The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire/Chapter XI
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Contents
- 1 The Phase of Cautious Disentanglement (I) (1753-1760)
- 2 Jat-Maratha rapprochement: c. June 1757
- 3 Suraj Mal And All Gauhar - Imad Tussle: Suraj Mal's Patch Up With Imad
- 4 Jats And The Afghan Maratha Struggle
- 5 Ahmad Shah and Suraj Mal in 1760
- 6 Rival Attempts To Win Over The Jats
- 7 Jats Join Bhau
- 8 Suraj Mal's Withdrawal From Bhau's Camp
The Phase of Cautious Disentanglement (I) (1753-1760)
[p.197]: The period of four years, preceding the fateful contest at Panipat, was characterized in an added degree by the interplay of mutually hostile forces, unscrupulous diplomacy, unsteady policies and mean intrigues. Hardly did anyone cherish a broad vision. The politicians of the day evolved and forsook policies to suit their selfish and narrow interests. Without caring for the Empire or the Emperor who had ceased to be the master of even his own person. Chaos and anarchy grew apace.
It was during this period that the Afghans (new entrants into the fray) and the Marathas came to be locked in a deadly rivalry for the mastery of Delhi's Empire. This in turn, threatened to engulf nearly the whole of Hindustan. This was especially true in case of the Jat State. It was "nearest the danger zone" and enjoyed "the fatal reputation of being excessively rich."1 Both the contenders were convinced of the partisan value of the Jat Raja. Yet, the irony was that both of them coveted his riches as before. In addition, the Marathas resented his occupation of the suba of Agra,2 while the indigenous pro-Abdali elements (the forces of political Islam and Najib) desired his people's outright extinction. Besides, the present and the subsequent Emperors made no secret of their anger towards him. His sworn enemy, Najib was now the real master of Delhi's government. The Rohilla chief on his own, was not powerful enough to cope with his resources and strength. But he had the unflinching support of the mighty Durrani, whose own exasperation in view of his recent failure in crushing the defiant Jat can be easily understood. Thus, it is apparent that probably no other leading Prince, even not Shuja-was simultaneously and to this degree exposed to the dual Afghan-Maratha danger. At least none else had to face their full-blooded invasions. Yet, as things stood,
1. Sarkar, Fall, 1I, 44l.
2. See Raghunathrao's letter, November, 1757, S.P.D., II, 84, XXVII, 158, XXI, 168.
[p.198]: there was little likelihood of Suraj Mal getting any external assistance- a situation for which he had partly to thank his own lukewarm policy3 as well as his expansionist designs, which cut the line of the Rajput ambition in the north4 while that of the Bangashes, Marathas and the Rohillas in the adjacent Doab.
The complex situation, however, brought forth the best in Suraj Mal. He displayed "marvellous sagacity", perseverance and "diplomatic shrewdness" in tackling it (Statesmanship requires exercise of caution and restraint). He re-adjusted his policy in the light of the exigencies of the situation and leaned towards cautious tactics and restrained political enthusiasm amidst the Afghan-Maratha tussle. Yet, he did not forego his opportunities all this while. The result, as would be seen, was more gratifying than ever before. In the end, whereas every other Indian power in the fray got "more or less ruined", Bharatpur grew to be the strongest power in the whole of India.5
The Jat Raja's immediate concern following the return of the Abdali, was to re-establish those outposts along both sides of the Yamuna which his men had to relinquish in face of the Afghan myriads. He got hold of the imperial fort of Agra as well.6 Some sporadic references indicate that in keeping with the general practice (including that the top Mughal officials like Najib),7 he made significant addition to his former possessions. His Jats stole a march over the Marathas by capturing (July, 1757) almost all the khalisa parganas of the district of Rewari.8 Ethnically Jat areas had an added attraction for him. About May, 1758, with a force of 5000, he was busy settling the tract around Meerut.9 Shortly afterwards he returned and encamped at Palwal.10
Jat-Maratha rapprochement: c. June 1757
About the middle of May, 1757, Raghunathrao sent a force of 20,000 under his chief agent Sakharam Bapu, with Vithal Shivdev, Gangadhar
3. For instance, we know that he had not fully helped the Rajputs in their struggle against the Scindes (1755), even though he was a strong advocate of the drive-out-the-Maratha policy.
4. Rival ambitions (in 1756) over Alwar is a case in point.
5. Memoires des Jats, 54, 49; Sarkar, Fall, II, 441, 442.
6. TAL., 222-223; Sarkar, Fall, II, 136, 138, 159; cf. SPD., XXVII, 172.
7. "Being most unscrupulous" Najib appropriated even the proceeds of the Princes' estates in the Main Doab country, treating the Mughal Emperor more disparagingly than even Imad. The Emperor, Alamgir, II, wrote, "I am a prisoner in the hands of this Rohilla". Nur. 15b-16a; Gupta, Panipat. 106.
