went to Raghunathrao. The latter had become convinced by now that the prospects of money would not improve under Intizam and Imad thus retained the Wizarat.79

A few months later, a much more capable aspirant approached a willing Jat Prince. Shuja, the son and successor of his friend Safdar Jang, longed for the imperial Chancellorship. Taking advantage of Imad's predicament at Panipat,80 Shuja sent his emissary Ali Quli Khan Daghastani to his hereditary friend Suraj Mal and Ahmad Bangash to solicit their help in superseding Imad on Wizarat.81 Suraj Mal relished this proposal and readily agreed to back Shuja against his enemy. Ali Quli also contacted Saif-ud-Din Muhammad Khan and Kishan Chand Sud also at the Capital. The Emperor also approved of the plot as a means to get rid of the tyrannical Imad.82 The requisite forces were set in order to effect a change which in the circumstances might have proved better both for the Empire as well as Suraj Mal.83 However, the imprudent delay in execution by Shuja, the key figure in the conspiracy, gave Imad an opportunity to assert himself. He rushed back to Delhi (May, 1755) and at once suppressed the local accomplices. The conspiracy was thus nipped in the bud.

Next, he endeavoured to wreck vengeance on the main accomplice, Suraj Mal and a big punitive expedition against him was planned. Although it could not materialize, in the name of the Emperor, he sent Najib (17th June, 1755-7th Ramzam) ostensibly to disgorge Suraj Mal from his recent annexations in the Doab, but really to express his fury over his complicity with Shuja. The powerful Jat who "completely disregarded the forces of the Wazir and the Rohilla" moved forward in a fighting posture.84 But in the meantime Raja Nagar Mal who did not

79. TAL., 47-48; Sarkar, Fall, II, 40ff.

80. For details see TAL.8lff

81. Ibid., 101.

82. Ibid., Also A.L. Srivastava, Shuja-ud-Daulab (Agra; 1961) I, 20.

83. cf Qanungo, Jats, 109.

84. TAL, 105.

[p.172]: desire a confrontation intervened and carried through his efforts for peace. It was signed at Dasna (10th July, 1755), on terms already narrated before.85 Imad, who meant to punish his enemy, had to legalize, instead, most of his territorial acquisitions. But Suraj Mal was still unreconciled. A Marathi despatch of the following month reads:

The Wazir and the Jat are not able to adjust themselves. The Jat is intimidating but the Wazir does not have the strength (to cope with Suraj Mal).86

Shuja had too great a fascination for the exalted office to have given up hopes after the present rebuff. There is little room for doubt that he remained in touch with his 'steadfast ally", Suraj Mal. Yet, he (Shuja) would not display the requisite initiative, courage or strength of will and the shrewd Suraj Mal, with all his interests, would not involve himself inextricably in the circumstances. On his part, Imad was prepared to go to any length to retain the Wizarat. He first intended to wean away Suraj Mal and then tried "to playoff" Shuja against the Bangash. He got the Viceroyalty of Allahabad transferred from Shuja to Ahmad Bangash (July, 1756). This worried Shuja and he marched towards Farrukhabad to prevent the Bangash from going to Allahabad. About October, 1756, the rumour was afloat the Raja Suraj Mal87 and Shuja had formed a coalition, and that uprooting the Bangash they intended to fight the Wazir. This perplexed him along with his advisers, Nagar Mal and Najib. Nagar Mal tried to arrange for Suraj Mal's meeting with the Wazir, while Najib prevailed upon the Wazir to get Allahabad restored to Shuja. The latter now gave up his intention to press the matter. With Shuja virtually drawing back, the move to replace Imad fizzled out once again. The Wazir, however, remained anxious about the movements of Suraj Mal.88

Suraj Mal On the Imperial Problems; Tilpat Talks

Meanwhile, the rumour of the coming of the Abdali to Delhi vexed the Wazir all the more. Unable to do anything himself and disillusioned from others, the fearstricken Imad at last turned for help to his old, though powerful, enemy Suraj Mal. But thanks to his persistent hostility placating the Jat was not easy. He, therefore, sought the services of Raja Nagar Mal as pointed above. The Raja sent his envoy Sujan Brahman to Bharatpur to persuade Suraj Mal to meet the Wazir. The Jat Raja

