The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire/Chapter X

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The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire
The book by Dr Girish Chandra Dwivedi, Edited by Dr Vir Singh 2003.

Chapter X - The Jats in the Vortex of Hostile Forces-(II)

Ahmad Shah Abdali's Jat Expedition

[p.179]: Hardly had Suraj Mal got relief from the internal crisis, when the Abdali invaded India, (December, 1756). Partly on his own and partly at the supplications of Mughalani Begam, Najib and others,1 Ahmad Shah Abdali swooped down on the imperil Capital (January, 1757) without meeting any effective resistance on his way. The invaders methodically sacked, tortured and outraged the populace of the Capital. Alamgir was deposed, Imad imprisoned and the Wizarat conferred upon Intizam on his promising to give two crores to the Shah. To escape the Afghan havoc, about half the population of the city flocked to popular refuge, the Jat dominions. However, unlike their earlier behaviour, the Jats this time added to the misery of the refugees by extorting money from them at every post from Badarpur to Mathura. Yet, such a heavy influx continued that getting accommodation became difficult at Mathura. Thefts became frequent.2

The threatening march of the invader within the striking distance of his dominions obviously created an unprecedented situation for Suraj Mal.3 It needed to be talked with great caution, foresight and courage. Earlier on 19th December, Imad (who had earlier rejected Suraj Mal's plan of the imperial defence) had written and sought help from him, the Marathas and Shuja4 The element of compulsion was apparent in the entreaties of Imad. Suraj Mal suspected that once the danger was over, he would attempt his (the Jats's) destruction with the help of his Maratha allies whose designs he (Suraj Mal) equally feared.5 Hence, he wisely


1. For details see G. Singh, Durrani, 148ff; Also Nur., 14b; Francklin (Shah Aulum, 4-5) is wrong in asserting that Mansur Ali Khan (who died much earlier) and Suraj Mal also invited the Shah.

2. TAL 166-167 and 236; D.C.; S.P.D., XXI, 96, XXVII, 144 is wrong in saying that the Wazir took shelter with Suraj Mal; Also Sarkar, Fall II, III, 88.

3. cf. Rajwade, I, 54; Memoires des Jats, 47.

4. D.C.; cf. S.P.D., XXI, 96.

5. SP.D., XXI, 100, 101.


[p.180]: refused to feed milk to such a dangerous viper. On the contrary he wished to utilize the opportunity to get rid of the mischief monger. Towards the end of January, 1757, he sent his envoy to the Abdali, professing submission and joined Najib, Nagar Mal and others in petitioning the Abdali, professing submission and common enemy Imad, "the son of Malharrao and the sworn brother of the Dada Sahib (Raghunathrao)" and detain him, (Imad) "beyond Attock". In return the signatories promised to give Rupees fifty lakhs as tribute to the Shah.6

The Marathas suspected Suraj Mal's hand also in the Shah's transfer of the Wizarat from Imad to Intizam. A report reads that Intizam and Suraj Mal were at the root of Imad's overthrow. "Khan-i-Khana became the Wazir. The (existing) Wazir was imprisoned and (thus) the influence of the Jat increased". It was also believed that Intizam, Suraj Mal and Shuja agreed to raise Rupees one and half crores from their own and the Capital's resources as a price for the Abdali's return. Thereafter, they would jointly chastise the common oppressors, the Marathas.7 Whatever be the truth, the Marathas were convinced of Suraj Mal's mischief and they resented his conduct on the occasion. The talk was loud in their circles that after expelling the Abdali, they should settle their score with Suraj Mal.8

On his part, the Abdali refused to be satisfied with the Jat King's submission in absentia. Early in February, 1757, he wrote to Suraj Mal ordering him to disgorge his acquisitions, pay money, attend his Court personally.9 The Abdali's perfidy was apparent from the fate of Imad hence the clever Jat would not wait on the invader, nor seek cowardly safety by giving him money or surrendering his lands. And yet precipitating clash with the Durrani swarms would have also been a foolhardy act on his part. The Mughal Emperor and his grandees lay prostrate before the Durrani whereas the treacherous Najib had crossed over, swelling the invader's ranks to about one lakh.10 He rightly told Antaji at Mathura:

The Padshah of Iran has captured the Empire of India with only My

thousand troops. None has fired a bullet at him and not one (man) has sacrificed his life (in resisting him). What then can I do (alone)?11


6. SPD., XXI, 96; Also Ghulam Husain Samin's narrative (trans. by W. Irvine in Indian Antiquary, 1907), 46. He is, however, wrong in placing Suraj Mal's petition after Imad's marriage with Umda 8egam i.e. on 21 st February.

7. S.P.D., XXVII, 166, XXI, 100.

8. See the Peshwa's letter in S.P.D., II, 80; SP.D., XXI, 100, XXVII, 166.

9. S.P.D., XXI, 99; Also Samin, 46.

10. Vide Gupta, Panipat, 85; A Marathi report (S.P.D., XXI, 101) hardly exaggerated that all that the Indian Rohillas the Pathans possessed was to be treated "as belonging to the Abdali".