8. SPD., XXVII, 193.
9. Ibid., 226.
10. TAL., 333.
[p.199]: Tatya and Antaji, in the direction of Agra. Reaching the taluka of Wair, they demanded the old dues from the Jat Raja. Vithal Shivdev, the deputy of the Holkar in the governorship of Agra, and the Jat plenipotentiary Rup Ram Kataria began negotiations on 27th May at Bhusawar (a nearby place). The Maratha deputy insisted on the full administrative and financial control of the suba. Eventually, a "friendly settlement" was effected between the two sides under which the Jat King was allowed to retain his annexations, including the fort of Agra, on the condition of his paying the installments of the outstanding tribute of 1754.11
Turning point in the Jat-Maratha relations: This settlement marked a turning point in the Jat-Maratha relations. Their respective compulsions forced them for compromise. It may be recollected that the recent coalition under the Abdali was hostile towards both the Jats and the Marathas. Though the latter escaped its brunt in 1757, their (Maratha's) clash with it looked certain in the circumstances. Even now their fortunes had not remained unaffected as a result of its operation. Their "bitterest enemy" Najib became supreme at Delhi in place of their tool Imad (who had temporarily gone over to the Abdali). This ran contrary to their ambition of dominating the Mughal government. Besides, their authority in the Doab had also been eclipsed by the Durrani supported expedition (Apirl-May, 1757) under the two Mughal Princes and Imad to recover the Doab and Awadh.12 The Jat outposts (in the Doab) also being threatened, this project itself contributed to bring Suraj Mal, the Marathas as also Shuja, together.13 In the prevailing situation, crushing Najib and restoring their authority at Delhi and in the doab were the immediate targets of the Marathas. Subjugating the Panjab and leading an expedition to Bihar and Bengal for collecting money were their subsequent plans.14 Amidst these compulsions the Marathas, though inwardly prejudiced, refrained from an inopportune and uncertain clash with the Jat King. The Peshwa's letter (July, 1757) referred to above, unmasks the Maratha policy which must have been maturing for sometime. He advised Raghunathrao that despite his mischief this year, Suraj Mal should be befriended. Further, in spite of the malice between the Holkar and Suraj Mal, the former should desist from a fight with the Jat Raja." As far as possible (the Marathas should) avoid a conflict with the Jat this year", concluded the Peshwa.15
11. Ibid, 236; SPD, XXVII, 158, II, 79, 80, XXI, 148; Sarkar, Fall, II, 159; cf Raj, I, 136.
12. For details of this abortive expedition see Sarkar, Fall II 130ff.
13. SPD., XXV !I, 152; Sarkar, Fall, !I, 9; cf. SP.D., II, 74.
14. For details see SPD., II, 80, Rajwade, I, 136; Gupta Panipat 93.
15. SPD., II, 80.
[p.200]: Little wonder, therefore, that the Marathas tried to make friends with Suraj Mal. Instead of downright cash, they kept content with his empty promise for payment (which in the light of his general evasion in the past was as good as not made at all). In addition, they respected the Jat annexations, as they did not wish to leave an estranged Suraj Mal in the rear while undertaking their distant enterprises.16 It is clear that with all their superior strength, the Marathas could not have accomplished both things at one and the same time to prevent the Jat expansion under their very feet and yet to spare their troops to realize their new ambitions and effectively confront the Abdali and his henchmen.
On his part, the Jat King himself wished to avoid further desolation of his principality now at the hands of the Marathas.17 Even otherwise it would be foolish to open a fresh front (with the Marathas) when the potential Afghan danger already lurked about. This apart, the difference between the recent Afghan atrocities and the present Maratha gestures was too distinct to have been missed by him. Hence, the pressure of the circumstances and the incomparably greater threat from the mightier and common foe drew the former adversaries together. It is then to the middle of 1757 rather than to 1754,18 that the Jat-Maratha accord should correctly be traced. Yet, the compulsions which brought about this accord constituted its weakness as well. Underhand dealings and suspicions on both sides still lingered on, though, on a much reduced scale.
Suraj Mal And All Gauhar - Imad Tussle: Suraj Mal's Patch Up With Imad
Three months afterwards (September, 1757) the Marathas and Imad (who had again won the former to his side) expelled their common enemy, Najib, from Delhi with the connivance of the Emperor.19 It is said that the Jats also co-operated with them.20 The change of the real masters at Delhi, however, brought no change in the general conditions. Undisputed power was the sole concern of the triumphant Wazir, Imad, and he attempted to weed out possible rivals from the Capital. From May 1757 to March 1758 the heir-apparent, Mirza Abdullah (entitled, Ali Gauhar and Sah Alam) had been energetically trying to recover his jagirs in the Rewari-Rohtak districts. But the Wazir got him recalled and, treacherously planning for his arrest, attacked him in May, 1758.
16. cf. Sarkar, Fall, II, 136.
17. TAL., 236.
18. Contra see, Sarkar, Fall, II, 437-438; Gupta, Panipat, 48; Qanungo, Jats, 96.
19. For details, see Sarkar, Fall, II, 140ff.
20. Muharbat, 10; K.A. Nizarni in Shah, Introduction, 43.
[p.201]:The prince was, however, fortunate to escape to Vithal Shivdev's camp. Therefrom he again went to his jagir in the company of that Sardar (last week of May).21
Raja Suraj Mal despatched his son, Ratan Singh, to wait on the Prince at Pataudi. On his father's behalf the Jat Prince presented 101 asharfis to Ali Gauhar along with Rupees 2,000, 1 elephant, 7 horses and 5 clothrolls as tribute besides the vast quantities of foodstuffs and other provisions loaded on camels and carts.22 Apparently, this was a well calculated diplomatic move on the part of the shrewd Jat to turn Imad-Ali Gauhar tussle to his own advantage. By his gestures he tried on the one hand to allure the wandering heir-apparent to his side, while on the other to overawe Imad into seeking terms with him. What was Ali Gauhar's reaction we do not know. But Imad was "greatly perplexed" by the Jat support to his rival.23 He had earlier (30th March, 1758) put under surveillance his another rival, Intizam following the interception of his letters soliciting help from the Jat and Rohilla chiefs.24 But Ali Gauhar was beyond his reach and appeared to have the powerful backing of the Jat Raja as well. The Wazir now resorted to cajoling the Jat Raja, whom he had relentlessly opposed since October, 1753 .