85. See Chapter V; Also TAL. 105-109.

86. S.P.D. II, 48.

87. He ascended the throne after his father's death on 9th June, 1756; Tawarikh-i- Hunud, 20a-20b.

88. TAL. (Pers Ms.), 157-158; Shuja, 22-24.

[p.173]: consented and arrived at Tilpat, probably in the first week of November, 1756. Najib went to see him followed by Nagar Mal (c. 11th November- 17th Safar) who stayed on in the Jat camp for negotiations on the Wazir's behalf. Mehdi Quli Khan, a confidant of the Wazir, was present all along there.

Sounding a different note, the Jat Raja spoke:

We zamindars live on with the Emperor's help. At this juncture the army of the Dekhani Marathas has penetrated these parts (the northern India) and is plundering the houses of the ryots. Ravaging and devastating the talukas of (all) the zamindars, big and small, it has spread rebellion, disturbance and uneasiness.

And (amidst the situation) all the Rajas namely of Jodhpur, Merta, Jaipur and of other places (including that of Bharatpur) have decided to bar its arrival to this (northern) side of the Narmada and (also) to expel them (the Marathas) from those places under their occupation and (thus) to restore the royal territories to the Emperor we ourselves should also disgorge all the (usurped) mahals over and above of old zamindaries. Acceding to these propositions the Wazir-ul-Mumalik should also support and help us and, marching towards Akbarabad, should endeavour to liberate Malwa and Gujrat from the grip of the Marathas.

Having thus safeguarded their homes, the Jat went on, the combined forces should then turn to the Panjab to expel the Abdali as had been done in 1748.89

This piece of advice reveals the political sagacity and realistic grasp of the Jat statesman. He regarded both the Marathas and the Abdali as the potential sources of trouble. But of the two he gave priority to the tackling of the Maratha problem.90 Little doubt, his approach was basically governed by his personal experience. Their recent invasion apart, the extortionate Marathas had been dunning him for dues and ravaging the Jat areas, whereas he had yet to feel the horrors of the Abdali. But similar was the experience of most of the other potentates also. The Abdali did not threaten the whole of Hindustan91 as was the case with the Marathas. The latter had inflicted by far the heaviest blow to the decaying Empire by bringing its major part either in their direct political rule or under their economic subordination. Their hordes frequently visited the plains of the north not for promoting the imperial, Hindu or truly speaking,

89. TAL., 157-158; Sarkar, Fall II, 84.

90. Contra see, Qanungo, Jats, 115.

91. See Indu Banga's article, "Ahmad Shah Abadali's designs over the Panjab", Proc. I.H.C., 1968; Ganda Singh, Ahmad Shah Durrani, (Bombay: 1959), 260-261.

[p.174]: even the Maratha cause, but for squeezing money from all.92 If the regular, though illegal tribute was not forthcoming these spoliators invariably took to their familiar practice of indiscriminate loot and creating desolation.93 In the process they incurred the indelible hatred and animosity of all.

In 1752, the Marathas undertook the responsibility to tight and banish the Abdali. Yet they themselves did not exert fully, while their exclusive responsibility for the imperial defences, tampered with whatever initiative was there in others to strive for the same. The example of February, 1752 illustrates it when the nobles and different potentates (including the Jat) kept back, submitting to the Emperor that as he had given them (the Marathas) Agra and Ajmer and the chauth of all the 24 provinces and placed all the authority in their hands, "Ask them what should be done now".94 It is significant to note that in 1748, the same potentates had joined the royal army against the Abdali. But this was generally wanting after the pact with the Marathas.