11. SP.D., XXI, 99.


[p.181]: Amidst the circumstances the Jat Raja resorted to the dilatory tactics. Sometime after 4th February, he despatched his Vakil, ostensibly to discuss terms and bribe the Afghan Court but really to gain time to explore the possibility of an effective allied front against the invader and failing that to organise his defences in the meantime.12 The Rajput and the notable Muslim potentates being either reluctant or helpless,13 only the Marathas remained whom Suraj Mal looked forward to help in his adversity. With them also rested the responsibility to expel the Abdali. Accordingly, in November 1756, the Peshwa sent Raghunathrao and Malharrao at the head of an army to Delhi.14

Had they so desired, they could have easily reached in time to confront the invader. But they loitered on their way (Indore and then Rajasthan), despite the most pressing and persistent appeals by their subordinates on the spot. One of these (Antaji) wrote that at the moment, as Suraj Mal was neither paying money nor serving the Abdali, the Marathas could join him. But in case his (the Jat's) patience wore out and he joined the invader, "what safety do we (the Marathas) have?15 This shows that the Maratha sardars then in the north were not less eager for the Jat help than Suraj Mal was for theirs. Determined to fight the Abdali, Suraj Mal offered to join with his men and money provided the Maratha army arrived there.16 But Raghunathrao kept back. In the circumstances, Suraj Mal sent his son to make a bid to defend his northern possessions, while he set himself to strengthening his defences in the centre of his realm, which was most likely to be the object of the Afghan fury.17

Meanwhile, Ahmad Shah insisted on Suraj Mal to return some eminent personages, like Nagar Mal (at Kumher), Bal Govind Sahukar, and the Khan-i-Saman, who had taken shelter with him. But the Jat King courageously refused saying, "How can I send Raja Nagar Mal and others, who have sought asylum with me?"18 Obviously the Jat Raja was made of a stuff different from that of the arpetknights whom the Abdali had so far come into contact with. This was too much for the ferocious Abdali. So far no native Prince had dared disobey him, this pround Jat had


12. S.P.D. XXI, 99.

13. The Jaipur and Jodhpur rulers expressed their allegiance to the Shah. See SP.D., XXI, 101, IDS; G. Singh, Durrani, 242. The Bangash chief also courted his favour. Shuja, was pinned down in his affairs. See Srivastava, Shuja, 31, cf. S.P.D. XXI, 105.

14. Sardesai, Marathas, II, 405

15. S.P.D., XXI, 105 also 100. 101, 110. The writer of the last letter went to the extent of saying that if Raghunathrao and Holkar were late in coming the Marathas would become a laughing stock for the Jats and the Rohillas.

16. S.P.D., XXI, 99SP.D., XXI, 99,101; Also see Rajwade, I, 54.

17. TAL., (Pers. Ms), 200; S.P.D., XXI, 96, II, SO; Samin, 48.

18. Samin, quoted by Ganda Singh. Durrani, 172; SP.D., XXI, 96; TAL., (Pers. Ms.) 236


[p.182]: mostly defied his authority.19 The Abdali now resolved to march in person against the Jat Raja and he sent a foraging party to Faridabad. Jawahar Singh, who was then at Ballamgarh, took 5 to 6 thousand men, fell upon and routed it, slaying some 60 men and capturing 150 horses. This exasperated the Durrani and he ordered Abdus Samd Khan to go out in the night, lie in ambush, despatch 100 sawars to draw out the Jats from their hiding place, and then annihilate them. Abdus Samad literally followed his master. Jawahar Singh narrowly missed falling a victim to the Afghan stratagem. He escaped to Ballamgarh, but a number of his men were killed. The Afghans then attacked and pillaged several Jat villages, killing as many inhabitants as they could. They returned to Faridabad taking the booty and 500 severed heads.20

On 22nd February, Ahmad Shah Abdali left Delhi and, moving slowly, came to Faridabad on 26th. At first he ignored nearby Ballamgarh, declaring that his objects were Deeg and Kumher. But the insistence of Imad and the presence of Jawahar Singh there made him change his plans. He personally invested Ballamgarh, despatching (c. 27th February) his vanguard of 20,000 under Jahan Khan and another 20,000 under Najib,21 with the instructions:

Move into the boundaries of the accursed Jat, and in every town and district held by him slay and plunder. The city of Mathura is a holy place of the Hindus .... let it be put entirely to the edge of the sword. To the best of your power leave nothing in the Kingdom and country. Upto Akbarabad leave not a single place standing.

Lest the Afghans should fail to execute the command literally he also issued a general order:

To plunder and slay at every place they reached. Any booty they acquired was made a free gift to them. Any person cutting off and bringing in heads of the infidels should throw them down before the tent of the chief minister, wherewith to build a high tower. An account would be drawn up and five Rupees per head would be paid them from government funds.22

Assault On Ballamgarh: (3rd March 1757)

It was One of the weakest Jat fortifications. The swivel pieces and muskets formed the only fire of this fort against the fire mortars of the Durrani. Besides, Jawahar Singh, who had just returned after having


19. Francklin, Shah Aulum, 6.

20 Samin, 48-49; TAH., 195.

21. TAL., 192 ff.; Samin, 58, 48-51; Also Amira, 53 and 99; Memoires des Jats. 47: Styar, III, 350; Ibrat, 17a, 16b; Gupta, Panipat, 85 and 10S