On 2nd June, 1758 (25th Ramzan, 1171 A.H.), he summoned the old mediator, Nagar Mal (who was intimate to the Jat Raja) and asked him to persuade the latter not to espouse Ali Gauhar's cause. Taking formal sanction from the helpless Alamgir II, the Wazir despatched his envoy on 3rd June (26 Ramzan), with a six piece robe of honour and a studded head-dress for his old enemy (Suraj Mal). It was obviously this development that the astute Jat had been aiming at. The same day Nagar Mal conveyed the Wazir's appeal to the Jat King at his camp at Palwal. The negotiations between them continued for three days. On 6th June (29th Ramzan), Nagar Mal went back accompanied by Nahar Singh (another son of Suraj Mal) and acquainted the Wazir with the Raja's response. Nahar Singh stayed at Khizrabad.25
The prolonged negotiations followed by Nahar Singh's visit to Delhi and the subsequent events suggest that Ali Gauhar's case channelized the Palwal talks to the basic issue, namely, the Jat-Wazir relations and that their outstanding differences were sorted out. As one of its first indications, Suraj Mal refrained from extending any help to Ali Gauhar, which Imad
21. For details of Ali Gauhar's activities see Sarkar, Fall, II, 161 ff.
22. TAL., 330.
23. Ibid., 330.
24. S.PD., XXVII, 226; Also Sarkar, Fall, II, 164.
25. TAL., 332-333; Antaji (S.P.D., XXI, 160) imputes unfounded motives to Nagar Mal's mission.
[p.202]: had apprehended earlier. It is believed that later (c. August, 1758), he positively declined to help redress that Prince's cause.26 Terikh-i-Alsmgir Sani records a hitherto unnoticed incident in this regard. It tells us that to thwart Ali Gauhar's plans of subjugating Bihar and Bengal, Imad got another Prince, Hidayat Bakhsh, appointed (February, 1759) the governor of Bihar and Ali Gauhar declared a rebel. In doing so, the arch schemer solely counted upon Suraj Mal's "big forces". His plan was that Hidayat Bakhsh should first proceed to Agra, enlist the Jat support and then march towards Bihar. But in the meantime (March), came the news of Suraj Mal's departure for Jaipur. This disappointed the Wazir. "What (he had) thought and what happened", remarked the Court historian.27
For our purpose the above plan is not as important as the light it throws on the Jat- Wazir relations in February-March, 1759. It indicates to what extent the Wazir had come to bank upon the Jat strength even though he did not yet part with the Marathas either. However, Dattaji Scinde's28 aggressiveness drifted him closer to the Jat Raja. The process reached its culmination a year later (on or before 9th January, 1760), when Imad, disenchanted with the Maratha alliance, repaired for safety against the Abdali to the Jat Court, where he had already sent (November, 1759) his family and belongings. What an irony: As Wendel puts it, Imad now stood suppliant before the same Suraj Mal and his forts to annihilate which "not long ago he had armed the whole of Hindustan". Suraj Mal showed all respect and attention due to the dignity of the Wazir and lodged him in his best palace at Bharatpur. Political expediency and characteristic generosity alike guided him in extending patronage to the imperial Wazir. This heightened his image.29 Yet Imad, besides being the Chancellor, was also a notorious regicide. Hence, giving asylum to such a man could not but provide an additional rallying point to his opponents. As a consequence of the Wazir-Jat combine, Shah Alam became apprehensive about his political future. Imad was his mortal enemy and Suraj Mal had latterly been siding with him. He suspected Imad with the help of Suraj Mal would raise some one else to the throne (evidently, he had not heard of Imad's prior enthronment of Shah Jahan II on 30th November, 1759) and he appealed to the Abdali to grant him the Crown of Delhi.30
26. Francklin, The History of the Reign of Shah Aulum, London (1798), 9-10.
27. TAL., 380.
28. For the Scinde's aggressiveness towards the Wazir see Sarkar, rail, II, 199-202.
29. Memoires des Jats, 49-50.63; Imad, III; Rajwade ; 1,143,144; S.PD., XXI, 176; Mirat 892, 905-906: Shakir, 100; Nur . 27b; Siyar, III, 375-376; Ibrat, 21a; Gulistan, 58; cat, 83; Majmaul-Akhbar, in Elliot, YIII, 363; Muharbat, 10f.; Francklin. The History of the Reign of Shah Autum, London (1798), 15.
30. Murasalat-i-Ahmad Shah Durrant, 21, Quoted by G. Singh, Durrant, 232-233.
Jats And The Afghan Maratha Struggle
[p.203]: We may now briefly notice the relevant Maratha doings. After the return of Raghunathrao (May, 1758) another army under Dattaji Scinde came to the north (December, 1758). Dattaji made an unsuccessful bid to arrest Najib. This precipitated a war which culminated in the Maratha siege of Sukkartal (July-December, 1759).31 Najib defended himself brilliantly but in the name of religion and Afghans race, he repeatedly appealed to his master, the Abdali for help. The siege was still on when Dattaji received the news of the coming of the Abdali. In face of heavy odds, he solicited help among others from the Jat King also. Consequently, the latter despatched a contingent of 5,000 under Rup Ram Kataria. It joined the Scinde on 8th November, 1759, at Sukkartal.32
Several considerations influenced the decision of the Jat Raja. Of all, the most important was the singleness of purpose. Whereas Malharrao - described as "the chief destroyer of Hindustan" by a contemporary33 - although shielded his adopted son, Najib34, Dattaji was required to altogether crush that "treacherous" supporter of the Abdali35. Suraj Mal also held a similar view, so that the Abdali's "prospects of any assistance from the traitors within " might be finished.36 Besides this broad issue, the atrocities perpetrated by the Rohilla chief in 1757, and his rival ambitions over the Jat areas in the Doab (such as Meerut), must have also prompted the Jat Raja to make a common cause with the Marathas against the common enemy. Moreover, as against the Holkar, the Scindes were agreeable to the Jats for their (especially Jayappa's) gestures during the siege of Kumbher. Dattaji replaced the Holkar and he reversed the policy of his predecessor. Herein lay possibly another factor affecting the Jat decisions.37
At Sukkartal the brave Rohilla showed no signs of giving up and the Abdali, having undone the Maratha gains in the Panjab, was threatening Dattaji in the rear. At last on 8th December, Dattaji raised the futile siege. He entrusted (c. 20th December, 1759) his family, heavy baggage, and the disabled camp followers to the care of the Jats to be escorted to
31. For this siege and other non-Jat affairs see Rajwade, I, 140-145; SP D., XXIX, 56, XXI, 176; D. C; Nur. 19b-20b, 22b-26b; Siyar, III, 371 If.