Under the pretext of serving the Empire the Marathas aspired for an exclusive authority over Hindustan.95 Yet they hardly cared for its fate. Nor, with their divided and mutually jealous leadership, to say the least about their general policy, were they capable of delivering any good to the ruled;96 "They (the Marathas) have despoiled and devastated the whole of Hindustan", is the comment of the Court historian on their expansion."97

Little wonder, therefore, that Suraj Mal advocated that "the best defence of the Empire"98 was first to expel the perpetual and common oppressors from the north by a joint front under the Mughal Emperor. Then the task of expelling the Afghan interloper from the Panjab was to be undertaken, according to his bold plan. And in the light of the result of the battle of Manupur, the success with the joint endeavours was not impossible.

Suraj Mal's proposition also reflects his general attitude towards the tottering Empire. At the outset it must be conceded that he, for one, could never have wished its restoration to its former vigour and strength, as it was sure to wipe out his own existence. But at the same time, he by no means desired its extinction either,99 By his emphasis on a bold front

92. Gupta, Panipat, 255-256, 121; Sarkar, Fall, 11,226, 190; Francklin, 5.

93. What fate befell the people in general can be understood in the confession of a prominent Maratha Sardar. He writes, "I burnt (devastated) the country upto wherever my hand could reach," S.P.D., XXI, 79.

94. S.PD., XXI, 79.

95. Srivastava, Shuja, 38.

96. Gupta, Panipat, 121; Freedom Movement (M. Husain), I, Introduction, 29.

97. TAL., 380.

98. Sarkar, Fall, II, 84.

99. Contra See Dow, Hindostan, n, 339.

[p. 175]: against the Marathas and the Abdali; especially by his reported offer to part with the recent usurpations (provided others did the same) he wished to impart the Empire "a new lease of life".100 He seems to have argued that if the deterioration went its way, not only the Empire would perish but in the ultimate analysis various potentates would also suffer heavily amidst the resulting political vacuum and anarchy. It was to ward off this common danger that he stood for the above re-adjustments. What he contemplated was the inception of a confederacy, with the Mughal Emperor as its supreme head and a co-ordinating link between the semi independent ruling chiefs.101 It was certainly not an ideal situation from the Emperor's viewpoint. But what is ideal is not always practical. Things (during the preceding decades) had reached a stage, where putting them back (to the former stage) was an impossible task. It was better to live on with reckonable authority than with no authority at all. Suraj Mal's plan, thus, offered a sensible and realistic solution to the complex political problems of the day.102 What is all the more noticeable is its patriotic and national touch. It envisaged a political regeneration with the united efforts of the sons of the soil and not with the help of the Abdali, who being a foreigner could have no instinctive attachment to this land.

But Imad-ul-Mulk did not desire to curb the Marathas, upon whom depended his Wizarat. Hence he disregarded Suraj Mal's wise propositions. "Getting disgusted" he went back home leaving the Wazir to his fate. One cannot miss the note of disappointment in the words of the Court Historian," ... and Suraj Mal could not serve the Empire."103

Relations With The Marathas

Though the Tilpat talks reveal the real state the Jat-Maratha relations, we may pause here to discuss them in some detail. Wendel claims that some time after the siege of the Jat forts, the Marathas entered into an "agreement" with Suraj Mal under which the latter agreed not to oppose their "enterprises", nor to obstruct their frequent march of their forces through northern India. In return, the Marathas permitted him to occupy much of the lands in the "government of Agra", then under Maratha "disposal".104 However, no contemporary Persian or Maratha source

100. Qanungo, Jats, 116.

101. Ibid, 116-117.

102. Cf. Sarkar, Fall, II, 84.

103. TAL., 158; G. Singh (Durrant, 170-171) rightly doubts the veracity of Tazkirah-i-Imad, (quoted by him) that Najib's meeting with Suraj Mal was partly responsible for his rift with the Wazir. For we know that rift, nay enmity, already existed between the two. Also makes a doubtful assertion that [[Suraj Mal]] asked Jawahar Singh to remain near the Capital, "ready for emergency".