22. Samin, 51.


[p.183]: been defeated at Chaumuha, must not have been able to muster up fresh strength. He was unable to hold for long against the enemy fire and he along with the Maratha sardars (Antaji and Shamsher Bahadur) escaped in the darkness of the night (3rd March) dressing as Qizilbashes. The Afghans broke open the gates of the fort and put the remainder to sword. Imad searched in vain corpses after corpses to trace Jawahar Singh. The invaders grabbed 12,000 Rupees, silver and copper utensils, gift idols, 14 horses, 11 camels, grain and clothes in large quantity. The Abdali stayed on for two more days and ordered general massacre and plunder. The environs of Faridabad were desolated and the terror stricken survivors fled elsewhere for safety.23

Then the Abdali himself proceeded southwards dealing death and destruction all round. An eye-witness giving its minute details says that the Afghans moved on in slow paces (one march never exceeded five 'kos' i.e. ten miles) after which one day's halt was made:

It was midnight when the camp followers went out to attack. ... one horsemen mounted a horse and took ten to twenty others, each attached to the tail of the horse preceding it, ... when it was one watch after sunrise I saw them come back. Every horseman had loaded up all his horses with the plundered property and atop of it rode the girl captives and the slaves. The severed heads were tied up in rugs and placed on the heads of the captive .... The severed heads were ... (then) entered in the register and then built up into heaps and pillars .... It was an extra-ordinary display .... Wherever your glance fell nothing else was to be perceived but severed heads ... Daily did this manner of slaughter and plundering proceed. And at night the shrieks of the women capitives, who were being ravished deafened the ears .... These things went on all the way to the city of Akbarabad nor was any part of the country spared.24

Battle Of Chaumuha (28th February 1757)

Earlier the strong Afghan vanguard, reaching nearer Mathura, planned to fall upon that unfortified city. But 10,000 Jats under Jawahar Singh stood firm on the way to lay down their lives for the defence of that sacred place. A fierce and long battle commenced between the opponents on 28th February at Chaumuha (8 miles to the north). The Jats displayed their traditional valour and courage. But the odds against


23. Samin, 56, 58-59; TAL.. 198, D.C.; S.P.D., XXI, 108, also: Also Amira, 99; Siyar, III, 352; Francklin, 6-7.

24. Samin, 55 and 60; G. Singh, Durrani, 176 footnote This IS untenable in the light of the eye-witness evidence to the contrary.


[p.184]: them were overwhelming. They had to cope with the superior generalship of Jahan Khan, who commanded a bigger force. After nine hours of grim fighting, the Jat resistance broke up and 10 to 12 thousand perished on the two sides taken together. Those wounded were "beyond count". The Mughal Emperor expressed his pleasure when he got his news through the two messengers, who were rewarded Rupees 300 each.25 Suraj Mal suspected that the Afghans might turn to Bharatpur, Deeg and Kumbher. Therefore, he "remained stationed there, prepared for war."26

Blood Bath At Mathura

Stamping "bleeding marks of their inhumanity",27 the Afghans. wrought greater havoc upon the innocent non-combatants of Mathura and its holy environs. Their only crime was their money and belief in a different religion. Early in the morning of 1st March, Jahan Khan and Najib pounced upon the people of the place. They were indiscriminately massacred, ravished and plundered. The Holi, though celebrated only two days ago, was now replayed not with colour but with the blood of the Hindus. The houses were pulled down in search of money and then put to flames. The places of Hindu-worship were desecrated, the temples demolished, idols broken and kicked on the streets like "polo-balls". The Afghan plunderers did not spare even their own co-religionists. Dissatisfied with the organised loot, Jahan Khan imposed Rupees one lakh upon the remnant of the city populace. He departed the same night to carry out his mission elsewhere. But this by no means relieved the people of their misfortune. Najib, the "infernal guide" of the "devilish"28 Durrani, stayed on for three days to inflict further brutalities on them. He plundered much wealth and carried off many beautiful women as captives. The ladies who could seek refuge into the deep waters of the Yamuna or the wells were fortunate. But those who survived suffered" a fate worse than death". Their modesty was cruelly outraged by the Afghan soldiers. Samin thus records what he saw a fortnight later:

Every where in lane and Bazar lay the headless trunks of the slain; and the whole city was burning. The water (of the Yamuna) flowing past was of a yellowish colour as if polluted by blood. The man (a Muslim jeweller) said, for several days following the general slaughter the water flowed of a blood-red colour. Now fourteen days have elapsed and the colour of the water has turned yellow.

25. TAL; 190-200; Nur,15b; cf. Rajwade, I, 63; S.P.D., XXI, 107; Sarkar, Fall, II, 118

26. TAL., 200; Also Memoires des Jats, 47.

27. Memotres des Jats, 47.

28. Gupta, Panipat, 85; Also SP.D., XXI, 144, 176; G Singh, Durrani, 177, cf Najib's cow-slaughter at Barari Ghat in 1757. Nur, 17a-17b


[p.185]: The Hindu hermits were butchered ill their huts. "In each hut lay a servered head with the head of a dead cow applied to its mouth and tied to it with a rope round its neck." A Muslim jeweller informed Samin that the Afghans daily appeared to dig the already dismantled houses in search of the buried treasures.29

Sack of Vrindaban (c. 6th March 1757)

Woeful was the tale of the countryside as well. The Afghans perpetrated rape, rapine and unmitigated bloodshed all round. About 6th March the people of Vrindaban, another sacred place, were put to the sword and their property was plundered by Jahan Khan and Najib. Our informer relates:

Where ever you gazed you beheld heaps of slain; you could only pick your way with difficulty owing to the quantity of bodies lying about and the amount of blood split. At one place we reached, we saw about two hundred dead children lying in a heap ... The stench and feter and effiuvium in the air were such that it was painful to open your mouth or even draw a breath.30

Bloody Encounter With The Nagas Of Gokul (16th March 1757)

Ahmad Shah Abdali was slowly coming pillaging and killing the people and desolating the rural areas. He divided his forces into groups of 50 soldiers each for the purposes of combing the adjacent areas. Halting at Shergarh, Hasanpur, Nadinah, and other places he arrived near Mathura on 15th March, 1757 and encamped at close by Mahaban. On the 16th, the greedy invader directed a contingent to loot Gokul (two miles away from his camp). But 4,000 martial naga Sanyasis of that place were determined, to defend their religious shrines. In a fierce action 2,000 Nagas fell but not before killing an equal number of the Afghan soldiers. Yet, none of the two sides would yield, Jugal Kishore, an agent of the Bengal governor, was present in the Abdali's camp. He pointed out the futility of fighting the Sanyasis as they possessed no money. The Abdali, therefore, recalled his troops31 and Gokul became an exception to the all round Afghan devastation. Incidentally, this episode disclosed that the Abdali's cupidity out-weighed his religious fanaticism. About this time Sarwar Khan had gone to sack Dhawalpuri.32


29. TAL; 199,215, Samin, 60 and 62; Nur, 15b; D.C.; S.P.D. (New Series) 1, 198; S.P.D, XXI, 107, 108, II, 71, XXVII, 152., Rajwade, I, 63; Amira, 99; Memoires des Jats, 47; Siyar, III, 352; Sarkar, Fall, II, 118-120; cf. Shah Alam Nama (Bib. Ind. New Series No. 1324), 28; Tarikh-i-Ahmad (Sultan-ul-Matabe: 1266 A.I-I.) 9.

30. Sam in, 60 and 62; Also see SP.D., II, 71

31. Samin. 60-62; Raj. 1,63, Also TAL., 215; D.C.

32 S.PD., XXI, III. 112.

Sack And Massacre At Agra (21st March 1757)


[p.186]. About 20th March, Jahan Khan and Najib were recalled from their "commission of raid and slaughter" and directed:

To move on to Akbarabad where there were many wealthy men, who are the subject of the Jat. These must be either slain or made captives and all their property seized.33

Obviously the Abdali's thirst for money had not quenched even after two months of incessant plundering. With 15,000 men, Jahan Khan reached Agra on the morning of 21st March. In order to avoid the horrible fate of lakhs of innocent people, some prominent bankers of the city waited on the general and promised to pay Rupees 5 lakhs. But what he desired was not their empty promises but money which was not easy for them to manage immediately. Jahan Khan lost his patience, more so because the general loot of the former Capital held out better prospects. So he entered and plundered the city, carrying out a general slaughter as far as the Nila Gumbaj. His hectic efforts to take the fort were, however, thwarted by the garrison. While Jahan Khan was still at Agra, his master "suddenly" sent to him (23rd March) an urgent message, calling him back to Mahaban. He, therefore, left Agra with the plundered booty along with one lakh of Rupees out of the promised ransom and joined the Abdali on 24th March.34

Causes Of The Abdali's Return

Ahmad Shah kept his "intentions secret" and three days later35 he suddenly resumed his homeward journey, without making an effort to fulfill his avowed objective of capturing Deeg and Kumbher. The outbreak of sickness in his camp was one of its important reasons. The misdeeds of the Afghans had at last begun recoiling upon their heads. The water of the Yamuna, which they used, reached them after getting polluted at the upstream places (such as Vrindaban and Mathura) which they had converted into "slaughter houses".36 Consequently, cholera broke out, which took a toll of 150 men daily.37 However, the pestilence as a factor in his abrupt return should be studied in its proper setting. There is ground to suppose that much of the heat of cholera had receded by the


33. Samin, 63; Sarkar, Fall, II, 122 says that the Abdali's plan was to proceed from Agra as his base and to capture the Jat forts to extract large tribute from Suraj Mal.

34. TAL., 222. 215: Samin, 65; SPD., (New Series) I, 198; Rajwade, I. 63; S PD., XXVII, 146, 152, 155, XXI, III also 108, 118 and H, 71; Memoires des Jots, 47: G. Singh, Durrant, 179-180.

35. TAL., 206; Gupta, Panipat, 89.

36. Sarkar, Fall, II, 125.

37. Samin, 64-65.


[p.187]: time he returned from the Jat country. The exorbitant price of tamarind 100 Rupees per seer, suggests its extensive use. Since the drink made of it was beneficial,38 it must have prevented infection and also remedied the surviving patients. This apart, we learn that the Afghan soldiers went back on foot as their chargers were required to carry the booty. They even left their artillery behind to spare their draught cattle to do the same job.39 By implication it means that the Abdali's army was nearly cured. Otherwise the soldiers suffering from diarrhea and vomiting could not have moved at all, leave alone undertaking long and strenuous homeward journey. One of the two things was bound to be correct, either sickness had ceased to be serious or the patients were also abandoned like the camp baggage, about which we have no information. Finally, the Maratha sardars such as Antaji Bapu, Hingne and Shamsher Bahadur (who were in the Jat country all this while) have not taken notice, of the dreadfulness of the pestilence as the cause of the Abdali's return,40 even though they had every reason to rejoice over nature's retribution against their foes. All this would show that whatever its form in the beginning, the threat of cholera had more or less been overcome in a short time. Hence, the pestilence, however important, was not the sole cause of the Abdali's sudden return as is commonly believed.41