32. Rajwade, I, 143, 147; K.R. Qanungo, Jats, 112 does not take note of the Scinde's invitation to Suraj Mal. According to him Jat troops went to Delhi and not to Sukkartal.
33. Memoires des Jats, 41, footnote.
34. cf. Raghunathrao's statement, quoted by Sardesai, Marathas, II, 417.
35.See the Peshwa's letter quoted by Sarkar, Fall, II, 232-233.
36. Qanungo, Jats, 109.
37. cf. Ibid., 112; Also Sarkar, Fall, II, 199-200.
[p.204]: Delhi38 while he set himself to arrest the foreigner's advance. But the fate had decreed otherwise. After two engagements, the first at Tarori (24th December) and the second near the Yamuna (29th), he was forced to retreat to Delhi. Herefrom he sent off (c. 4th January, 1760) his own and his officers' families and the heavy equipage towards Rewari (in the Jat country) in charge of Rup Ram Kataria.39 On 9th January, 1760, Dattaji was killed fighting heroically against the Abdali at Barari Ghat.40 A virtual hide and seek then commenced between the Afghans and the dispirited Marathas, which ended only with the rout of the Holkar's men (4th March) at Sikandarabad. The same day Malhar and Gangadhar fled to Agra and Mathura respectively. Rup Ram Kataria also returned with them. Jahan Khan pursued the vanquished upto the bank of the Yamuna opposite Mathura. They sought safety in the Jat State or Etawah. The back of the Maratha's resistance to the invader's combination was thus broken.41
In his distress the Holkar swallowed his old enmity with Suraj Mal. As is evident from his own letter (3rd February, 1760), he had begun to realize how helpful his redoubted foe could be in the changed circumstances.42 He now took steps to defreeze his relations with him. From Agra he made off in the direction of Bharatpur. When he reached some 30 miles from that place, Suraj Mal, who seems to have been nearby, met him (before 12th March). The solemn assurances of friendship, sworn to on the 'Bel' leaves and the Ganga water, followed. As a proof of amity, the elderly Maratha stalwart gave robes of honour to the Jat, while the latter offered full protection to his erstwhile opponent and his men.43
38. Rajwade, I, 147; cf. SPD., II, 110.
39. Meanwhile numerous people, both the Hindus and the Muslims, had fled to the "safest" heaven of refuge, the Jat state. Memoires des Jats, 49; SPD., XXI, 176; Rajwade, I, 143, 144, 150; Mirat, 892-893; Nur. 27b.
40. For details of Dattaji's battles with the Abdali see Gupta, Panipat, 126ff.
41. For details see SPD., XXI, 182-185, 188, II, 120, 121; Rajwade, I, 178, VI, 403; D.e.; Nur. 3Ia-3Ib; Shakir, 100; Siyar, III, 380-381; Shah Alam Nama, 123; Muharbat, II.
42. SPD. II, 117, Also Raj. I, 164. The version of Amira (102-103): Siyar (III, 380); Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan (in Elliot, VIII, 272); Scott (Dekkan, II. 239) and following Siyar of Qanungo (Jats, I 18) that after Barari Ghat the Holkar unsuccessfully importuned the Jat Raja to jointly move against the Abdali cannot be accepted in view of the Holkar's own omission of the supposed incident. No Marathi despatch or the Jat histories refer to it.
43. SPD., 11,121; Gupta, Panipal, 132; G. Singh, Durrani 243. Completely ingorning the utter helplessness of the Holkar at the moment, Shejwalkar (Panipat ; 49) forwards a strange argument that Suraj Mal joined the Holkar and Scinde simply because they had become weak after their defeat at the Abdali's hands.
Ahmad Shah and Suraj Mal in 1760
[p.205]: The Abdali had been enquiring about the movements of the Wazir and Suraj Mal and the latter's relations with Najib.44 After routing Dattaji, he turned his attention to Suraj Mal who had collaborated with the former. On 14th January, he came to Khizrabad and wrote to him and the other Hindu and Muslim chiefs, ordering them to pay tribute, present themselves in his court and join him against the Marathas. But the addressees had no faith either in the perfidious Abdali or in the exacting Marathas. On his part, the Jat King cleverly refused to comply with the Abdali's demands unless he substantiated his claims by an effective and lawful possession of the sovereignty of Hindustan. The Abdali was incensed at this renewed defiance. Meanwhile, Najib also instigated him again to lead an expedition and "destroy" the Jat. Hence partly to punish him and partly to pin him down and thus prevent his possible junction with the Maratha fugitives, he set out for the second time against Suraj Mal. On 27th January, he left Khizrabad, marched into the Jat State and via Shergarh came to Deeg on 6th February. Next day he invested that fort. But a few days' experience revealed to him the magnitude of his task and he left that place in the pursuit of Malharrao, then advancing northwards.45 He later defeated him as noted above. Meanwhile, Najib entreated his master to stay on and crush his enemies. For the Abdalis encampment he suggested Ramgarh (Aligarh), which belonged to his enemy, the Jat Raja. Accordingly on 5th March the Abdali arrived at and besieged that place. Ramgarh was a strong and well provided for fort and was deemed capable to hold out for long. But the Afghan occupation of the intervening land upto the Yamuna cut off its garrison from outlying Bharatpur (60 miles). The fort commandant, Durjan Sal grew disheartened and after 19 days he surrendered that place, half of which was plundered by the new occupants. The sudden and unexpected fall of this fort, coupled with the loss of his possessions east of the Yamuna, worried Suraj Mal. As confrontation with the Afghan combination was out of question, he chose to amuse the Abdali by opening negotiations. The Abdali, however, saw through the game and he demanded Rupees 45 1akhs.46
44. SPD., II, 106.
45. D.C.. SPD., XXI, 186, 187, 11,118; Mirat, 906; Also Memoires des Jats, 51; Francklin, 15; Muharbat, 12; G. Singh, Durrani, 233-234; Gupta, Panipat, 138. T.S. Shejwalkar (Panipat 30) follows imagination rather than facts in asserting that Malhar's tactics "saved" the Jat and Rajput Princes. He somehow ignores that the Abdali did not intend to destroy the Rajputs, with whom he had been on ntimate terms (See S.H. Askari, Durrani-Rajput Negotiations 1759-1761) in Proc. I.H.C. (1945).258-269, and that his mere whirlwind march was not going to penetrate the Jat defences.