104. Memoires des Jats, 44.

[p.176]: speaks of this agreement. The Court history merely contains a reference that on 29th September, 1754 (11th Zil-Hijja, 1167 H.), Raghunathrao declined to join Imad in an attack on Suraj Mal (who had recaptured Palwal two days ago), saying that he had "made peace with Suraj Mal" and he would not deviate from their promise to the Jats.105 But this cannot be confused with the alleged pact, on which that historian is completely silent. At best, it may suggest Raghunathrao's disinclination to get re-entangled in an elusive Jat war or his avarice to get the promised tribute from Suraj Mal which could have been jeopardised in the event of open hostility. The fact that he assured Imad to warn Suraj Mal to vacate his mahals,106 disagrees with the spirit of the said agreement. The Marathas had taken pains to retain the governorship of Agra,107 which they wanted to hold with full administrative and financial control.108 Hence, the view that they gifted away the same suba looks highly doubtful especially in the situation of 1754. The fact is that Raghunathrao himself resented the Jat occupation of the Agra province.109 Further, we have positive evidence to show that at least upto 1757, if not beyond, Malhar Holkar nursed the designs to fight Suraj Mal to the better end110 and he was the man who controlled the Maratha affairs in the north. This all the more reduces the chances of the supposed friendly understanding. Finally, had there been anything like that, it must have been specifically mentioned in the Marathi despatches. But we do not find in them even the slightest hint about it. Thus, it is unsafe to accept Wendel's testimony about the Jat-Maratha "agreement" of 1754.111 If at all there occurred anything of that sort, it must not have been more than the routine expression for amity (on the part of Raghunathrao and Suraj Mal) which usually marks the termination of a war, while rancour and enmity lie concealed in the opponent's hearts.

It was this enmity which continued to characterize the Jat-Maratha relations, till the Abdali returned after his fourth invasion. Barely two months after the peace with the Jats, Purshottam Mahadev wrote (July 1754):

Shri Pant and Subahdar (Raghunathrao and Malhar respectively) are in Delhi. The Jat remains to be crushed after settling the matters here (at Delhi).112

105. TAL, 39-40.

106. Ibid., 40.

107. S.PD. XXI, 57,44.

108. Ibid., XXVII, 158.

109. cf. the tone of Raghunathrao's letter, S.PD. II, 84.

110. S.P.D., II, 80.

111. Contra see Sarkar, Fall, II, 437-438; Gupta, Panipat, 48. Qanungo (Jats, 96) rightly ignores Wendel's 'agreement', but he thinks that Malhar and Imad tried to win over Suraj Mal.

112. S PD. XXI, 60

[p.177]: Purshottam was the political agent of the Peshwa at the Court. His statement, therefore, may be taken to reflect the official Maratha policy of wrecking vengeance on the Jats. We have seen how in 1755, the Marathas under Vithal Shivdev attacked Bhim Singh Jat of Gohad, who was the protege of Suraj Mal and to whose help the latter had sent his troops as well.113 Next, on 27th December, 1756, the Marathas wrested the district of Jalesar from the Jats.114

On the other side, Suraj Mal himself persisted with the anti- Maratha policy. After Jayappa's murder in July, 1755, Bijay Singh of Marwar endeavoured to form a powerful front consisting of various chiefs including Suraj Mal to banish the Marathas from the north. He offered to bear the expenses and appealed to the Emperor to lead the joint command. The talk was in the air that the Emperor, taking Suraj Mal, Madho Singh, the Wazir and the Rohillas, would fall upon Dattaji Scinde at Marwar. 115

However, even the open offer failed to arouse the impotent Court of Delhi and nothing substantial was done in this direction. As Suraj Mal was personally involved at the time in his northern affairs, he sent his son with 10,000 men against Antaji, who was leading a succour of 10,000 (including the Jat retainers from Gohad) to Dattaji. The Jats and the Jaipur Bakhshi tried to impede Antaji's march while he was crossing the river Mar, near Karauli. Antaji was then forced to make a detour through the hills,116 and he eventually succeeded in joining the Maratha forces. We have no information about the subsequent Jat movements. Incidentally, during this later phase of the Maratha-Bijay Singh conflict, the former dunned Suraj Mal for dues amounting to Rupees seven lakhs.117 In November, 1756, how Suraj Mal strongly advocated 'the drive-out- Maratha' policy, has already been seen above.