The trend of the events warrants the inference that the Jat's "threatening demeanour"42 and the Abdali's fear of the Jat forts coupled with the coming of the Maratha army in the adjacent Jaipur State43 also contributed to his retreat without even having a look at his targets, Deeg and Kumbher. The Abdali had sent repeated messages for tribute to Suraj Mal at Kumbher but he egotiated44 merely to gain time. Through his diplomatic tact, he on the one hand impressed upon the Abdali the impregnability of his forts, while on the other he held out to him veiled threats. As described below, his professed humbleness was ironically worded and smacked more of stinging taunt than pleasing humility.

Surprising Vrindaban a second time when the Abdali reached Shergarh, he sent to the Jat a letter (through Jugal Kishore) and an officer in another bid to extract money from Suraj Mal. In case of non-


38. Ibid, 65.

39. SPD, II, 71.

40. Naro Shankar (SPD., XXVll, 146) does mention at one place that the summer did not suit the Durranis. But this cannot be stretched to account for the fury of the epidemic.

41. Qanungo, Jats, 105; Sarkar, Fall, II, 125-126; G. Singh, Durrani, 180-181.

42. Sardesai, Marathas, II, 405.

43. S.P.D., XXVII, 155.

44. S.P.D., XXVII, 146 says that at one stage Suraj Mal gave out to pay twenty lakhs; Shah Alam Nama, 28 and K.R. Qanungo, Jots, 106 relying on later sources carry this to incredible figure of fifty lakhs and one crores respectively.


[p.188]: compliance. the invader threatened to destroy him along with his forts. Suraj Mal wrote back in sarcastic though polished language:

I have no important position and power in the empire of Hindustan. I am one of the zamindars living in the desert and on account of my worthlessness not one of the Emperors of the age thought it worthy of him to interfere with my affairs. Now that a powerful Emperor like Your Majesty, determined on meeting and opposing me face to face in the field of battle, would draw his armies against this insignificant person, that action alone would be discreditable to the dignity and greatness of the Shah and would help in the elevation of my position and would be a matter of pride for my humble self. The world would say that the Emperor of Iran and Turan had, out of extreme fear, marched his armies upon a penniless nomad. These words alone would be a matter of great shame for Your Majesty .... Moreover, the ultimate result is not altogether free from uncertainty. If with all this power and equipage, you succeed in destroying a weakling like myself, what credit will there be gained? ... But if by divine decree, which is not known to anyone, the affair takes a different turn (i.e. Ahmad Shah is forced to embrace defeat) ... all this power and predominance brought about by Your Majesty .... during a period of eleven year will vanish in a moment.
.... As to the threatening and violent order issued for the slaughter and devastation of myself, warriors have no fear on that score. It is well-known that no intelligent man has any faith in this transient life. As for myself, I have already crossed fifty of the stages (of life) and know nothing about the remaining. There shall be no greater blessing than that I should drink the draught (or martyrdom) .... in the field of battle with valiant soldiers and leave my name and that of my ancestors, on the pages of (the book of) the age to be remembered that a powerless peasant breathed equality with such a great and powerful emperor as had reduced mighty Kings to subjection and that he fell fighting. And the same virtuous intention lies at the heart of my faithful followers and companions. Even I wish to make up my mind to attend at the threshold of your .... Court, the honour of my friends does not permit me. Under such circumstances, if Your Majesty .... forgive me .... and turn your attention to expeditions of greater importance, no harm shall come to your dignity and glory.
The truth about the three forts belonging to (me) the object of your wrath, which have been regarded by Your Majesty's chiefs as (weak as)

[p.189]: spider's web, shall be tested only after an actual contest. God willing. they shall be (as invincible as) Alexander's Rampart.45

A later authority, summing up the Jat-Durrani negotiations, remarks that the Jat Raja did not leave Kumbher and prepared himself for war. He told the envoys of the Abdali:

You have pot conquered India as yet. If you have taken hold of an inexperienced child (Imad) who held Delhi, what is there (to be proud of)? If you have any pretensions, why this delay (in attacking me)? ..... I have spent large sums of money on this fort. The Shah can be kind to me by fighting with me as that the world may remember in future that a Badshah came from Vilayat and conquered Delhi, but was helpless against an insignificant zamindsr:46

This was perhaps the mightiest challenge, couched in biting sarcasm, to his prowess and authority that Ahmad Shah Abdali even faced in India. Yet he dared not accept it. The argument that 'the terrible loss of life' and the 'daily increasing heat' prevented him from doing it,47 does not look convincing. Even if we concede the continued severity of the pestilence, the total loss according to the authentic figure of daily deaths would not have exceeded a thousand or so by the time of his departure. And this cannot be termed "Terrible" in the context of such a big army . As for the heat of the summer, it is to be remembered that it was merely the beginning (March) and the climax was still far away. Then again, we know that in 1760 the same Abdali had chosen to brave one full Indian summer with all its scorching heat. Positive evidence suggests that it was the impregnability of he Jat Forts accompanied by the threatening postures of their owner, which deterred the Abdali from moving against the forts. Emphasizing that the task of their reduction was "beyond human comprehension" the Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani says, "Since Ahmad Shah calculated that it would take him years to reduce these strong forts, he thought it better to keep off his hands from this expedition." What is more, the Court history accords precedence to this fact over the Afghan sickness as the primary factor obliging the Abdali to return.48 Jam-i-Jahan Numa confirms it when it says, "(Getting) Fearful of the strength of the Jat forts the Shah went back. ... "49 Suraj Mal's tact and boldness had borne fruits. The fear of what the