46. Nur. 31b-32b; D.C.; Memoires des Jats, 51-52; Mirat 906; Imad 117; Gulistan,....
Rival Attempts To Win Over The Jats
[p.206]: As the shadow of the prospective Afghan-Maratha conflict lengthened, the entire political atmosphere became surcharged with intense and intriguing diplomacy. Pressures and persuasions, threats and allurements and religious excitement, all were brought into full play by the contenders to win over the allies. The Jats occupied a conspicuous position among the northern powers. We learn from a letter of Shah Alam II that some personages, including the imperial Diwan of Crown-lands impressed upon the Abdali the relative strength of the Jat Raja by terming him as "the key to India". This estimate may not be correct in its entirety in the situation of 1760. But it could not be dismissed as a mere "fabrication" either, as the helpless Shah Alam did in his defeatist grudge against the protector of his mortal enemy, Imad.47We know that as early as 1757, he had come to be regarded as the strongest and richest ruler in the north.48 The Nawab of Awadh no doubt possessed the death-defying band of the Nagas and Qizilbashes. But in point of cool obstinate valour, Suraj Mal's Jats were inferior to none. And so far as the generalship was concerned, Shuja compared poorly with the Jat veteran Ghulam Husain adds:
- There were no troops in India that could pretend to face them (mounted matchlockman trained by Suraj Mal himself) in the field.49
Moreover, Suraj Mal also possessed, as Shuja did not, at least 4 fairly spacious, best provisioned (both in terms of munition as well as food and fodder) and the then strongest forts, whose strength was such that no power in the whole of the Asian continent was deemed capable of capturing them.50 These forts could serve as bases for operations as well as refuge in adverse moments. Besides, for reasons of invisible tribal ties, the outlook of their chief spokesman (Jat Raja) could not but condition the friendship or enmity (towards a particular contender) of the entire warlike Jat populace spread distantly around the Capital, which was, as it turned to be, the likely fighting zone. The general disposition of the non-combatants, even though directly meaningless, was sure to affect the flow of supplies, which had a significance of its own in a marathon contest. Thus, from the viewpoint of the military utility Suraj Mal had a definite edge over Shuja as well-a fact which
47. Murasilat-i-Ahmad Shah Durrani, 21, quoted by G. Singh Durrani, 232-233.
48. Rajwade, I, 71.
49. Siyar, IV, 28. Even if this remark is taken to refer to the post-Panipat period of that Raja's life, it should be borne in mind that this excellence could not have been achieved overnight.
50. Supra. 102. Also Memoires des Jats, 39-40; TAL., 200, 215.
[p.207]: has not been emphasized so far.51 The fact that both the opponent (the Abdali and the Marathas) appeared to be taking greater pains in wooing Shuja than Suraj Mal cannot mislead us, if only we keep in mind their respective positions in the setting of 1760. It would appear that Suraj Mal was already more involved than Shuja in the Afghan-Maratha rivalry when both sides intensified hunt for allies. Ever since the siege of Sukkartal (i.e. since November, 1759), his contingents had been associated with one of the two rivals (the Marathas). In addition, he at the time had given shelter to most of the Maratha fugitives against their Afghan enemies. As such there could be no mistaking about his leanings towards the one as against the other rival. To the corresponding degree the intensity of the efforts to win him over was bound to be lessened; from the side of the Marathas because of their basic confidence, while from the side of the Afghans because of their proportionate pessimism. As against Suraj Mal, Shuja's case was evenly open. Having silently gone back from Sukkartal, he had scrupulously avoided taking sides in the subsequent struggle. His impartial postures thus held out equal chance for both the suitors. This possibly formed the secret of their showing more efforts in his than Suraj Mal's case.
And yet Suraj Mal's adhesion, failing that his neutrality was "coveted" by both the contenders.52 Ahmad Shah had displayed wanton tyranny in 1757 and only recently he had attacked him (February, 1760). As such he stood only a remote chance of an alliance with the Jat Raja53 and though he instructed his envoy to persuade him to join his side, he mainly concentrated upon securing the Jat neutrality. In addition, he tried to realize a big amount of money from Suraj Mal. With these objectives he despatched Hafiz Rahmat on 16th May to Mathura to negotiate with the Jat as also the Marathas. The Rohilla Sardar proceeded to Bharatpur accompanied by Suraj Mal and Gangadhar Yashwant. Suraj Mal acted as the middleman in the Maratha negotiations with the Afghan envoy but they produced no results. In his own case, as he was unwilling to adhere to the invader, he simply prolonged the discussions to gain time. At length when Bhau arrived (8th June), the Rohilla was dismissed without achieving anything at all.54
51. Contra see Srivastava, Shuja, 76f; Sarkar, Fall, II, 274ff. H.R. Gupta (Panipat,137), however, acknowledges "Almost equally important was Raja Suraj Mal, the richest and strongest Hindu ruler in northern India."
52. Gupta, Panipat, 137: Qanungo, Jats, 138-139.
53. cf. Gupta, Panipat, 137.
54. See D.C.; S.PD. II. 127, 124; Shakir, 100; Tarikh-i-Hussaini quoted by Qanungo, Jats, 119 also cf. 139; Sarkar, Fall, II, 246-247, 274; Gupta, Panipat, 138; Shejwalkar, Panipat, 36; cf. Mirat, 906; Gulistan, 59; Gul. 84; Muharbat, 12; For a detailed discussion about Ahmad Shah's inability to subdue Suraj Mal see Memoires des Jats., 55-56.