Jawahar Singh's Rebellion Against Raja Suraj Mal

Before taking up the Abdali's Jat invasion, we may briefly notice a preceding internal Jat crisis. Raja Badan Singh died on 9th June, 1756 (Jeth Such Ekadasi Samvat, l813). De facto ruler for, Suraj Mal now ascended the throne118 with the title of Maharaja Brijendra Bahadur.119 It

113. S.P.D., II, 45 XXIX, 60, XXVII, 113,118.

114. S.P.D. XXVII, 206.

115. Ibid, 119, XXI, 73, II, 48; cf. M.L. Sharma, Jaipur, 177.

116. Ibid, II, 54-56, also 52 XXI, 79, 70 Antaji, a habitual boaster, however, claimed (S.PD., II, 56) that he frightened Suraj Mal and occupied his country.

117. S.P.D. XXI, 80.

118. Tawarikh-i-Hunud, 20a-20b it, however, does not refer to Jawahar's rebellion, while Memoires des Jats (45ff., 63) does not specify the date of his coronation. In all likelihood, Suraj Mal ascended the throne after Badan Singh's death and the revolt of Jawahar occurred after that.

119. This can be inferred from Nur. 33a and Brijenda Vinod, 212.

[p.178]: seems that shortly afterwards Jawahar Singh raised the standard of rebellion against his father, which rocked the Jat state, apparently till his departure for Tilpat (i.e. till the first week of November,1756).

Born with boundless courage, and a habitual delight in fighting, this "Young absalom" (Jawahar Singh) was an impetuous, extravagant and extremely ambitious man. His expenditure over his Court and train, exceeded the decent allowance fixed for him by his father and he insisted on for more. Suraj Mal strongly disapproved of his ways. But his frequent remonstrances, more and more aggravated the mind of Jawahar Singh. Already at a young age he had begun to nourish high ambitions. We have noted that, in 1751 Javed Khan, attempted to play off dissatisfied Jawahar against his father. Suraj Mal tried to satisty him by making him the governor of Deeg. But it whetted his appetite for more. Of later, a few sycopnants, who resented the growing influence of Balram and Surati Ram, veered round him and poisoned his ears against the two officials. Suraj Mal reprimanded his problem-son for having been swayed by his advisers, who, being dangerous, should be dismissed instead. But all was in vain.

Partly on his own and partly at the instigation of his evil flatterers, Jawahar Singh prepared for revolt and took position at the fort of Deeg. Persuasion having failed, Suraj Mal had no other way left except to personally besiege his son.In order to expedite the matter, he threatened the families of Jawahar's supporters with dire consequences. The rebel Prince came out and a fierce fight with the state forces raged under the walls of the fort. His followers were driven back but not the undaunted youth. He rushed into the thickest of the fight but was incapacitated with three severe wounds from sword, spear and bullet. Suraj Mal, who would rather see Deeg lost than his son dead, ran immediately to snatch him away from those, who inspite of his shouts, hastened to kill the fallen Prince. Jawahar Singh survived but due to his wounds his right arm became weak an one leg lame.120 Suraj Mal now seriously thought of entrusting Mewat as a small estate to his ambitious son.121, XIX

120. Memoires des Jats, 44-47, also see 83-84, it, however, presents a highly exaggerated picture of Suraj Mal's personal simplicity. The popular belief, recorded herein, that Jawahar contained the "bill" to the buried treasures of the late King and that Suraj Mal pressed the severely wounded son, to surrender it, also looks incredible, not only in the light of the positive evidence to the contrary (see Tawarikh-i-Hunud, 20a) but also common sense.

121. Memoires des Jats, 46; Also see Nur., 60b.

XIX. For assessment of early life of Jawahar Singh, see Rajpal Singh, Rise of the Jat Power, Annexure, III, 243-250 and Upendra Nath Sharma, Brijendra Bahadur Suraj Mal Jat, 95, 147, 344 f.n, 148, 151, 152, 159, 167-8, 182, 185,201-2,210,216,221-226,245,251,286,287,309-313,341-51, 443-461, 478.-Editor.

End of Chapter IX - The Jats in the Vortex of Hostile Forces-(I) (1753-1757)
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