45. Tazkirah-i-Imad-ul-Mulk, 243-245 quoted by G. Singh, Durrani, 181-183.

46. Jam-i Jahan Numa, quoted by G. Singh, Durrani, 183.

47. G. Singh, Durrani, 183.

48. TAL., 215.

49. Jam-i-Jahan Numa, quoted in Durrani, 183, Also see Sardesai, Marathas, 11,405.


[p.190]: Abdali regarded "spider's web" - Deeg, Kumbher and Bharatpur, had worked up in his mind.

Apart from the Jat ruler's postures the Maratha army also arrived in close by Jaipur and carrying back his immense spoils safely became a source of anxiety to the Shah.50 It was believed that he "sought an assurance from Suraj Mal not to deceive him (surprise him in his rear) until (he reached) Delhi."51 On the other side, the Jat envoys in order to be sure that the Shah definitely left for Afghanistan, accompanied him (upto the suburbs of Delhi) alternating their master's stubbornness with the gestures for giving tribute. But when his intentions became certain, the fast camel riders broke the news to Suraj Mal and he dismissed the Abdali's negotiators without paying "a single Kauri" out of the settled tribute of seven lakhs, (five lakhs to the Shah and another two to his Wazir) the first half of which was to be paid at Delhi, while the remaining one at the Shah's next halt.52

Underlying Causes Of The Shah's Expedition

A close perusal of the Afghan doings gives us an insight into the underlying causes of their Jat expedition, which have not been fully appreciated so far. K.R. Qanungo appears to suggest that the Abdali's attack on "refractory" Suraj Mal was the part of his assumed political duty as the occupier of Delhi's throne.53 This is untenable. On the other side, Sarkar and Ganda Singh refer to the Jat Raja's noncompliance of the Shah's command to pay tribute, to wait on him, and to surrender recent usurpations and certain refugees as the factors neccesitating this expedition.54 But even these do not cover every aspect of the issue, in the proper perspective.

All these matters, except tribute, were more in the nature of provocations and as such were the immediate rather than the basic causes. Grabbing the Jat wealth was the primary reason of the Afghan expedition. Confronted with poor resources at home, squeezing money from this country was a perennial objective of the Abdali's doings in


50. Gupta, Panipat, 88 and 89; cf. S.P.D., XXI, 119, XXVII, 146, 155; Amira, 100.

51. S.P.D., II, 72. It was supposed that Suraj Mal was pursuing the Shah with his men. See SPD., XXI, 116.

52. S.P.D., XXI, III, II, 72, XXVII, 155; cf. Memoires des Jats, 48; Relying upon Bhau Bakhar Professor Qanungo (Jats, 106-107) puts the settled tribute at 10 lakhs although at another place (Jats, 144) he speaks of 5 lakhs. G. Singh (Durrani, 183-184), apparently following Qanungo, also mentions 10 lakhs; TAL., 215 says that since Suraj Mal had not at all been compelled he did not accept to pay any tribute whatsoever.

53. Qanungo, Jats, 98.

54. Sarkar, Fall, II, 115 and 114; G. Singh, Durrani, 172.


[p.191]: India.55 Only his recent loot of Delhi (it could not escape plunder for the second time after Jat war) showed that like that of the Marathas his own greed for money was insatiable. A contemporary, therefore, correctly anticipated:

He (Suraj Mal) possesses enormous wealth. The foremost enemy of the Hindus (the Abdali) shall never leave him unfleeced.56

Apart from the Bharatpur treasures, the rich Jat country also held out an irresistible temptation to the avaricious invader. He, therefore, resorted to a systematic and exhaustive plunder of the extensive Jat areas as it promised him great return.

This expedition was also intended to be a 'Jihad' against the Jat "infidels" as was put by the Bangash envoy (in the Abdali's camp).57 The Afghans indulged in large scale killing of the civilians including their infants - which smacked of a genocide. In addition, they completely destroyed their habitat and the objects of their religious veneration. This incidentally differentiated the Afghan rapacity from that of the Marathas. The Abdali was not averse to exploiting religion for political ends. Notwithstanding, he was not a fanatic58 noSr being a foreigner he could have sufficient grounds to be so ruthless towards the local populace (overwhelmingly Jats). And yet they were subjected to such a terrible persecution in course of his expedition.

To a great extent its secret may be traced to the operation of a strong anti-Jat-Maratha- Sikh movement under the leadership of Shah Waliullah of Delhi. Its ultimate aim was to revitalize Islam along its earlier traditions and through it retain Hindustan under the effective Muslim hegemony. This was to be fulfilled through Najib (whom Shah Waliullah encouraged and advised) and the real Islamic soldiers imbued with the spirit of "Jihad".59 The expansionist Jats were regarded as the mightiest thorn60 as they were the first supplant the Mughal authority under the very walls of the Capital. Shah Waliullah stressed that


55. Sardesai, Marathas, II, 372; Gupta, Panipat, 68-69, 164; cf. G. Singh., Durrani, 261.

56. S.P.D., XXI, 100; Scott (Dekkan, II, 233) says that unsatisfied with the wealth of the capital, Ahmad Shah marched against the Jat Raja.