[p.208]: It is noteworthy to examine here the inner working of Suraj Mal's mind in the present context. We know that he was the only Indian Raja to have so heavily suffered at the hands of both the extortionate Afghans as well as the greedy Marathas. Both of them now sought his alliance or neutrality only to fry their pan. The shrewd Jat Raja could easily realize that their (especially Marathas') soft postures accrued from their pressing needs and once they were over, the victor would not hesitate to swing back to the old ways. Raja Keshavrao aptly observed (10th March, 1760) that Suraj Mal and others feared the Marathas on one side while Ahmad Shah on the other.55 Choice between the two was thus difficult indeed. Yet, in the circumstances it had to be made and56 Suraj Mal, discarding the Abdali, leaned towards the Marathas as the lesser of the two evils.
Varied considerations seem to have influenced his thinking. At the outset it may be recollected that he hailed from a proud stock, which had opposed to its might almost every foreign invader including Ahmad Shah himself (at Manupur). A treacherous collusion with the Shah by an illustrious son of that stock thus stood against its national characteristic. Suraj Mal had once emphasized it, in his letter to Ahmad Shah Abdali (1957).57 The weightier factor, however, was his own interest. We know that Ahmad Shah was the prop of the internal anti-Jat forces. Shah Waliullah, who along with Najib, was the "chief agent" in bringing about the battle of Panipat,58 deemed annihilation of the Jats as a step towards the revival of Islam and the Muslim political hegemony.59 However, the Marathas had no such avowed objective before them. At any rate there was no scope for the religious considerations to the material differences between the two. Moreover, Suraj Mal could not have easily forgotten the bitter memories of the Abdali's gruesome sack and slaughter (in 1757), which outclassed all the grasping tyranny of the Marathas put together. These factors weighed with the Jat Raja and he turned down the Abdali's "overtures for alliances60, both in January, 1760 as also afterwards.
Meanwhile, the Marathas made efforts to win him over to their side. We learn from a despatch that Suraj Mal agreed to depute 10,000 men to fight anywhere in the Marathas van provided they desisted from creating "disturbance" in his country and dunning him for tribute. The acceptance
55. S.P.D., XXI, 187 also 188, cf 186; Memoires des Jats, 52, 51; Also see Rajwade, I, 71.
56. Qanungo, Jats, 108.
57. Supra, see ch. X, f.ns. 45,46.
58. K.A. Nizami in Shah, Muqadmah, 42 also in Freedom Movement, I, 532.
59. Supra, ch. X, f.ns. 57-68.
60. G. Singh, Durrani, 243; cf. Qanungo, Jats, 115-116.
[p.209]: of these conditions amounted to abandoning their age-old practices. Yet, so keen were the Marathas to retain his support that they acceded to these demands.61 It is noteworthy that when Bhau entered the Jat domains on 8th June, 1760, he forbade his soldiers on fear of strictest punishment to harass the Jats or molest their territories.62 In response, the Jat ruler supplied the hard pressed Maratha hordes with huge quantities of food-stuffs and other requirements, which sufficed them for over a month.63
Jats Join Bhau
Right from the start the Maratha commander attempted to win over allies. He wrote, though in vain, to the various Hindu and Muslim chiefs, seeking their help in banishing the invader.64 The Sarva Khap Pimchayat of the upper Doab, however, responded to his call.65
From his camp south of the Bangaga river (20 miles south of Agra) Bhau wrote to Suraj Mal entreating him to expeditiously unite with his forces. The Raja, however, suspected treachery and hence hesitated to visit the Maratha camp till the Holkar and the Scinde furnished personaloaths and solemn assurances concernmg1iIS safety. On 30th June, 1760, the Holkar conducted the Jat King (at the head of 8 to 10 thousand troops) and Imad to Bhau. Bhau, in person, advanced two miles to honourably welcome his only as also an important ally (Suraj Mal). The renewed pledges followed, Bhau taking the Yamuna's water in his hands as a solemn proof of his alliance with the Jat Raja. The Wazir held a conference with Bhau through the mediation of Suraj Mal.66
61. SPD., XXI, 190. By way of its date, this letter merely refers to 19th Muharram, and not to the particular year. The mention of the name of Badan Singh along with that of Suraj Mal, herein would show that the above negotiations occurred in the former's lifetime i.e. before 9th June, 1756. But the fact that the Marathas continued to press Suraj Mal for money even after that date, goes against it. From the tone of the letter as well as Bhau's conduct, respecting the Jat conditions, it seems that the Bhau's arrival i.e. before 8th June, 1760 rather than after it, as SPD.'s, editor G.S. Sardesai guesses. The incorporation of Badan Singh's name appears here due to the slip of its writer.
62. SPD., II, 126; Also Rajwade, I, 199; contra see Dow, Hindustan, II, 339.
63. Sarkar, Fall, II, 243-244; Memoires des Jats, 53.
64. Rajwade, I, 174; SPD., XXIX 41; Shejwalkar, Panipat, 37.
65. We are told that subsequently the above Panchayat at its meeting held at Sisauli under the Presidentship of Danat Rai, decided to despatch a milita under the command of Chowdhary Sheo Lal Jat of village Shoram (Muzaffarnagar) to the help of the Maratthas. Vide Bhau's letter, Muzaffarnagar Records. Kanha Ram, 19.
66. Purandare, I,387; S.P.D. II, 127; Amira, 103; Siyar, 1II, 382-383; Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan in Elliot, VIII, 274-275; Imad, 121,272; Scott, Dekkan, II, 240; Also Memoires des Jats, 53; Mirat, 907; Nur, 32b; Qanungo, Jats, 123-124 and 132; Dow (Hindustan, 11, 339) is wrong in claiming that 50,000 Jats joined the Marathas, Francklin, The History of the Reign of Shah Aulum. London (1798), 18.
[p.210]: When asked for his advice, Suraj Mal emphasized "caution and reflection in conducting the war" against a mighty and clever enemy like the Abdali. He proposed that the ladies, the heavy equipage, big guns and such other things, which were of little use in the present struggle, should be despatched to Jhansi, Gwalior or anyone of his "four iron like forts". The line of supplies should be kept safe and open. The provisions, he ensured, could be procured from the Jat country. The Jat veteran disapproved of pitched contest. Instead, he stressed that unencumbered cavalry should constantly engage the enemy in irregular warfare. In other words the allies should stick to their traditional and tested guerilla system. The astute Jat went on that strong detachments should be sent towards the Afghan homelands. This would not only cut off the enemies supplies but also create a diversion and thus force his Indian allies to desert the Abdali. Perplexed by this strategem as also by the rainy season, the invader would go back and his Afghan henchmen would be brought to their knees, so calculated the Jat Raja. Malharrao Holkar, by far the most experienced Maratha general, concurred with this sagacious advice. However, young Bhau despite being a complete stranger to the north and its people, preferred the new mode of warfare, namely, to engage the enemy in pitched contest through infantry tactics. He, therefore, slighted this wise counsel. Both Suraj Mal and the Holkar felt disgusted at his attitude.Though differences over the plan of campaign did not lead to open rift, some coolness arose between Suraj Mal and Bhau and whatever enthusiasm the former had developed for the Maratha side was affected at the very beginning.67
The facade of unity was however, maintained between the two. Bhau accompanied by Suraj Mal inspected the Yamuna near Agra on 14th July, 1760. Finding it unfordable, the earlier plan to cross the river and then effect a junction with Govind Ballal was now dropped. Two to three thousand reckless Jat soldiers still crossed the flooding Yamuna, but no Maratha ventured the same and the Jats were cut off from the rest of the armies. Bhau now decided to capture the Capital and he moved on to Mathura on 16th July. He asked the Jat Raja to help him in "conquering and settling" De1hi.68 From Mathura he detached a strong force to Delhi
67. Imad, 273-276. However, its assertion that Bhau humiliated Suraj Mal at Agra does not appear to be correct for the simple reason that in view of his pressing needs he could not afford to alienate his only ally at that stage. Qanungo, Jats, 125ff; Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan (in Elliot, VIII, 275) claims that Bhau on his own endorsed the Jat plan but eventually discarded at the behest of Vishwasrao. This is incorrect. Gupta, Panipat, 153; Also Sarkar, Fall, II, 256; footnote; For a discordant note see Shejwalkar, Panipat, 42f.
68. Rajwade, I, 217, 217a, 216 also 204, 205 and 215; Shejwalkar, Panipat, 43.
[p.211]: under the Holkar and Scinde guided by Suraj Mal and the Wazir. The city captured and soon (22nd July, 1760) it passed into the hands of the Wazir. The Fort was then put to siege. This was defended, though, inadequately by Yaqub Ali Khan, a relation of the Afghan Wazir. On getting the promise of safe exit he evacuated and handed over the fort on 1st August, 1760.69 Ali Muhammad Khan who wrote only about a year later, adds that the disheartened commandant (Yaqub Ali Khan) decided to make peace and came out to take "a strong pledge", through the Wazir and Suraj Mal. The latter's order got established inside the fort. Bhau "had farfetched ideas in his mind .... He did away with the (Jat) bandobast and appointed his own men there". The Wazir (backed by the Jat Raja) represented to the Maratha commander that as he himself was capable of protecting the fort, he (Bhau) should remove his own men. But Bhau was keen for personal control of the Capital and he spurned this appeal.70
In order to win Shuja over to his side, Bhau had been in touch with that chief, promising him the Wizarat.71 On the other side, he had apparently also assured the current holder of that office, Imad, of his re-installation at Delhi.72 Otherwise, the Wazir would not have confederated and marched with the Marathas upto Delhi. Bhau, however, concealed from his allies his secret promises to Shuja.73 It was only on 1st August, 1760 that the reality dawned them (Jat King and Imad). On that day, Shuja who was encamped across the Yamuna sent a letter to Bhau through Devi Dutta. Referring to the Maratha proposal, he pointed out that if among others he (Shuja) was recognised the Wazir and the Marathas agreed to return to the Deccan, he would persuade the Abdali to go back.
Suraj Mal's Withdrawal From Bhau's Camp
This embassy could not remain a secret. The thought of his prospective overthrow "displeased" power hungry Imad and his patron and both of them marched away to their camp at Tughlaqabad the same day. Delhi Chronicle adds that next day (i.e. 2nd August) the Marathas "rode out to remove (their) anger."74 This entry (in the above work) has been mainly relied upon by J.N. Sarkar and H.R. Gupta to establish that Suraj Mal
69. Rajwade, I,222-224,226; D.C.; S.P.D., XXVII, 258; Nur, 33a-33b; Mirat, 907; Imad, 275; Memoires des Jats, 53; Amira, 103-104; Siyar, III, 383-384; Shah Alam Nama,171-172; Mirat-i-Aftabnuma, 370; Ahwal, 124; Muharbat, 12.
70. Mirat, 907; Also see Purandare, I, 389 (suggesting his desire to retain personal control).
71. For details see Srivastava, Shuja, 78-80.
72. Shah-Alam Nama, 171; Also Mirat, 907; G. Singh, Durrani, 244, footnote; cf. Qanungo, Jats, 130.
73. Gupta, Panipat, 156.
74. D.C.
[p.212]: abandoned the Marathas on 2nd or 3rd August.75 That right now he finally departed to Ballamgarh has not been specified even by the above authority. The above scholars supplement their version with such sources76 (including SPD, XXI, 190, SPD, XXVII 258) which do not specifically place the Jat return under any of the suggested dates. On the contrary, certain hints in most of them suggest a later date, but this discrepancy has been somehow left un-explained.