57. Samin, 62.

58. On his own he generally displayed a restrained zeal in the religious matters. See G. Singh, Durrani, 339-341. It is noteworthy here that once informed that the recluses possessed no wealth he recalled his men from Gokul without destroying the religious shrines there.

59. K.A. Nizami in Shah, Introduction and also in Freedom Movement, I, 512 ff; Gupta, Panipat, 118. Formerly, Shah Waliulla centred his hopes (Shah, 31) on Firoz Jung. While inspiring Najib, he also tried to make the Wazir, Imad, mend his ways. Shah, 28-30, 33 also 26.

60. Nizami, in Freedom Movement, I, 552.


[p.192]: subjugating them "ensures both religious and material gains."61 He reminded Najib that the Emperor, nobles and people as a whole would have no peace till the above three harsh groups were "extirpated".62

Shah Sahib being such an influential figure of his age,63 his 'root out the Jat' advice must have left its impress upon the leading personages especially Najib, who himself sought his guidance and inspiration on different matters including those concerning the Jats.64 And the same Najib was the guide of the Abdali in the Indian affairs and as such as believed to be "at the root of all absurdities."65 What a havoc he and Jahan Khan wrought at, has already been seen before.

The letter which Shah Waliullah wrote (c. February 1757)66 to Ahmad Shah Abdali offered immediate and added inducement to that Emperor to be all the more rigorous upon the Jat people. Dwelling briefly upon the socio-political conditions and the nature of the Jat-Maratha danger, the reputed theologian described the pitiable plight of the Muslims vis-a-vis the Hindu in India. He says:

All control of Machinery of government is in the hands of the Hindus ... All wealth and prosperity is piled up in their (Hindus) houses, while poverty and misery is threatening the Muslims.

If the situation was allowed to drift "even the name of Islam would not remain anywhere". He further informed him about the persecution of the Muslims by Suraj Mal at Bayana and in the Jat Kingdom saying,


61. Shah, I also see 7-9, 20, 34, 35 and 39.

62. Ibid., 7.

63. Even the Mughal Emperors (Ahmad Shah and Alamgir II) the Wazir (Imad) and other leading nobles (such as Firoz Jang and Najib) and the Queens (such as Udham Bai and Zinat Mahal) deemed it a privilege to visit and consult Shah Sahib. Shah, 3-11,20,26,28,30-34; Also Muqadma, 20ff.

64. It can be easily inferred from Shah Sahib's letters to Najib. Shah, 4-10.

65. S.P.D. XXVII, 144; Raja Keshv Rao (S.P.D. XXI, 176) burst forth, "This wicked (Najib) indulged in slaughter at Mathura". Also Sarkar, Fall, II, 92.

66. Shah, 2. Like almost all of his other letters the present one also contains no date. K.A. Nizami (Freedom Movement, I, 531 f.) and following him H.R. Gupta (Panipat, 121) seemingly suggest that this letter (i.e. 2nd one) was written sometime after October, 1758, in any case not in 1757. However, two references occurring herein disagree with their suggested date. At one place Shah Waliullah writes 'a year is passing now" when Suraj Mal captures Alwar. See. S.P.D., XXVII, 128; S.P.D., (New Series) I, 189 as the Jats capture that fort about 23rd March, 1756 the Shah's letter can at most be placed upto 23rd March, 1757 and not in October, 1758 or beyond. Besides, it is noteworthy that he appeals to the Abdali not to return like Nadir, without crushing the Jats and the Marathas, and yet he does not make even the slightest hint about the Abdali's present evastating Jat expedition. This, when juxtaposed with the reference about Alwar, unmistakably shows that the present letter written before the commencement of the Abdali's Jat expedition i.e. sometime before 22nd February, 1757.


[p.193]: "None has the power to restore the Azan and Salat there (in the [[Jat Kingdom]])."67 The reputed scholar saint appealed to the Abdali not to return like Nadir, without chastising the Marathas and the Jats. Making the most earnest appeals to his religious sentiment, he reminded him that being the most powerful Muslim King, it was his bounden duty to crush the Marathas and the Jats and thus rescue his brethren (the Muslims of India) from "the clutches of the non-Muslims." Apart from him, Alamgir II (who cherished the ideals of his great namesake) and his nobles also made entreaties to the invader to stay on and crush the Marathas and the Jats.68

All this could not but produce the inevitable reaction in the mind of the invader, although it must be borne in mind that the great saint was opposed to the molestation of the innocent people, whether Muslims or Hindus.69 As the Marathas70 were outside the striking distance, Ahmad Shah, already having his eyes on the Jat wealth and also provocated by Suraj Mal's persisting defiance, finally resolved to bear his full weight upon that ruler. Various circumstances thus combined to work up his fury and one mighty assault on the Jats appeared to be promising him several rewards; his Indian admirers would be pleased, religious glory71 attained and Suraj Mal's provocations avenged. All along he stood to collect rich spoils and tribute.

Consequences Of Shah's Expedition

The consequences were indeed terrible. Enough has been said above to repeat again the harrowing tale of sack, slaughter and sacrilege. In the Afghan doings Samin visualized the spectacle "of the day of Last Judgement."72 The villages from Delhi to Agra were completely desolated and ruined.73 "Not a man" was left in any hamlet and not even "two seers of grain and fodder" could be found in the areas traversed by the atrocious Afghans.74 The marks of this man-made "catastrophe" were too visible even 11 years later, when the Jesuit Father thus wrote:


67. However, Suraj Mal's generally liberal policy towards the Muslims warrants a different inference. See Chapter XIV, f.n. 9-11.

68. S.P.D., XXVII, 152; cf. Samin, 49.

69. cf. Shah, 6.

70. According to Samin (51) Ahmad Shah on this occasion expressed his resolve to pursue and remove the name of the Marathas from Hindustan. Significantly, the Marathas also suspected that he would march on to Malwa from Agra. S.P.D., XXVII, 166.

71. Having seen the work of Najib and Jahan Khan around Mathura and at other places, Ahmad Shah gave vent to his desire to be remembered as the hero who gave "to Islam peace from the oppression of the infidel (Suraj Mal) ... " Samin, 63.

72. Sam in, 60; K.R. Qanungo, comments (Jats, 100); "This was not a war but a scalp gathering expedition on a big scale."

73. TAL., 215; Also S.P.D., XXI, 108; Ibrat, 17a.

74. S.P.D.,XXI,111.


[p.194]: (The Brij) was totally set on fire and bloodshed by the barbarity of the Durranis, joined by the Rohillas .... (and) the environs of Agra and that city itself were desolated more than ever. We see even at this hour (i.e. 1768) the sad marks of it.75

The Afghans practically sucked dry the areas within the reach of their hands and they collected immense spoils. As pointed before, the Abdali had to abandon his artillery (later captured by Suraj Mal) and order his soldiers to return on foot to enable his draught-cattle and the chargers to carry the booty. Horses, camels and even donkeys were seized from others for the same purpose.76 A considerable portion of the spoils requiring such enormous size of conveyance was obviously grabbed from the Jat areas. According to one report booty worth 25 lakhs of Rupees was carried from the city of Mathura alone.77 And this was the case when nothing but gold and silver was retained by the plunderers. The rest, however, they did not forget to destroy78 there and at other places.

Though, it is not possible to endorse Naro Shankar's optimism about the Abdali's rout,79 it is almost certain that had Raghunathrao arrived and joined Suraj Mal, people would have been spared of much of his atrocities. He, however, kept back inspite of the fact that with him and his men lay the responsibility to resist the Abdali. The streams of blood flowed down the streets of Brij and its shrines continued to be desecrated but no Maratha (or for that matter no Rajput) was stirred to action, although it is argued that the Marathas claimed tribute in return for the promise of protection as also liberating and maintaining the sanctity of the holy places.80 In explaining their conduct, we need not over-emphasize their lack of sufficient sources.81 It is noteworthy that not long afterwards they despatched 20,000 men to Agra (May 1757- Ed.) for extracting tribute.82 And no other man but one of their own commanders (Antaji) testified to Suraj Mal's readiness to fight the Abdali, if only the same number of the Marathas could reach on the spot to combine with them.83 This leads us to infer that a secret pleasure over


75. Memoires des Jats, 47.

76. S.P.D., II, 71 and 72.

77. Rajwade, I, 63. Booty worth 12 crores of Rupees was grabbed from different places and 30,000 horses, camels, etc. were needed to carry it away. Numerous ladies were also forcibly taken to Afghanistan. Vide Raghubir Singh in Brij, 189.

78. Samin, 60.

79. S.P.D, XXVII, 146.

80. J.N. Sarkar, (Fall, II 189-190) believes that in view of the above factor, the task was impossible for Raghunathrao. However, G.S. Sardesai (Marathas, II, 404) and H.R. Gupta (Panipat, 106) do not share his views.

81. ?

82. Chapter XI, f.n. II

83. S.P.D., XXI, 105.


[p.195]: the distress of their foe (Suraj Mal) and lack of bold initiative on their part also conditioned their movements. Their keeping away from moments of peril was bound to affect Suraj Mal's policy during the Panipat (in 1761), although the Maratha indifference in itself was appreciably due to his own anti-Maratha policy so far.

The Afghan devastation of its parts was sure to adversely affect the resources of the Jat State. All the same, its military strength and the rich treasury mostly remained unaffected.84 With all his legions, the Abdali failed, like the Maratha hordes three years before, to annihilate Suraj Mal or his main forts. In addition, he could not get "a single Kauri" by way of tribute. The valiant and shrewd Jat Raja, thus, single handed85 tided over yet another, this being the most formidable storm when the Mughal Emperor and his Courtiers ... .lay overwhelmed by it.86 Not merely that he emerged as the "strongest" and "richest" potentate in the north.87


84. cf Memoires des Jats, 48.

85. Facts of sober history belie TS. Shejwalkar's rather chauvinistic claim (Panipat: 1761, Poona, 1946m 48) that Antaji (with his negligible force) served as a shield for Suraj Mal's dominions and his forts. The truth is rather the other way round. Repulsed by the Afghans, he and other Maratha Sardars hid themselves in the Jat states for safety and they left it only after the Shah's departure.

86. G. Singh, Durrant, 344; Also Sardesai, Marathas, II, 405.

87. Rajwade , I, 71; Also Tawarikh-i-Hunud, 22a.


End of Chapter X - The Jats in the Vortex of Hostile Forces-(II)

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