The available sources need to be critically examined to ascertain the account and date of Suraj Mal's withdrawal. At the outset it is to be noted that overwhelming evidence of the nearly contemporary as well as important later works, the Sakhas and strong local tradition link his presence with such well-known events, which occurred after 2nd or 3rd August. Of the scores of the Marathi newsletters, only one (written from Bhau's camp) refers to Suraj Mal's departure, though only briefly and a little ambiguously too. It tells us that Suraj Mal and Imad got annoyed with, and left the Marathas and Mahipatrao Chitnis, Gangoba Tatya and Ramji Anand "have gone to bring them back". It merely refers to September, 1760, but contains no exact date of that month. Significantly, it does speak of Naro Shankar having been appointed the governor of Delhi77-an event which took place on 12th August, 1760.78 We have another fragmentary letter, written about 16th October, 1760, from Bhau's camp near Kunjpura. It makes the significant disclosure that Suraj Mal then was at Ballamgarh and that the Bharatpur troops under the command of his son(?) were shortly due to join Bhau. This letter also expresses the Maratha conviction, "The Jat is ours" and that there was no fear of supplies being obstructed on the Agra Mathura route.79
An entry of 24th September (1760), in Delhi Chronicle, whose contents are supported by Mirat-i-Ahmadi (a work written only eight months after Panipat) throws a good deal of light on our present issue. We are told that in order to assure themselves that Suraj Mal would not rejoin the Marathas, Ahmad Shah Abdali and Shuja sent robes of honour for that chief (at Ballamgarh) and sought intended assurances.80 These
75. Suraj Mal left according to H.R. Gupta (Panipat, 156) on 2nd while according to J.N. Sarkar (Fall,II, 255) on 3rd August, 1760
76. Of all the authorities quoted by these scholars, only Tarikh-i-Muzaffari (wr. in 1800) is not acessible to us. We, however, presume that had it contained their dates, K.R. Qanungo, who has used it, must have referred to it while contradicting (Jats, 138) Delhi Chronicle. He, however, follows Bhau Bakhar to place the Jat departure somewhere between 25th September to 25th October. This is equally doubtful.
77. S.P.D., XXVII, 258.
78. Sarkar, Fall, II, 266-267
79. Rajwade, I, 259.
80. D.C.; Mirat, 908; Also Gupta, Panipat, 138-139.
[p.213]: references belie Bhau Bakhar's claim that Suraj Mal left Bhau just before Bhau's departure for Kunjpura81 (i. e. in October, 1760) and also that of a popular Sakha which even makes the Jat go up to Kunjpura.82 In addition, they make an important hint about the period that had intervened since the Jat's return. Apparently, the above gesture of the Abdali emanated from his apprehension lest the Maratha efforts to placate the Jat should bear fruit. That it was not totally unfounded is borne out by Bhau's letter of 18th September. Therein he assures Govind Ballal that he could seek assistance from the Jat contingent (at Shikohabad) for threatening the homelands of the Abdali's Afghan allies.83 We know that Suraj Mal had returned annoyed. And Bhau could express such a conviction which suggests a comparative improvement in his relations with Suraj Mal around the middle of September. This leaves an impression that a reasonable period had elapsed since the Jat withdrawal which enabled the Marathas to re-open dialogue with the displeased Suraj Mal and that too in a manner as to cause concern to the Abdali. This, in turn, leads us to look further back, more appropriately to August, 1760, for the intended date, as is also suggested by a number of important sources.
Mir Ghulam Ali Azad (who wrote roughly two years later) relied upon the testimony of the Maratha negotiator with Shuja, who, being in the same camp, had the unique opportunity to know the actual facts. He places the Jat withdrawal after Bhau-Shuja negotiations and the appointment of Naro Shankar to the Capital's governorship (i e. 12th August, 1760).84 Tankh-i-Ibrahim Khan85 and Siyar accept this in toto, though the latter attributes the Jat departure primarily to that chiefs shock over Bhau's removal of the silver ceiling of the Diwan-i-Khas (6th August).86 So far as we are able to infer, the well-circumstanced eye-witness, Kashi Raj87 and Mirat-i-Ahmadi88 also place that event impliedly well after the ceiling episode. Ghulam Ali, whose informant was Rao Radha Kishan, a trusted follower of the Jat Raja says that the latter left following Bhau's exorbitant demand for money and his suspicious watch over the Jat Raja.89 As regards Shah Alam Nama,
81. Qanungo, Jats, 132.
82. The Sakha sung by Imaduddin and Party of Haryana. Its type script was sent to me by ex-M.P. Shri Jagdeo Singh Sidhanti of Delhi.
83. Rajwade, I, 244; also see its Introduction (by VK. Rajwade).
84. Amira, 105.
85. Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan in Elliot, VIII, 277-278.
86. Siyar, III, 385.
87. Kashi Raj as referred to by Duff. History of the Mahrathas (Oxford press: 1921), I, 520 footnote; also Owen, The Fall of the Mogul Empire. 247.
88. Mirat, 908.
89. Imad, 276.
[p.214]: although it does not connect the Jat alienation with any specific event, it all the same tends to put it quite a few days after the capture of the Delhi fort.90 Memoires des Jats also supports the inference that can be drawn from the above analysis. According to it, Suraj Mal came back when Bhau first thought (c. 17th August 1760)91 of proceeding northward (apparently to Kunjpura).92 All that the Bakhar and persistent tradition suggest is not correct but both these also agree with Suraj Mal still being with Bhau at that time. Thus, varied, weighty and overwhelming evidence leads us to place Suraj Mal's withdrawal from the Maratha camp sometime in the middle of August, 1760 rather than under the alleged date of the Delhi Chronicle. xx
90. Shah Alam Nama, 173.
91. The First clear mention of Bhau's resolve to go to Kunjpura is found in a letter of 2nd September, 1760. See Rajwade, I, 237. It is implied that the plan had been maturing in his mind for some time. Significantly we find him ordering Govind Ballal as early as 17th August, 1760, to send immediately 500 bullocks, which were needed for dragging the baggage, See Rajwade, I, 231. This would show that Bhau began to toy with Kunjpura project right from this time.
92. Memoires des Jats, 53; Tawarika-i-Hunud silently sidetracks the Panipat days.
XX. Rajpal Singh puts 20th August, 1760 for withdrawal on the evidence of Scindhias of Gwalior, II, letter no. 297 dated 20th August 1760, p, 217; also see Gupta, Panipat, 161-162 and Mirat-A-Ahmadi, 908, cited in Rise of the Jat Power, 127, 151, fn. 209.-Editor.